OBLIGATION" OF CONTRACTS. 



649 



ready to receive said coupons in payment of 

 such taxes, debts, and demands, as soon as 

 they have been legally ascertained to be genu- 

 ine." The act then prescribes the legal pro- 

 cedure by which the issue of genuineness is to 

 be joined and decided. 



The question raised by this legislation was 

 whether the act of January, 1882, was in vio- 

 lation of that clause of the Federal Constitu- 

 tion which declares that no State shall pass any 

 "law impairing the obligation of contracts." 

 It was raised by Andrew Antoui, who, in 

 March, 1882, tendered to Samuel 0. Greenhow, 

 treasurer of the city of Richmond, a coupon of 

 the issue of 1871 for $3.00, in payment of taxes. 

 The tender was refused, whereupon Antoni 

 applied to the Supreme Court of Appeals for a 

 mandamus to compel its acceptance. The Treas- 

 urer answered that under the law of January, 



1882, he could not receive the coupon until its 

 genuineness was established as prescribed by 

 that law. To this return a demurrer was filed. 

 The four judges of the Supreme Court of Ap- 

 peals divided equally on the question of the 

 constitutionality of the law of January, 1882. 

 The mandamus was accordingly denied, and 

 an appeal was taken to the United States Su- 

 preme Court. The opinion of that court, up- 

 holding the constitutionality of the act, was 

 delivered by Chief-Justice Waite, in March, 



1883. Elaborate dissenting opinions were ren- 

 dered by Justices Field and Harlan. Justice 

 Matthews concurred in the judgment of the 

 majority, but dissented from the grounds on 

 which it was based. The Chief- Justice pointed 

 out that the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir- 

 ginia had held in two or three cases that in 

 issuing the bonds of 1871 the State had entered 

 into a valid contract with all persons taking 

 the coupons to receive them in payment of 

 taxes and State dues. The same principle was 

 affirmed by the United States Supreme Court 

 in the case of Hartman vs. Greenhow, de- 

 cided at the October term, 1880, and reported 

 in 102 United States Reports. "Any act of 

 the State," says Chief-Justice Waite, " which 

 forbids the receipt of these coupons for taxes 

 is a violation of the contract, and void as against 

 coupon holders." 



But the question here is, continues the opin- 

 ion, whether the act of 1882 violates any im- 

 plied obligation of the State in respect to the 

 remedies that may be employed for the enforce- 

 ment of its contract, if the collector refuses to 

 take them. It can not be denied that, as a gen- 

 eral rule, laws applicable to the case, which 

 are in force at the time and place of making a 

 contract, enter into and form part of the con- 

 tract itself, and that this embraces alike those 

 laws which affect its validity, construction, dis- 

 charge, and enforcement. But it is equally 

 well settled that changes in the forms of action 

 and modes of proceeding do not amount to an 

 impairment of the obligations of a contract, if 

 an adequate and efficacious remedy is left. As 

 the Supreme Court said in the case of Von 



Hoffman vs. Quincy (4 Wallace's Reports, 553), 

 " it is competent for the States to change the 

 form of the remedy, or to modify it other- 

 wise, as they may see fit, provided no substan- 

 tial right secured by the contract is thereby 

 impaired. No attempt has been made to fix 

 definitely the line between alterations of the 

 remedy, which are to be deemed legitimate, 

 and those which, under the form of modifying 

 the remedy, impair substantial rights. Every 

 case must be determined upon its own circum- 

 stances. Whenever the result last mentioned 

 is produced, the act is within the prohibition 

 of the Constitution, and to that extent void." 

 In all such cases the question becomes, there- 

 fore, one of reasonableness, and of that the 

 Legislature is primarily the judge. The Court 

 ought never to overrule the decision of the Leg- 

 islature unless a palpable error has been com- 

 mitted. If a state of facts could exist that 

 would justify the change in a remedy which 

 has been made, the Court must presume it did 

 exist, and that the law was passed on that ac- 

 count. The Court has nothing to do with the 

 motives of the Legislature, if what they do is 

 within the scope of their powers under the 

 Constitution. 



The right of the coupon-holder, continued 

 the Court, is to have his coupon received for 

 taxes when offered. The question here is not 

 as to that right, but as to the remedy the hold- 

 er has for its enforcement when denied. 

 After comparing the old with the new remedy, 

 the Chief-Justice said : 



The following changes are thus made in the old 

 remedy : 1. The taxes actually due must be paid in 

 money before the court can proceed, after the collector 

 has signified in the proper way his willingness to re- 

 ceive the coupons, if they are genuine and in law re- 

 ceivable ; 2. The coupons must be filed in the Court 

 of Appeals ; and, 3. They must be sent to the local 

 court to have the fact of their genuineness and re- 

 ceivability determined, subject to an appeal to the 

 Circuit Court and the Supreme Court of Appeals. As 

 the suit is for a mandamus, all the provisions of the 

 general law regulating the practice not inconsistent 

 with the new law remain, and, if the petitioner suc- 

 ceeds in getting his peremptory Avrit, he will recover 

 his costs. No Issues are required that it would not 

 have been in the power of the collector to raise before 

 the change was made, and there is no additional bur- 

 den of proof imposed to meet the issues, so that the 

 simple question is, whether the requirement of the 

 advance of the taxes and the change of the place and 

 manner of trial impair the obligation of the contract 

 on the part of the State to furnish an adequate and 

 efficacious remedy to compel a tax-collector to receive 

 the coupons in payment of taxes, in case he will not 

 do it without compulsion. 



The Court then proceeded to show that the 

 change of remedy was not such as, in its opin- 

 ion, was sufficient to impair the obligation of 

 the contract. " The primary obligation^of the 

 State," it said, " is for the payment of the cou- 

 pons. All else is simply as a means to that 

 end. It matters not whether the coupons have 

 been refused for the taxes, if full payment of 

 the amount they call for is actually made in 

 money. A remedy, therefore, which is ample 

 for the enforcement of the payment of the 



