720 



PANAMA CANAL. 



miles through dangerous seas. It is hardly conceiv- 

 able that the same great power, which considers her- 

 self justified in taking these precautions lor the safety 

 of a remote colony on another continent, should object 

 to the United States adopting similar but tar less de- 

 monstrative measures for tlie protection of the dis- 

 tant shores of her own domain, for the drawing to- 

 gether of the extremes of the Union in still closer 

 bonds of interest and sympathy, and for holding, in 

 the quiet determination of an honorable self-defense, 

 the absolute control of the great water-way which 

 shall unite the two oceans, and which the United 

 States will always ii^ist upon tmiting as part of her 

 coast-line. If a hostile movement should at any time 

 be made against the Pacific coast, threatening clanger 

 to its people ami destruction to its property, the Gov- 

 ernment of the United States would feel that it had 

 been unfaithful to its duty and neglectful toward its 

 own citizens, it' it permitted itself to be bound by a 

 treaty which gave the same right through the canal 

 to a war-ship, bent on an errand of destruction, that 

 is reserved to its own navy, sailing for the defense of 

 our coast and the protection of the lives of our people. 

 And as England insists, by the might of her power, 

 that her enemies hi war shall strike her Indian pos- 

 sessions only by doubling the Cape of Good Hope, so 

 the Government of the United States will equally in- 

 sist that the interior, more speedy, and safer route of 

 the canal shall be reserved for ourselves, while our 

 enemies, if we shall ever be so unfortunate as to have 

 any, shall be remanded to the voyage around Cape 

 Horn. 



A consideration of controlling influence in this 

 question is the well-settled conviction on the part of 

 tnis Government that only by the United States exer- 

 cising supervision can the Isthmus canal be definite- 

 ly, and at all times, secured against the interference 

 and obstruction incident to war. A mere agreement 

 of neutrality, on paper, between the great powers of 

 Europe might prove ineffectual to preserve the canal 

 in time of hostilities. The first sound of a cannon in 

 a general European war would, in all probability, 

 nnnul the treaty of neutrality, and the strategic posi- 

 tion of the canal, commanding both oceans, might be 

 held by the first naval power that could seize it. If 

 this should be done, the United States would suffer 

 such grave inconvenience and loss in her domestic 

 commerce as would enforce the duty of a defensive and 

 protective war on her part, for the mere purpose of 

 earning that control which, in advance, she insists is 

 due to her position and demanded by her necessities. 

 I am not arguing or assuming that a general war, or 

 any war at all, is imminent in Europe, but it must 

 not be forgotten that within the past twenty-five years 

 all the great powers of Europe nave been engaged in 

 war most of them more than once. In only a single 

 instance in the past hundred years has the United 

 States exchanged a hostile shot with any European 

 power. It ia in the highest degree improbable that 

 for a hundred years to come even that experience will 

 be repeated. It consequently becomes evident that 

 the one conclusive mode of preserving any Isthmus 

 canal from the possible distraction and destruction 

 of war, is to place it under the control of that govern- 

 ment least likely to be engaged in war, and able, in 

 any and every event, to enforce the guardianship 

 which she will assume. For self-protection to her 

 own interests, therefore, the United States, in the 

 first instance, asserts her right to control the Isthmus 

 transit ; and, secondly, she offers by such control that 

 absolute neutralization of the canal", as respects Euro- 

 pean powers, which can in no other way be certainly 

 attained and lastingly assured. 



Another reason given for the modification 

 of the treaty was. that since 1850 other Eu- 

 ropean nations had extended their commercial 

 connections with South America, and an agree- 

 ment between the United States and Great 



Britain alone could no longer serve the pur- 

 pose originally contemplated. It was now 

 sought " not only to free the United States 

 from unequal and inequitable obligations to 

 Great Britain, but also to empower this Gov- 

 ernment to treat with all other nations seeking 

 a foothold on the Isthmus, on the same basis 

 of impartial justice and independence." The 

 modifications proposed were as follows: 



1. Every part of the treaty which forbids tbe 

 United States fortifying the canal and holding the 

 political control of it, in conjunction with the coun- 

 try in which it is situated, to be canceled. 



":.'. Every part of the treaty in which Great Britain 

 and the United States agree to make no acquisition of 

 territory in Central America to remain in full force. 

 As an original rropositipnj this Government would 

 not admit that Great Britain and the United States 

 should be put on the same basis, even negatively, 

 with respect to territorial acquisitions on the Ameri- 

 can Continent, and would be unwilling to establish 

 such a precedent without full explanation. But the 

 treaty contains that provision with respect to Central 

 America, and if the United States should seek its an- 

 nulment it might give rise to erroneous and mischiev- 

 ous apprehensions among a people with which this 

 Government desires to be on the most friendly terms. 

 The United States has taken special occasion t"o assure 

 the Spanish-American republics to the south of us 

 that we do not intend and do not desire to cross their 

 borders or in any way disturb their territorial integ- 

 rity, and we shall not willingly incur the risk of a 

 misunderstanding by annulling the clauses in the 

 Clayton-Bulwer treaty which forbid such a step with 

 Central America. Ihe acquisition of military and 

 naval stations necessary for the protection of the canal 

 and voluntarily ceded to the United States by the 

 Central American States is not to be regarded as a 

 violation of the provision contained in the foregoing. 



3. The United States will not object to maintaining 

 the clause looking to the establishment of a free port 

 at each end of whatever canal may be constructed, if 

 England desires it to be retained. 



4. The clause in which the two governments 

 agreed to make treaty stipulations for a joint protec- 

 torate of whatever railway or canal might be con- 

 structed at Tehuantepec or Panama has never been 

 perfected. No treaty stipulations for the proposed 

 end have been suggested by either party, although 

 citizens of the United States long since constructed a 

 railway at Panama, and are now engaged in the same 

 work at Tehuantepec. It is a fair presumption, in 

 the judgment of the President, that this provision 

 should be regarded as obsolete by the non-action and 

 common consent of the two governments. 



5. The clause defining tbe distance from either end 

 of the canal where, in time of war, captures might be 

 made by either belligerent on the higli seas, was left 

 incomplete and the distance was never determined. 

 In the judgment of the President, speaking in the 

 interest of peaceful commerce, this distance should bo 

 made as liberal as possible, and might with advantage, 

 as a question relating to the high seas and common 

 to all nations, be a matter of stipulation between the 

 great powers of the world. 



In conclusion, the Secretary said : 



In assuming, as a necessity, the political control of 

 whatever canal or canals may be constructed across 

 the Isthmus, the United States will act in entire har- 

 mony with the governments within whose terri- 

 tory the canals shall be located. Between the United 

 States and the other American republics there can be 

 no hostility, no jealousy, no rivalry, no distrust. This 

 Government entertains no design in connection with 

 this project for its own advantage, which is not also 

 for the equal or greater advantage of the country to 

 be directly and immediately affected. Nor does the 



