620 



NON-INTERVENTION AMONG NATIONS, THE PRINCIPLE OF. 



of the voluntary law of nations. He says : " I 

 do not find the fiction of such a republic either 

 very just or sufficiently solid to deduce from it 

 the rules of a universal law of nations, neces- 

 sarily admitted among sovereign states. I do 

 not recognize any other natural society be- 

 tween nations than that which nature has 

 established between all men. It is the essence 

 of all civil society that each, member thereof 

 should have given up a part of his rights to 

 the body of the society, and that there should 

 exist a supreme authority capable of command- 

 ing all the members, of giving to them laws, 

 and of punishing those who refuse to obey. 

 Nothing like this can be conceived or supposed 

 to exist between nations. Each sovereign state 

 pretends to be, and in fact is, independent of 

 all others. Even, according to Mr. Wolf, they 

 must all be considered as so many free individ- 

 uals, who live together in a state of nature, 

 and acknowledge no other law than that of na- 

 ture itself, and its Divine Author." * Accord- 

 ing to his view, the law of nations in its origin 

 is nothing but the law of nature applied to 

 nations ; yet, he says, there are many cases in 

 which the natural law does not furnish the 

 same rule of decision between state and state 

 as would be applicable between individual and 

 individual. It is the art of accommodating 

 this application to the different nature of the 

 subjects in a just manner, according to right 

 reason, which constitutes the law of nations a 

 particular science. 



The two last-named writers, together with 

 Grotius, recognize an application of the natural 

 law, to regulate the conduct of nations in their 

 intercourse with each other. This is desig- 

 nated by the former as "the necessary law of 

 nations," because they are absolutely bound 

 to observe it, as it is binding upon states as 

 upon individuals; while Grotius designates it 

 as "the internal law of nations," being obliga- 

 tory upon nations in point of conscience. By 

 others this is termed " the natural law of na- 

 tions," which is immutable, and founded on 

 the nature of man. To embrace the whole 

 science of international law, the first-named 

 writers, Wolf and Vattel, recognize a volun- 

 tary law of nations, arising from the presumed 

 consent of nations, a conventional law result- 

 ing from compacts between particular states, 

 and a customary law resulting from usage be- 

 tween particular nations. The obligation of 

 the voluntary law, Vattel establishes in a man- 

 ner unlike Wolf, as above mentioned. 



The view of Heffter, a writer of distinction, 

 is that the law of nations is a law common to 

 all mankind, which no people can refuse to ac- 

 knowledge, and the protection of which may 

 be claimed by all men and by all states. He 

 places the foundation of this on the incon- 

 testable principle that wherever there is a so- 

 ciety there must be a law obligatory on all its 

 members; and hence deduces the consequence 

 that there must be likewise for the great soci- 

 * Vattel, " Droit des Gens," Preface. 



ety of nations an analogous law. Again, he 

 says : " Its sanction (the law of nations), or the 

 obligation of all men to respect it, results from 

 the moral order of the universe, which will not 

 suffer nations and individuals to be isolated 

 from each other, but constantly tends to unite 

 the whole family of mankind in one great har- 

 monious society." * 



An eminent French writer on this science t 

 questions the propriety of using the term " law 

 of nations " as applicable to those rules of con- 

 duct which obtain between independent socie- 

 ties of men. " There can be no right where 

 there is no law, and there is no law where 

 there is no superior ; without law, obligations, 

 properly so called, can not exist ; there is only 

 a moral obligation resulting from natural rea- 

 son." M. Hautefeuille, an admirable French 

 writer, says : " From the primitive law, that is, 

 from the natural law, flows the entire inter- 

 national law. Its principles are not only to be 

 found in Grotius and Hobbes, but they are in 

 the hearts of all men. The natural law exe- 

 cuted with exactitude, would secure to all na- 

 tions the tranquil exercise of all their rights, 

 that is to say, peace and happiness." J 



Mr. Wheaton gives us this definition of 

 the science: " International law, as understood 

 among civilized nations, may be defined as con- 

 sisting of those rules of conduct which reason 

 deduces, as consonant to justice, from the na- 

 ture of the society existing among independent 

 nations; with such definitions and modifica- 

 tions as may be established by general con- 

 sent." The sources of international law, he 

 says, are text - writers of authority, treaties 

 of peace, ordinances of particular states, ad- 

 judications of international tribunals, written 

 opinions of official jurists, and the history 

 of wars, negotiations, and other transactions 

 relating to the public intercourse of nations. 

 His view of the obligatory authority of these 

 rules of conduct must be sought for in his 

 definition and general remarks. Thus of the 

 text- writers of authority he says, "Without 

 wishing to exaggerate the importance of these 

 writers, or to substitute in any case their au- 

 thority for the 'principles of reason, it may 

 be affirmed that they are generally impartial 

 in their judgment." Here the authority is 

 ascribed to the principles of reason, or rather, 

 principles deduced by reason. In the defini- 

 tion he makes the substance of international 

 law to consist of those rules of conduct which 

 reason deduces from the nature of society. 

 The distinctive powers of man are reason and 

 free-will; the former to deduce the truth, 

 and the latter to choose or accept it. The great 

 principle that determines the character of all 

 the actions of men toward each other, is jus- 

 tice. When, therefore, Mr. Wheaton requires in 



* Heffter, " Das europaische Volkerrecht," 2. 



t Eayneval, " Institutions du droit de la nature et des 

 gens," note 10 du ler liv., p. 8. 



$ " Des droits et des devoirs des nations neutres en temps 

 de guerre maritime." 



Lawrence's Wheaton, Part I, cap. i, p. 26. 



