840 



TURKEY. 



With the assistance of the energetic Prussian 

 agent, Wettendorf, the Turkish Government, by 

 stripping the Ottoman subjects of their last 

 possessions and collecting the taxes for 1881 

 and 1882 in advance, had, by the beginning of 

 1881, scraped together tbe means of maintain- 

 ing an effective army of 100,000 men. The 

 Porte pursued its old policy in the Greek 

 boundary question of temporizing and delay- 

 ing, hoping that the conflicting interests of the 

 great powers would again break up the Eu- 

 ropean concert. The Sultan differed greatly, 

 in his strong will and active mind, from his 

 predecessors, and was prepared to defend, with 

 Turkish obstinacy and Mohammedan fanati- 

 cism, the Ottoman power in Europe. The old 

 ally of the Sultan, Great Britain, seemed ready 

 to give the signal for Greece to seize Epirus 

 and Thessaly, for the Albanians to throw off 

 the Turkish yoke, and for the Bulgarians to de- 

 scend upon Roumelia. The Austro-German 

 alliance was alone interested in preserving the 

 status quo. The Gambettists, in France, were 

 disposed to seize the opportunity which the 

 general conflagration would afford, for again ac- 

 quiring for their country a controlling position 

 in the councils of Europe. The majority of the 

 French Cabinet, on the other hand, were will- 

 ing to listen to the counsels of Germany, and 

 when Bismarck assured them that the French 

 occupation of Tunis would be approved,with or 

 without the leave of England, France came for- 

 ward as the spokesman of the powers desirous 

 of maintaining the status quo in the singularly 

 phrased note of Barthelemy Saint -Hilaire, 

 dated December 24, 1880. In this document the 

 dangers threatening the peace of Europe were 

 depicted in somber colors. Greece, in demand- 

 ing the fulfillment of the Berlin protocol, was 

 hlamed for frivolously attempting to provoke a 

 European war without having any just basis 

 for her demands, and the cue was given to 

 Turkey to continue her refusals, by describing 

 the terms of the protocol as simply the advice 

 of the powers to Turkey, and not an arbitra- 

 tion of the question. When the French Gov- 

 ernment reminded the English Cabinet of the 

 promised acquiescence of their predecessors in 

 the annexation of Tunis, the English ministers 

 sought to involve the French in a difficulty 

 with the Porte, by declaring that Tunis stood 

 under the suzerainty of the Sultan. 



The remedy propos3d by the French Minis- 

 ter of Foreign Affairs, for the dangers of the 

 situation, was a court of arbitration. The 

 Greeks refused to submit their claims a second 

 time to arbitration, and made preparations os- 

 tentatiously for the invasion of Epirus and 

 Thessaly, at the end of March. Turkey forti- 

 fied Arta, Yanina, and the historical passes 

 which lead from Greece into the Thessalian 

 plain, sank torpedoes in the Dardanelles strait, 

 and called the redifs to their colors, but with- 

 held from hostilities, although able to crush 

 the presumptuous Greeks. Both were in the 

 hands of Europe, but, while Greece was seek- 



ing to obtain a better settlement by threats of 

 war and a display of national spirit and mili- 

 tary ardor, Turkey took the strong defensive 

 ground left open to her by the French note, 

 and expressed a willingness to make conces- 

 sions in order to preserve peace and satisfy 

 Europe. A compromise had already been of- 

 fered by the Porte, in the note of October 3, 

 1880, in explicit terms. 



A circular note was sent out by Assim Pasha 

 on the 14th of January, in which the six signa- 

 tory powers were invited, in view of the dan- 

 gers to the peace of Europe and the critical 

 relations between Turkey and Greece, result- 

 ing from the precipitate armament of the 

 Greeks, to authorize their representatives in 

 Constantinople to confer with the Sublime 

 Porte on the question. The proposal was ac- 

 cepted by the powers, and the conference be- 

 tween the embassadors and the ministers of 

 the Porte resulted in an arrangement which 

 was laid before the Greek Government on the 

 8th of April. The Greeks accepted this very ad- 

 vantageous settlement under protest, and with 

 the threat that they would redeem the rest of 

 the territory to which they laid claim at the first 

 opportunity. The powers declared that they 

 would assist in carrying out the stipulations of 

 the convention, and make it their own affair 

 that the Porte should not evade the agreement. 

 The districts of Larissa, Volo, and Trikhala, in 

 Thessaly, and Arta and Punta in Epirus, were 

 ceded to Greece. The territory comprised 265 

 square miles, including a great part of the 

 fertile plains of Thessaly, and contained 388,- 

 000 inhabitants, among them 48,000 Moham- 

 medans. The evacuation took place by zones, 

 and was concluded by the transfer of Volo on 

 November 14th. Military commissioners of 

 the powers supervised the operations. A dis- 

 pute occurred at the last moment concerning 

 the stipulation that the boundary should fol- 

 low the water-partings, which the commission- 

 ers took to mean the crest of the mountains, 

 but which the Porte insisted on having con- 

 strued literally. (For particulars of the nego- 

 tiations, see GREECE.) 



The Tunisian affair, and afterward the Egyp- 

 tian difficulty, gave the Sultan occasion to make 

 an empty protest of his nominal sovereignty in 

 those lost regencies. This course was favored 

 by England for reasons of policy. Since the 

 time of Lord Palmerston the Government of 

 England, when in Liberal hands, has been ac- 

 customed to shield its interests in North Africa 

 against the aggressions of other powers behind 

 the fiction of the suzerainty of the Sultan. 

 Abdul-Hamid, however, in asserting his legal 

 rights as lord paramount, though supported 

 by Lord Granville, who was a pupil of Palm- 

 erston in diplomacy, was actuated by the Pan- 

 islamic aspirations to which his mind was doubly 

 susceptible through his religious character and 

 his personal ambition. A formal correspond- 

 ence was carried on with France regarding her 

 interference in Tunis, and the undeniable legal 



