UNITED STATES. 



811 



made a final report of the result of his mission, 

 dated June 5th, in which he said : 



It only remains for me to state what consideration 

 has so far been given to the proposed conditions. For 

 reasons stated in former dispatches I was obliged to 

 leave Lima before my communication in its formal 

 shape could reach the Chilian Government at Santi- 

 ago. But that Government has in Lima a diplomatic 

 representative in the person of Senor Novoa, who is 

 authorized to consider any propositions tending to a 

 negotiation for peace. The whole subject was fully 

 discussed with him and General Lynch, the military 

 commander of the Chilian army of occupation, and 

 the propositions, together with the substance of the 

 conference, were telegraphed by Senor Novoa to his 

 Government. I do not regard the telegraphic reply 

 which was communicated by Senor Novoa as conclu- 

 sive. My dispatch had not yet reached the Chilian 

 Government, and 1 think it clear that the bare state- 

 ment of the propositions had not put the Chilian Gov- 

 ernment in full possession of the considerations which 

 recommended ttair adoption. I have other reasons 

 for believing that the question is still an open one. 

 The reply of the Government of Chili as communi- 

 cated by Senor Novoa intimated : 1. That as no ac- 

 tive military operations were being conducted by the 

 Chilian army, there was no apparent necessity for a 

 truce. But it is obvious that, as Arequipa is open 

 at any moment to occupation by the Chilian troops 

 from Mollendo, the Peruvian Congress would natu- 

 rally and properly require some guarantee that its 

 deliberations should be free and uninterrupted. A 

 repetition of the dissolution of Congress because its 

 deliberations were not agreeable to the Chilian Gov- 

 ernment is a contingency which the Congress, in view 

 of the past, could scarcely disregard, and which would 

 make any effort at negotiation only another unfortu- 

 nate failure. Besides which, if there are to be no 

 active military operations, there can be no possible 

 danger or inconvenience to Chili in giving such a con- 

 dition of things the sanction of a lormal agreement 

 by a short truce. 2. While the Chilian Government 

 desired peace, it was unwilling to enter upon negotia- 

 tion without distinct agreement in advance of the 

 terms which must be accepted. It was dissatisfied 

 with the experience of its former attempts at negotia- 

 tion with the Calderon Government, and was indis- 

 posed to renew the effort without the certainty of a 

 successful result. It was willing, therefore, to nego- 

 tiate informally with General Montero, and, upon the 

 signature of satisfactory preliminaries, would recog- 

 nize the existence of the Peruvian Government pari 

 passu with the execution of the treaty. But the Con- 

 gress which had authorized General Montero to nego- 

 tiate had expressly forbidden any cession of territory, 

 and it Avas therefore simply impossible for General 

 Montero to sign a treaty containing such provisions. 

 After some discussion Senor Novoa expressed his will- 

 ingness to accept a preliminary agreement by which 

 General Montero would bind himself to submit for 

 approval to the national Congress such a treaty as he 

 and Senor Novoa could agree upon, and to recognize 

 General Montero's Government upon the execution of 

 such an instrument. This would have afforded an op- 

 portunity for the opening of negotiations, but Senor 

 Novoa added the limitation that, if Congress did 

 not approve the treaty so submitted, the recognition 

 would be withdrawn. This was simply an impossible 

 condition. The recognition of the Montero Govern- 

 ment had to be positive. If Congress tailed to ap- 

 prove, Chili could still prosecute the war until Peru 

 was compelled to accept her terms, but such a con- 

 tingent recognition was, in fact, only the old propo- 

 sition of a treaty before recognition in another and 

 much more illogical and embarrassing shape. Senor 

 Novoa was willing to adopt another method. He 

 would sign a treaty with General Montero, to be sub- 

 mitted and approved by the municipalities that is, 

 by the local authorities of the separate provinces. 

 Such a method was entirely beyond General Montero's 



constitutional powers, and would, I think, have led 

 to the renewal of the difficulties between the various 

 parties in Peru, who, accepting General Montero as 

 the legitimate representative of the Government, would 

 acquiesce hi the regular action of the Executive and 

 Congress. As Senor Novoa was either indisposed or 

 unauthorized to move out of this vicious circle, our 

 conferences terminated. I regret this the more, as I 

 think the propositions offered a fair prospect of a se- 

 rious negotiation. Chili can not obtain a peace which 

 will give sanction and title to her acquisition of terri- 

 tory without the recognition of a legitimate govern- 

 ment in Peru. Without a treaty with such authority 

 the acquisition will be simply one of force, to be 

 maintained as it has been acquired. The recognition 

 of General Moutero's Government will place upon 

 him and upon the people of Peru the responsibility 

 of making or rejecting peace, while the calling of 



HENRY M. TELLER, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. 



[Born in Alleghany County. New York. May 28, 1880 ; was 

 admitted to the 'bar in 1858; on the admission of Colorado 

 into the Union in 1876, was elected a United States Sena- 

 tor from that State for the short term ending March 3, 

 1877; was re-elected for the full term ending March 3, 

 1883. On April 6, 1S82, his appointment to a position in 

 President Arthur's Cahinet was confirmed by the Senate, 

 and he resigned his seat in that body.] 



Congress will afford the opportunity to those who 

 desire peace to do what they can not do under present 

 circumstances organize a party which can exert its 

 influence directly, effectually, and legitimately in the 

 Congress itself. 



But I can not with justice conclude this dispatch 

 without saying that I believe the reason which in- 

 duces the hesitation of Chili is that she believes that, 

 so long as the Peruvians are convinced that the United 

 States will finally intervene, they never will nego- 

 tiate in earnest. It is unquestionably true that the 

 Peruvian Government does believe that the United 

 States will intervene ; at any rate, it considers that 

 the question of intervention as one of its leading 

 officials expressed it to me was still a pending ques- 

 tion. It is obvious that neither Chili nor Peru will 

 approach the solution of their difficulties in the proper 

 spirit, or in any hope of a result satisfactory to both, 

 as long as this impression lasts. If the United States 

 intend to intervene effectively to prevent the disin- 

 tegration of Peru, the time has come when that in- 

 tention should be avowed. If it does not, still more 

 urgent is the necessity that Chili and Peru should un- 

 derstand exactly where the action of the United States 

 ends. It would be entirely beyond my duty to dis- 

 cuss the character or the consequences of either line of 



