NON-INTERVENTION AMONG NATIONS, THE PRINCIPLE OF. 619 



nance to the rational and social nature, and 

 that, consequently, such actions are either for- 

 bidden or enjoined by God, the Author of Na- 

 ture. Actions which are the subject of this 

 exertion of reason are in themselves lawful or 

 unlawful, and are, therefore, as such, necessa- 

 rily commanded or prohibited by God.* 



These views are in conformity with the 

 philosophy of the period in which Grotius 

 lived. They recognize an arrangement and 

 order in all things, of which God is the au- 

 thor, and which is designed to be the immuta- 

 ble order of the universe. "Within the province 

 of human actions justice is the rule which se- 

 cures the observance by them of that order, 

 and injustice expresses the departure from it, 

 and is a violation of the rule. Thus he finds 

 the source or foundation of the rules which 

 should govern the relations of nations to each 

 other to be a part of that basis upon which 

 rests the superstructure of all human actions, 

 and that the authority for these rules is none 

 other than that of the Creator and Author of 

 all things. 



But the application of this law of nature, as 

 it is, related to man as an individual, and also 

 to men united in one common society, soon led 

 to a distinction in his views. Thus "Wheaton 

 observes : " The term natural law is here evi- 

 dently used for those rules of justice which 

 ought to govern the conduct of men, as moral 

 and accountable beings, living in a social state, 

 independently of positive human institutions 

 (or, as is commonly expressed, living in a state 

 of nature), and which may more properly be 

 called the law of God, or the divine law, being 

 the rule of conduct prescribed by him to his 

 rational creatures, and revealed by the light of 

 reason, or the sacred Scriptures. As independ- 

 ent communities acknowledge no common su- 

 perior, they may be considered as living in a 

 state of nature with respect to each other, and 

 the obvious inference drawn by the disciples 

 and successors of Grotius was, that the dis- 

 putes arising among these independent com- 

 munities must be determined by what they 

 call the law of nature. This gave rise to a 

 new and separate branch of the science called 

 the law of nations Jus Gentium" t 



This law of nations Grotius distinguished 

 from the natural law by the different nature 

 of its origin and obligation. These features of 

 the natural law have been stated, but the origin 

 and obligation of the law of nations he attrib- 

 uted to the general consent of nations. This 

 distinction has been also expressed by desig- 

 nating the one as the natural and the other as 

 the positive or voluntary law of nations. 



Neither Hobbes nor Puffendorf expressed 

 an approval of this derivation of the origin and 

 obligatory force of the positive law of nations. 

 The former, in his work " De Cive," says: 

 " The natural law may be divided into the nat- 

 ural law of men, and the natural law of states, 



* Grotius, " De Jur. Bel. ac Pac.," lib. i, cap. 1, x, 1, 2. 

 t Lawrence's Wheaton, Part 1, chap, i, pp. 2, 3. 



commonly called the law of nations. The pre- 

 cepts of both are the same ; but since states, 

 when they are once instituted, assume the per- 

 sonal qualities of individual men, that law, 

 which when speaking of individual men we 

 call the law of nature, is called the law of na- 

 tions when applied to whole states, nations, or 

 people." * To this view Puffendorf implicitly 

 subscribes, saying that "there is no other vol- 

 untary or positive law of nations properly in- 

 vested with a true and legal force, and binding 

 as the command of a superior power." t Here 

 the issue is directly made between authority 

 and obligation arising out of consent of nations, 

 and the same arising under the law of nature. 

 After denying that there is any positive or 

 voluntary law of nations founded on the con- 

 sent of nations, and distinguished from the 

 natural, Puffendorf admits that the usages and 

 comity of civilized nations have introduced 

 certain rules, for mitigating the exercise of 

 hostilities between them ; that these rules are 

 founded on a general tacit consent, and that 

 their obligation ceases by the express declara- 

 tion of any party, engaged in a just war, that 

 it will no longer be bound by them. 



Bynkershoek, who wrote later than Puffen- 

 dorf, says: "The ancient jurisconsults assert 

 that the law of nations is that which is ob- 

 served in accordance with the light of reason, 

 between nations, if not among all, at least cer- 

 tainly among the greater part, and those the 

 most civilized. According to my opinion, we 

 may safely follow this definition, which estab- 

 lishes two distinct bases of this law, namely, 

 reason and custom."! It will thus be seen 

 that the sources and obligation of international 

 law are, by this writer, laid upon the bases of 

 reason and custom. The views thus far pre- 

 sented, with the exception of the latter writer, 

 represent international law as a branch of the 

 science of ethics, and consider it as the nat- 

 ural law of individuals applied to regulate the 

 conduct of men in societies, called states. "Wolf, 

 the next writer, separated the law of nations 

 from that which treated of the duties of indi- 

 viduals. He says : " Since such is the condi- 

 tion of mankind that the strict law of nature 

 can not always be applied to the government 

 of a particular community, but it becomes 

 necessary to resort to laws of positive institu- 

 tion, more or less varying from the natural 

 law, so in the great society of nations it be- 

 comes necessary to establish a law of positive 

 institution more or less varying from the nat- 

 ural law of nations." He then advances the 

 fiction of a great republic or commonwealth 

 of nations upon whose assent this law of posi- 

 tive institution is supposed to be founded, and 

 thus derives its origin and obligation. 



Vattel, who followed Wolf, differs from him 

 in the manner of establishing the foundations 



* " De Cive," chap, xiv, 4. 



t Puffendorf, " De Jure Naturae et Gentium," lib. ii, cap. 

 iii, 23. 



Bynkershoek, " Quest. Jur. Pub.," lib. i, cap. x. 

 Wolfius, "Jus Gentium," Pref., 3. 



