LABOR, MOVEMENTS OF. 



LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL. 457 



their attorney that the character of the appli- 

 cation, as disclosed in the affidavits of the 

 freight-handlers, was simply that the respond- 

 ent companies should not be permitted to select 

 their own employes at such reasonable com- 

 pensation as might be agreed upon, but " should 

 be compelled at the pressure of a judicial man- 

 date to employ a certain class of men at a rate 

 of compensation arbitrarily dictated by them- 

 selves. . . . On what principle of justice, free- 

 dom, or sound policy can a court of justice 

 lend itself to the work of coercing one class 

 of persons to enter into contracts with another 

 class on terms dictated by the latter? " ^More- 

 over, the court had no right to exercise its dis- 

 cretion except upon the ground that the de- 

 mand was reasonable and just. Now, it no- 

 where appeared in the petition and affidavits 

 that the compensation the freight -handlers 

 were already receiving was not a fair and 

 proper one, or whether their demand was rea- 

 sonable and just, or exorbitant and unjust. " Is 

 it discreet or practicable for the court to under- 

 take to regulate the employment of men by 

 carriers, whether individuals or corporations? " 

 The respondents also endeavored to show that 

 action by mandamus was not proper, but that 

 the right course lay in suits by aggrieved parties 

 for damages. 



The court in chambers decided, through a 

 single justice, July 28th, refusing the applica- 

 tion for writs of mandamus. It held that the 

 court had not the power to prescribe a scale of 

 wages ; that while the writ of mandamus could 

 issue to compel the exercise and discharge ot 

 those duties which belonged to the State or 

 Government and were conferred upon the re- 

 spondent by the State (such as to maintain and 

 operate the road regularly, to build bridges 

 across streams so as not to interfere with navi- 

 gation, to take freight to the place of delivery, 

 if on its line, etc.), it could not issue a manda- 

 mus to a common carrier to exercise his rights 

 as such; for the right to become a common 

 carrier did not emanate from the Government, 

 but was universal. The refusal of a common 

 carrier to transport freight was a private wrong 

 redressible through suit by the person ag- 

 grieved, and not such a public wrong as would 

 authorize a suit by and on the part of the 

 State. The neglect or refusal of a railroad 

 corporation to receive and transport freight 

 tendered to it by citizens of the State was of 

 this character, and remediable in this way. 

 Furthermore, "the writ of mandamus, when 

 it is issued, must clearly and distinctly state 

 the act or duties which are by it commanded 

 to be performed, so that the party to whom it 

 is addressed may distinctly understand what 

 he is to do. If he fails or neglects to perform, 

 an attachment will issue against him to the 

 end that he may be adjudged in contempt of 

 the process of the court. It is not in the power 

 of the court to look into the future and deter- 

 mine the kinds or quantities of freight that 

 will hereafter be presented for transportation, 



and by an order specify how and in what man- 

 ner the same shall be carried, or what kinds 

 shall take preference." The court, therefore, 

 quashed the writ. Before this decision was 

 given, the railroad companies had secured full 

 forces of men at their stations, most of their 

 old laborers having returned, and the strike 

 had failed. The decision of the court in cham- 

 bers was reversed in January, 1883, by the 

 same court in general term. 



STRIKE OF COAL-MINERS. A strike was be- 

 gun in March in the bituminous-coal mines of 

 Western Pennsylvania and Ohio. The pro- 

 prietors employed foreigners and colored men 

 to take the places of their disaffected work- 

 men. The Miners' Association then directed a 

 general strike, but afterward modified its order 

 so as to limit its bearing to the pits of operators 

 who were filling contracts for mines whose 

 men were on strike, and to those which were 

 supplying coal-yards in Pittsburg. .A policy 

 of passive resistance against the employment 

 of colored miners was persisted in, and con- 

 certed efforts were made to induce men of this 

 class working as substitutes for men on strike 

 to desist. This strike was encouraged by the 

 Knights of Labor, and continued through most 

 of the summer. 



LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL. During the 

 session beginning in October, 1882, several 

 cases involving important questions of con- 

 stitutional law were decided by the Supremo 

 Court of the United States. 



THE KU-KLUX LAW. In the case of the 

 United States against Harris the court set aside 

 as unconstitutional what has been known as 

 the " Ku-klux law." This law was passed by 

 Congress in 1871, and now appears as section 

 5,519 of the Revised Statutes of the United 

 States. It is as follows: 



If two or more persons in any State or Territory 

 conspire or go in disguise upon the highway or on the 

 premises of another, for the purpose of depriving 

 either directly or indirectly any person or class of per- 

 sons of the equal protection of the laws or of equal 

 privileges or immunities under the laws, or for the 

 purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted 

 authorities of any State or Territory from giving or 

 securing to all persons within such State or Territory 

 the equal protection of the laws, each of said persons 

 shall be punished by a fine of not less than $500 nor 

 more than $5,000, or by imprisonment, with or without 

 hard labor, not less than six months nor more than 

 six years, or by both such fine and imprisonment. 



Under this law one R. G. Harris and nine- 

 teen others were indicted and arraigned in the 

 United States Circuit Court for the Western 

 District of Tennessee for conspiring to commit 

 violence upon certain negroes who had been 

 arrested for a criminal offense, and were in 

 the custody of the sheriff. The defense raised 

 the objection that the act of Congress under 

 which the prisoners were indicted was uncon- 

 stitutional. In order to determine this ques- 

 tion the court considered four clauses of the 

 Federal Constitution, namely, section 2 of 

 Article IV of the original Constitution, and the 

 thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amend- 



