458 



LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL. 



ments. Taking these up in inverse order, 

 Justice Woods, who delivered the opinion, said 

 that the fifteenth amendment simply secures 

 to all citizens of the United States the right to 

 vote, and protects that right against all hostile 

 legislation on account of race, color, or previ- 

 ous condition of servitude. This gave to Con- 

 gress no power to pass the law embodied in sec- 

 tion 5,519 of the Kevised Statutes. Nor was 

 such power found in the fourteenth amend- 

 ment, which declares that "no State shall 

 make or enforce any law which shall abridge 

 the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 

 United States, nor shall any State deprive any 

 person of life, liberty, or property without due 

 process of law, nor deny to any person within 

 its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 

 laws. 1 ' This amendment, as the Court held in 

 Virginia against Rives, 100 United States Be- 

 ports, 313, has reference to State action exclu- 

 sively, and not to any action of private persons. 

 After citing this case and the United States 

 against Cruikshank, 92 United States Eeports, 

 542, Justice Woods said : 



These authorities show exclusively that the legisla- 

 tion under consideration finds no warrant for its en- 

 actment in the fourteenth amendment. 



The language of the amendment does not leave this 

 subject in doubt. When the State has been guilty of 

 no violation of its provisions; when it has not made 

 or enforced any law abridging the privileges or immu- 

 nities of citizens of the United States ; when no one 

 of its departments has deprived any person of life, 

 liberty, or property without due process of law, or 

 denied to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 

 protection of the laws ; when, on the contrary, the laws 

 of the State, as enacted by its legislative, and con- 

 strued by its judicial, and administered by its execu- 

 tive departments, recognize and protect the rights of 

 all persons, the amendment imposes no duty and con- 

 fers no power upon Congress. 



Section 5,519 of the Kevised Statutes is not limited 

 to take eifect only in case the State shall abridge ^he 

 privileges or immunilies of citizens of the United 

 States,' or deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop- 

 erty without due process of law, or deny to any person 

 the equal protection of the laws. It applies, no mat- 

 ter how well the State may have performed its duty. 

 Under it private persons are liable to punishment for 

 conspiring to deprive any one of the equal protection 

 of the laws enacted by the State. 



In the indictment in this case, for instance, which 

 would be a good indictment under the law if the law 

 itself were valid, there is no intimation that the State 

 of Tennessee has passed any law or done any act for- 

 bidden by the fourteenth amendment. On the con- 

 trary, the gravamen of the charge against the accused 

 is that they conspired to deprive certain citizens of the 

 United States and of the State of Tennessee of the 

 equal protection accorded them by the laws of Ten- 



As, therefore, the section of the law under consid- 

 eration is directed exclusively against the action of 

 private persons, without reference to the laws of the 

 States or their administration by the officers of the 

 State, we are clear in the opinion that it is not war- 

 ranted by any clause in the fouiteenth amendment to 

 the Constitution. 



Coming to the thirteenth amendment, the 

 Court said that it is clear that this amend- 

 ment, besides abolishing forever slavery in the 

 United States, gives power to Congress to pro- 

 tect all persons within the jurisdiction of the 



United States from being in any way subjected 

 to slavery or involuntary servitude, except as 

 a punishment for crime, and in the enjoyment 

 of that freedom which it was the object of 

 the amendment to secure. kt Congress has, by 

 virtue of this amendment, exacted that all 

 persons within the jurisdiction of the United 

 States shall have the same right in every State 

 and Territory to make and enforce contracts, 

 to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the 

 full and equal benefit of all laws and proceed- 

 ings for the security of persons and property 

 as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be 

 subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, 

 taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and 

 no other." The opinion then proceeds as fol- 

 lows : 



But the question with which we have to deal is, Does 

 the thirteenth amendment warrant the enactment of 

 section 5,519 of the Eevised Statutes? We are of 

 opinion that it does not. Our conclusion is based on 

 the fact that the provisions of that section are broader 

 than the thirteenth amendment would justify. Under 

 that section it would be an offense for two or more 

 white persons to conspire, etc., for the purpose of de- 

 priving another white person of the equal protection 

 of the laws. It would be an offense for two or more 

 colored persons, enfranchised slaves, to conspire with 

 the same purpose against a white citizen or against 

 another colored citizen who had never been a slave. 

 Even if the amendment is held to be directed against 

 the action of private individuals, as well as against 

 the action of the States and United States, the law 

 under consideration covers cases both within and 

 without the provisions of the amendment. It covers 

 any conspiracy between two free white men against 

 another free white man to deprive the latter of any 

 right accorded him by the laws of the State or of the 

 United States. A law under which two or more free 

 white private citizens could be punished for conspir- 

 ing or going in disguise for the purpose of depriving 

 another free white citizen of a right accorded by the 

 law of the State to all classes of persons, as, for in- 

 stance, the right to make a contract, bring a suit, or 

 give evidence, clearly can not be authonzed by the 

 amendment which simply prohibits slavery and invol- 

 untary servitude. 



Those provisions of the law, which are broader than 

 is warranted by the article of the Constitution by 

 which they are supposed to be authorized, can not be 

 sustained. 



There is another view which strengthens this con- 

 clusion. If Congress has constitutional authority 

 under the thirteenth amendment to punish a conspir- 

 acy between two persons to do an unlawful act, it can 

 punish the act itself, whether done by one or more 

 persons. 



A private person can not make constitutions or laws, 

 nor can he with authority construe them, nor can he 

 administer or execute them. The only way, therefore, 

 in which one private person can deprive another of 

 the equal protection of the laws is by the commission 

 of some offense against the laws which protect the 

 rights of persons, as by theft, burglary, arson, libel, 

 assault, or murder. If, therefore, we hold that sec- 

 tion 5,519 is warranted by the thirteenth amendment, 

 we should, -by virtue of that amendment, accord to 

 Congress the power to punish every crime by which 

 the right of any person to life, property, or reputa- 

 tion is invaded. Thus, under a provision of the 

 Constitution which simply abolished slavery and in- 

 voluntary servitude, we should, with few exceptions, 

 invest Congress with power over the whole catalogue 

 of crimes. A construction of the amendment which 

 leads to such a result is clearly unsound. 



The Court concluded by saying that there is 



