746 



PERU, CHILI, AND THE UNITED STATES. 



power of Chili to supply them, and the reasonable 

 exercise of that right, however much its necessity 

 may be regretted, is not ground of legitimate complaint 

 on the part of other powers. 



But this Government feels that the exercise of the 

 right of absolute conquest is dangerous to the best 

 interests of all the republics of this continent : that 

 from it are certain t<> spring other wars and political 

 disturbances, and that it imposes even upon the con- 

 queror burdens which are scarcely compensated by the 

 apparent increase of strength which it gives. This 

 Government also holds that between two independent 

 nations, hostilities do not, from the mere existence of 

 war, confer the right of conquest until the failure to 

 furnish the indemnity and guarantee which can be 

 rightfully demanded. The United States maintains, 

 therefore, that Peru has the right to demand that an 

 opportunity should be allowed her to find such in- 

 demnity and guarantee. Nor can this Government 

 admit that a cession of territory can be properly ex- 

 acted far exceeding in value the amplest estimate of a 

 reasonable indemnity. Already, by force of its occu- 

 pation^ the Chilian Government has collected great 

 sums Irom Peru, and it has been openly and officially 

 asserted in the Chilian Congress that these military 

 impositions have furnished a surplus beyond the cost 

 of maintaining its armies in that occupation. The 

 annexation of Tarapaca, which, under proper admin- 

 istration, would produce annually a sum sufficient to 

 pay a large indemnity, seems to us to be not consistent 

 with the execution of justice. 



The practical prohibition of the formation of a stable 

 Government in Peru, and the absolute appropriation 

 of its most valuable territory, is simply the extinction 

 of a state which has formed part of the system of 

 republics on this continent, honorable in the traditions 

 and illustrations of its past history, and rich in the 

 resources for future progress. The United States, with 

 which Peru has for many years maintained the most 

 cordial relations, has the right to feel and express a 

 deep interest in its distressed condition, and while, 

 with equal friendliness to Chili, we will not interpose 

 to deprive her of the fair advantages of military suc- 

 cess, nor put any obstacle to the attainment of future 

 security, we can not regard with unconcern the de- 

 struction of Peruvian nationalitv. If our good offices 

 are rejected, and this policy of the disruption of an 

 independent state be persisted in, this Government 

 will consider itself discharged from any further obli- 

 gation to be influenced in its action by the position 

 which Chili has assumed, and will hold itseli free to 

 appeal to the other republics of this continent to join 

 it in an effort to avert consequences which can not 

 be confined to Chili and Peru, but which threaten 

 with cxtremest danger the political institutions, the 

 peaceful progress, and the liberal civilization of all 

 America. 



If, however, none of these embarrassing obstacles 

 intervene, and Chili receives in a friendly spirit the 

 representatives of the United States, it will DC your 

 purpose, first, to concert such measures as will enable 

 Peru to establish a regular government and initiate 

 negotiations; second, to induce Chili to consent to 

 such negotiations without cession of territory as a 

 condition precedent ; third, to impress upon Chili that 

 in such negotiations she ought to allow Peru a fair 

 opportunity to provide for a reasonable indemnity, 

 and in this connection to let it be understood that the 

 United States would consider the imposition of an ex- 

 travagant indemnity, so as to make the cession of 

 territory necessary in satisfaction, as more than ia 

 justified by the actual cost of war and as a solution 

 threatening renewed difficulties between the two coun- 

 tries. As it is possible that some time will elapse 

 before the completion of all arrangements necessary 

 for a final negotiation, this Government would sug- 

 gest a temporary convention, which, representing the 

 spirit of our friendly representations, would bring 

 Peru and Chili into amicable conference and provide 

 for a meeting of plenipotentiaries to negotiate a per- 



manent treaty of peace. If negotiations be assured, 

 the ability of Peru to furnish the indemnity will be 

 a matter of direct interest. On this subject we have 

 no information upon which definite instructions can 

 now be based. While you will carefully abstain from 

 any interposition in this connection, you will examine 

 and report to the department promptly any plans 

 which may be suggested. You will not indicate any 

 wish that the Government of the United States shall 

 act as umpire in the adjudication between the contend- 

 ing powers. Should an invitation to that effect be 

 extended, you will communicate by telegraph for in- 

 structions. The single and simple "desire of this Gov- 

 ernment is to see a just and honorable peace at the 

 earliest day practicable, and if any other American 

 Government can more effectively aid in producing 

 this auspicious result, the United States will cordially 

 sustain it, and lend such co-operation as the circum- 

 stances may demand. I am, etc., 



JAMES G. ELAINE. 



Minister Kilpatrick wrote to Secretary Elaine 

 under date of Santiago, December 2, 1881, stat- 

 ing that the Chilian Government had promised 

 that it would not demand a cession of territory 

 as an absolute condition of peace, and that it 

 would endeavor to build up and strengthen the 

 Calderon Government in Peru. These prom- 

 ises, General Kilpatrick intimated, would have 

 been fulfilled but for the representations made 

 by Minister Hurlbut of the attitude of the 

 United States and bad faith on the part of Cal- 

 deron. The coming of the special mission, it 

 is stated, creates considerable excitement in 

 Chili, and the alleged support by the United 

 States of the Peruvian Company scheme greatly 

 intensifies it. On December 2, 1881, Secretary 

 Elaine wrote as follows to Mr. Trescot : 



SIB : It is not impossible that before the close of the 

 special mission, instructions for which have been al- 

 ready furnished you, it may be deemed advisable that, 

 at its close, you should return to the United States by 

 way of the Argentine Confederation and Brazil. Posi- 

 tive instructions may be sent you to this effect before 

 your mission closes, but at present my purpose is to ad- 

 vise you of such possible contingency, and to add that, 

 if at the close of the special mission you should decide 

 that a return home by the way of Buenos Ayres and 

 Eio do Janeiro was advisable, you are hereby author- 

 ized, without waiting for such instructionSj to return 

 home by that way. Should you do so, you will, in your 

 communications with the representatives of the Gov- 

 ernments of Brazil and the Argentine Confederation, 

 impress upon them the advantages which would result 

 from a full and frank conference between all the repub- 

 lics of North and South America. By the time you can 

 reach these points the opinions of this Government on 

 this subject will have been formally submitted to them, 

 and you will have the opportunity to enforce these 

 views, and to direct their attention to the importance 

 of the proposed congress. If you will telegraph the 

 probable time of your arrival at Buenos Ayres, a vessel 

 of the United States will meet you at that place. 



On Januarys, 1882, Secretary Frelinghuysen 

 instructed Mr. Trescot by telegraph to exert 

 his influence pacifically, and to avoid all issues 

 which might lead to his withdrawing from his 

 post in Chili. 



On the next day (January 4th) the Secretary 

 telegraphed to Mr. Trescot that it was the wish 

 of the President that our friendly offices should 

 be extended impartially to both republics (Chili 

 and Peru) ; that a pacific influence should be 

 exerted, and every issue which might lead to 



