LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL. 



465 



ceive of equal protection under any system of laws 

 where arbitrary and unequal taxation is permissible ; 

 where different persons may be taxed on their prop- 

 erty of the same kind, similarly situated, at different 

 rates ; where, for instance, one may be taxed at 1 per 

 cent on the value of his property, another at 2 or 5 

 per cent, or where one may be thus taxed according 

 to his color, because he is white, or black, or brown, 

 or yellow, or according to any other rule than that of 

 a fixed rate proportionate to the value of his property. 



The Court then proceeded to consider the 

 question whether a corporation can be con- 

 sidered a person within the meaning of the 

 fourteenth amendment so as to be entitled 

 with respect to its property to the equal pro- 

 tection of the laws. It was conceded that the 

 amendment had its origin in a purpose to se- 

 cure colored persons whom it made citizens in 

 the full enjoyment of their freedom and civil 

 rights. 



But (said Justice Field) the generality of the lan- 

 guage used extends the protection of its provisions to 

 persons of every race and condition against discrimi- 

 nating and hostile State action of any kind. Its effect, 

 in preserving free institutions and preventing harsh 

 and oppressive State legislation, can hardly be over- 

 stated. When burdens are placed^ upon particular 

 classes or individuals, while the majority of the peo- 

 ple are exempted, little heed may be paid to the com- 

 plaints of those affected. Oppression thus becomes 

 possible and lasting. But a burdensome law, operat- 

 ing equally upon all, will soon create a movement for 

 its repeal. With the amendment enforced, a bad or 

 an oppressive State law will not long be left on any 

 statute-book. 



The argument that a limitation must be given to 

 the scope of this amendment, because of the circum- 

 stances of its origin, is without force. Its authors, 

 seeing how possible it was for the States to oppress, 

 without relief from the Federal Government, placed 

 in the Constitution an interdict upon their action, 

 which makes lasting oppression of any kind by them 

 under the form of law impossible. 



The amendment prohibiting slavery and involuntary 

 servitude, except as a punishment tor crime, had its 

 origin in the previous existence of African slavery. 

 But the generality of its language makes its prohibi- 

 tion apply to slavery of white men as well as that ot 

 black men ; and also to serfage, vassalage, villanage, 

 peonage, and every other form of compulsory labor to 

 minister to the pleasure, caprice, vanity, or power of 

 others. 



Quoting from the opinion of Chief-Justice 

 Marshall, in the Dartmouth College case, in 

 which the latter laid down the principle that 

 " the case being within the words of the rule, 

 must be within its operation likewise, unless 

 there be something in the literal construction 

 so obviously absurd or mischievous, or repug- 

 nant to the general spirit of the instrument, as 

 to justify those who expound the Constitution 

 in making it an exception," Justice Field pro- 

 ceeded as follows : 



Following that authority, we can not adopt the nar- 

 row view for which counsel contend, and limit the ap- 

 plication of the prohibition of the fourteenth amend- 

 ment to legislation touching members of the enfran- 

 chised race. It has a much broader operation. It 

 does not, indeed, place any limit upon the subjects in 

 reference to which the States may legislate. It does 

 not interfere with their police power. Upon every 

 matter upon which, previously to its adoption, they 

 could act, they may still act. They can legislate now, 

 as they always could, to promote the health, good 

 VOL. xxii. 30 A 



order, and peace of the community, to develop their 

 resources, increase their industries, and advance their 

 prosperity ; but it does require that in all such legis- 

 lation, hostile and partial discrimination against any 

 class or person shall be avoided ; that the States shall 

 impose no greater burdens upon any one than upon 

 others of the community under like circumstances, 

 nor deprive any one of rights which others similarly 

 situated are allowed to enjoy. It forbids the State to 

 lay its hand more heavily 'upon one than upon another 

 under like conditions. It stands in the Constitution 

 as a perpetual shield against all unequal and partial 

 legislation by the States, and the injustice which fol- 

 lows from it, whether directed against the most hum- 

 ble or the most powerful ; against the despised laborer 

 from China, or the envied master of millions. . . . 

 Private corporations are, it is true, artificial persons, 

 but with the sole exception of a [municipal] corpora- 

 tion, with which we are not concerned, they consist 

 of aggregations of individuals united for some legiti- 

 mate business. ... It would be a most singular re- 

 sultj if a constitutional provision intended for the pro- 

 tection of every person against partial and discrimi- 

 nating legislation by the States, should cease to exert 

 such protection the moment the person becomes a 

 member of a corporation. We cannot accept such a 

 conclusion. On the contrary, we think that it is well 

 established by numerous adjudications of the Supreme 

 Court of the United States, and of the several States, 

 that whenever a provision of the Constitution, or of a 

 law, guarantees to persons the enjoyment of property, 

 or affords to them means for its protection, or pro- 

 hibits legislation injuriously affecting it, the benefits 

 of the provision extend to corporations, and that the 

 courts will always look beyond the name of the arti- 

 ficial being to the individuals whom it represents. 



After citing the fifth amendment to the Con- 

 stitution, which declares among other things 

 that "no person shall be compelled in any 

 criminal case to be a witness against himself, 

 nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 

 without due process of law ; nor shall private 

 property be taken for public use without just 

 compensation," Justice Field said: 



From the nature of the prohibitions in this amend- 

 ment, it would seem, with the exception of the last 

 one, as though they could apply only to natural per- 

 sons. No others can be witnesses : no others can be 

 twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, or compelled to 

 be witnesses against themselves ; and, therefore, it 

 might be said with much force that the word person 

 there used in connection with the prohibition against 

 the deprivation of life, liberty, and property without 

 due process of law, is in like manner limited to a 

 natural person. But such has not been the construc- 

 tion of the courts. A similar provision is found in 

 nearly all of the State Constitutions ; and everywhere 

 and at all times, and in all courts, it has been held, 

 either by tacit assent or express adjudication, to ex- 

 tend, so far as their property is concerned, to corpo- 

 rations. And this has been because the property of 

 a corporation is in fact the property of the corporators. 

 To deprive the corporation of its property, or to bur- 

 den it, is in fact to deprive the corporators of their 

 property or to lessen its value. Their interest, undi- 

 vided though it be. and constituting only a right during 

 the continuance of the corporation to participate in its 

 dividends, and on its dissolution to receive a propor- 

 tionate share of its assets, has an appreciable value, 

 and is property in a commercial sense ; and whatever 

 affects the property of the corporation necessarily 

 affects the commercial value of their interest. If, for 

 example, to take the illustration given by counsel, a 

 corporation created for banking purposes acquires 

 land, notes, stocks, bonds, and money, no stockholder 

 can claim that he owns any particular item of this 

 property, but he owns an interest in the whole of it, 



