POLITICAL ASSESSMENTS. 



695 



being interested in contracts with the United 

 States ; and that passed in 1870, which provides 

 that no officer, clerk, or employe in the Gov- 

 ernment service shall solicit contributions from 

 other officers, clerks, or employes for a gift to 

 those in a superior official position, and that 

 no officers or clerical superiors shall receive 

 gifts from their subordinates. After remark- 

 ing that many other acts of a kindred charac- 

 ter might be referred to, Chief-Justice Waite 

 said: 



The evident purpose of Congress in all this class of 

 enactments has been to promote efficiency and integ- 

 rity in the discharge of official duties and to maintain 

 proper discipline in the public service. Clearly such 

 a purpose is within the just scope of legislative power, 

 and it is not easy to see why the act now under con- 

 sideration docs not come fairly within the legitimate 

 means to such an end. It is true, as is claimed by the 

 counsel for the petitioner, political assessments upon 

 office-holders are not prohibited. The managers of 

 political campaigns not in the employ of the United 

 States are just as free now to call on those in office for 

 money to be used for political purposes as ever they 

 were, and those in office can contribute as liberally as 

 they please, provided their payments are not made to 

 any of the prohibited officers or employe's. What we 

 are now considering is not whether Congress has gone 

 as far as it may, but whether that which has been 

 done is within the constitutional limits upon its legis- 

 lative discretion. 



A feeling of independence under the law conduces 

 to faithful public service, and nothing tends more to 

 take away this feeling than a dread of dismissal. If 

 contributions from those in public employment may 

 be solicited by others in official authority, it is easy 

 to sec that what begins as a request may end as a de- 

 mand, and that a failure to meet the demand may be 

 treated by those having the power of removal as a 

 breach of some supposed duty growing out of the 

 political relations of the parties. Contributions se- 

 cured under such circumstances will quite as likely 

 be made to avoid the consequences of the personal 

 displeasure of a superior as to promote the political 

 views of the contributor to avoid a discharge from 

 service, not to exercise a political privilege. The law 

 contemplates no restrictions upon either giving or re- 

 ceiving, except so far as may be necessary to protect, 

 in some degree, those in the public service against ex- 

 actions through fear of personal loss. . . . 



If there were no other reasons for legislation of this 

 character than such as relate to the protection of those 

 in the public service against unjust exactions, its con- 

 stitutionality would, in our opinion, be clear ; but 

 there are others to our minds equally good. If persons 

 in public employ may be called on by those in au- 

 thority to contribute from their personal income to the 

 expenses of political campaigns, and a refusal may 

 lead to putting good men out of the service, liberal 

 payments may be made the ground for keeping poor 

 ones in. So. too, if a part of the compensation re- 

 ceived for public services must be contributed for po- 

 litical purposes, it is easy to see that an increase of 

 compensation may be required to provide the means 

 to make the contribution, and that in this way the 

 Government itself may be made to furnish indirectly 

 the money to defray the expenses of keeping the po- 

 litical party in power that happens to have for the 

 time being the control of the public patronage. Po- 

 litical parties must almost necessarily exist under a 

 republican form of government, and, when public em- 

 ployment depends to any considerable extent on party 

 success, those in office will naturally be desirous of 

 keeping the party to which they belong in power. 

 The statute we are now considering does not interfere 

 with this. The apparent end of Congress will be ac- 

 complished if it prevents those in power from requir- 



ing help for such purposes as a condition to continued 

 employment. 



Justice Bradley dissented from the opinion 

 of the court. 



In his annual message to Congress in De- 

 cember, President Arthur referred to the sub- 

 ject of political assessments in the following 

 language : 



I declare my approval of such legislation as may be 

 found necessary for supplementing the existing pro- 

 visions of law in relation to political assessments. 



In July last I authorized a public announcement 

 that employes of the Government should regard 

 themselves as at liberty to exercise their pleasure in 

 making or refusing to make political contributions, 

 and that their action in that regard would in no man- 

 ner affect their official status. 



In this announcement I acted upon the view which 

 I had always maintained and still maintain, that a 

 public officer should be as absolutely free as any other 

 citizen to give or to withhold a contribution for the 

 aid of the political party of his choice. It has, how- 

 ever, been urged, and doubtless not without founda- 

 tion in fact, that by solicitation of official superiors 

 and by other modes such contributions have at times 

 been obtained from persons whose only motive for 

 giving has been the fear of what might befall them if 

 they refused. It goes without saying that such con- 

 tributions are not voluntary, and in my judgment 

 their collection should be prohibited by law. A bill 

 which will effectually suppress them will receive my 

 cordial approval. 



Early in January, 1883, the President signed 

 the Civil-Service Reform bill, which contains 

 the following provisions relating to political 

 assessments : 



SECTION 11. That no Senator or Eepresentative or 

 Territorial Delegate of the Congress, or Senator, Eep- 

 resentative, or Delegate elect, or any officer or employe 

 of either of said Houses, and no executive, judicial, 

 military, or naval officer of the United States, and no 

 clerk or employ 6 of any department, branch, or bu- 

 reau of the executive, judicial, or military or naval 

 service of the United States shall, directly or indi- 

 rectly, solicit or receive, or be in any manner con- 

 cerned in soliciting or receiving, any assessment, sub- 

 scription, or contribution for any political purpose 

 whatever, from any officer, clerk, or employe or the 

 United States, or any Department : branch, or bureau 

 thereof, or from any person receiving any salary or 

 compensation from moneys derived from the Treasury 

 of the United States. 



SEC. 12. That no person shall, in any room or build- 

 ing occupied in the discharge of official duties by any 

 officer or employe" of the United States mentioned in 

 this act, or in any navy-yard, fort, or arsenal, solicit 

 in any manner whatever, or receive any contribution 

 of money or any other thing of value for any political 

 purpose whatever. 



SEC. 13. No officer or employe" of the United States 

 mentioned in this act shall discharge, or promote, or 

 degrade, or in any manner change the official rank or 

 compensation of any other officer or employe, or prom- 

 ise or threaten so to do, for giving or withholding or 

 neglecting to make any contribution of money or 

 other valuable thing for any political purpose. 



SEC. 14. That no officer, clerk, or other person in 

 the service of the United States shall, directly or in- 

 directly, give or hand over to any other officer, clerk, 

 or person in the service of the United States, or to 

 any Senator or member of the House of Bepresenta- 

 tives, or Territorial Delegate, any money or other 

 valuable thing on account of or to be applied to the 

 promotion of any political object whatever. _ 



SEC. 15. That any person who shall be guilty of vi- 

 olating any provision of the four foregoing sections 



