PERU, CIIILI, AND THE UNITED STATES. 



741 



. . . The United States can not refuse to recognize the 

 rights which the Chilian Government has acquired by 

 the successes of the war, and it may be that a cession 

 of territory will be a necessary price to be paid for 

 peace. It would seem to be injudicious for Peru to 

 declare that under no circumstances could the loss of 

 territory be accepted as the result of negotiation. The 

 great objects of the provisional authorities of Peru 

 would seem to be to secure the establishment of a 

 constitutional government, and, next, to succeed in the 

 opening of negotiations of oeace, without the declara- 

 tion of preliminary conditions as an ultimatum on 

 either side. It will be difficult perhaps to obtain tliia 

 fr 'in Chili, but, as the Chilian Government has dis- 

 tinctly repudiated the idea that this was a war of con- 

 quest, the Government of Peru may lairly claim the 

 opportunity to make propositions of indemnity and 

 guarantee "before submitting to a cession of territory. 

 A^ tar as the influence of the United States will go in 

 Chili, it will be exerted to induce the Chilian Govern- 

 ment to consent that the question of cession of the 

 territory should be the subject of negotiation, and not 

 the condition precedent upon which alone negotiation 

 shall commence. 



If you can aid the Government of Peru in securing 

 such a result, you will have rendered the service 

 whicli seems most pressing. Whether it is in the 

 power of the Peruvian Government to make any ar- 

 ran_'i'iiieiits at homo or abroad, singly or with the as- 

 sistance of friendly powers, which will furnish the 

 necessary indemnity or supply the required guaran- 

 tee, you will be better able to advise me after you 

 have reached your post. As you are aware, more than 

 one proposition has been submitted to the considera- 

 tion of this Government, looking to a friendly inter- 

 veiirion by which Peru might be enabled to meet the 

 conditions which would probably be imposed. Cir- 

 cum.^tanecs do not seem at present opportune for such 

 action ; but if, upon full knowledge of the condition 

 of Peru, you can inform this Government that Peru 

 can devise and carry into practical effect a plan by 

 which all the reasonable conditions of Chili can be met 

 without sacrificing the integrity of Peruvian territory, 

 the Government of the United States would be willing 

 to tender its good offices toward the execution of such 



linistcr at Santiago, 

 advised of the position which this Government as- 

 sumes toward all the parties to this lamentable con- 

 flict. . . . JAMES G. ELAINE. 

 III. 



DEPARTMENT OF STATB. I 

 WASHINGTON, June 1 o, IsSl. i 

 Jud*on Kilpatrii'n. Kij., etc. 



SIR: The unfortunate condition of the relations be- 

 t'.veen Chili and Peru make the mission upon the 

 duties of whicli you arc now entering one of grave rc- 

 sp.in-iibility and great delicacy. Difficult as would 1x3 

 any intervention of the United States under ordinary 

 circumstances, our position is further embarrassed by 

 the failure of the conference at Arica. undertaken at 

 our suggestion. It is evident from the protocols of 

 that conference that Chili was prepared to dictate and 

 jr it t<> discuss terms of peace, and that the arbitration 

 of the United States upon any questions of difference 

 with the allied powers of Peru and Bolivia was not 

 iMe and would not be acceptable by the Chilian 

 Government. Since that time the war DM <-li>.-i-d in 

 the complete success of Chili, and in what can scarcely 

 be considered less than the conquest nf Peru and Bo- 

 livia. . . . But I am sure the Chilian QownflMOt 

 will appreciate the natural and deep intcrot which the 

 United States feels in the termination of a e"iiiliti'>n 

 so calamitous in its consequence* to the bc-t in 

 of all the South American republics. It should also 

 know that, if at any time the interposition of the 

 good offices of this Government can contribute t<> tin- 

 restoration of friendly relations between the bcUiger- 

 ent powers, they will, upon proper intimation, bo 



promptly offered. While, therefore, no instructions 

 are given you to tender officially any advice to the 

 Government of Chili which is unsought, you will, "ti 

 such opportunity as may occur, govern your conduct 

 and representations by the considerations to which I 

 shall now call your attention. 



Without enuring upon any discussion as to the 

 - >f the late war between Chili on the one side 

 and Peru and Bolivia on the other, this Government 

 recognizes the ri^ht which the successful conduct of 

 that war has conferred upon Chili, and in doing so I 

 will not undertake to estimate the extent to which the 

 Chilian Government has the right to carry its calcula- 

 tion of the indemnities to which it is entitled, nor the 

 security for the future which its intere.-ts may >eem to 

 require. But, if the Chilian Government, a> its rep- 

 resentatives have declared, seeks only a guarante- !' 

 future peace, it would seem natural tliat Peru and Bo- 

 livia should be allowed to offer such indemnity and 

 guarantee before the annexation of territory, wh'ieh is 

 the right of conque.-tj is insisted upon. If these pow- 

 ers fan to offer what is a reasonably sufficient indcm- 

 nity and guarantee, then it becomes a fair subject of 

 consideration whether such territory may not be ex- 

 acted as the necessary price of peace. But at the con- 

 clusion of a war, avowedly not of conquest but for the 

 solution of differences which diplomacy had failed to 

 settle, to make the acquisition of territory a tine qua 

 non of peace, is calculated to cast suspicion on the 

 professions with which war was originally declared. 

 It may very well be that at the termination of such a 

 contest the changed condition and relation of all the 

 parties to it may make readjustment of boundaries nr 

 territorial changes wise as well as necessary ; but this, 

 where the war is not one of conquest, should be tho 

 result of negotiation and not the absolute preliminary 

 condition on wliich alone the victor consents to nego- 

 tiate. At this day, when the right of the people to 

 govern themselves^ the fundamental basis of repub- 

 lican institutions is so widely recognized, there is 

 nothing more difficult or mote dangerous than the 

 forced transfer of territory, earning with it an indig- 

 nant and hostile population, and nothing but a neces- 

 sity, proved before tho world, can ju>tify it. It is 

 not a case in which tho power desiring tho territory 

 can be accepted as a safe or impartial judge. 



While the United States Government docs not pre- 

 tend to express an opinion whether or not such au 

 annexation of territory i> a necessary consequence <!' 

 this war, it believes tfiat it would be more honorable 

 to the Chilian Government, more conducive to the se- 

 curity of a permanent peace, and more in consonance 

 with those principles which lire professed by all the 

 republics or America that such territorial changes 

 should be avoided as far as possible ; that they should 

 never bo tho result of mere force, but, if necessary, 

 should bo decided and tempered by full and equal dis- 

 cussion between all the powers whose people and 

 whose national inten-ts are involve.!. At the present 

 moment the completeness of the victory of Chili .-eon it 

 to render such a diplomatic discussion impossible. 

 The result of the conflict has been not only the defeat 

 of the allied armies, but the dissolution or all respon- 

 sible government in Peru. Its soil is occupied, the 

 collection of its revenues tran-lcrrv<l t the conqueror, 

 and iN executive, legislative, und judicial functions STO 

 in abeyance. It con neither enforce order within nor 

 aurc' peace without. An effort, iili.l apparently a 

 very earnest and honest one. has been made to 

 a pro visional government winch shall gradually restore 

 or-ler and the reign of law. But it is obvious that, for 

 such a government to succeed in obtaining the confi- 

 dence, cither of iu own people or of foreign powers, 

 it nr.i-t !>e allow e.l u l'm-<Iom and force of action which 

 can not be exercised while Chili holds absolute posset* 

 sion and governs bv military authority. Thi 

 ernment, therefore, "has been glad to learn fr-m its 

 Minister in Chili, whom you succeed^ that the Chilian 

 authorities liave decided to give tbcir support to the 

 efforts of Sefior Calderon to establish on a steady foot- 



