AFGHANISTAN. 



the two powers for the possession of India 

 is not now considered possible. Prince Bis- 

 marck illustrates its absurdity by the meta- 

 phor of a battle between a wolf and a fish, 

 meaning that India's outlets and points of de- 

 fense are all by sea, and therefore beyond the 

 reach of a land power like Russia. Moreover, 

 against Russia Great Britain could count on a 

 larger measure of loyalty in India than they 

 can ordinarily attract, and also upon the effect- 

 ive support of Europe. But a " diversion " in 

 India, in the event of Russian complications 

 or hostilities with Great Britain, was actually 

 undertaken in the diplomatic contest follow- 

 ing the Russo-Turkish War, and is felt on both 

 sides to be an important strategic factor and a 

 telling diplomatic weapon. Because the Eng- 

 lish have been able neither to cow nor to con- 

 ciliate the Afghans, they do not suppose that 

 the Russians would find them intractable. 

 The dangers of the immediate proximity of the 

 Northern Colossus to the English rule in India 

 are appreciated even by the Liberals. How- 

 ever well disposed, the Russians would suggest 

 hopes, particularly among the Mohammedans of 

 the northwest, of deliverance from the British 

 Raj ; and with disaffection rife throughout In- 

 dia, as at present, the difficulties of govern- 

 ment, at least by present methods, would be 

 greatly enhanced. For this reason the British 

 Government still aims to preserve the integ- 

 rity and power of Afghanistan as a buffer be- 

 tween the two empires. The recent advances 

 of Russia in the direction of Herat have stirred 

 the English Cabinet from their repose. 



Fresh Russian Annexations. In 1883 Merv 

 made its submission to the Czar. In the spring 

 of 1884 a Russian force occupied and fortified 

 the old strategic point of Sarakhs on the Heri 

 Rud River, within 110 miles of Herat. About 

 the same time the Saryk Tartars, who possess 

 the stronghold of Penjdeh, still nearer Herat, 

 and within its natural line of defense, were 

 taken under the protection of the White Czar 

 by Prince Dondoukoff-Korsakoff at Askabad, 

 April 20th (see RUSSIA). These annexations 

 bring Russia to the confines of the territory de- 

 fined in the convention of 1873 between Great 

 Britain and Russia as belonging to Afghanistan. 

 In this the districts of Akcha, Sir-i-Pul, Mai- 

 mene, Shibergan, and Andkoi are declared to 

 be Afghan, though no topographical features 

 are indicated as marking the frontier line. 



British Action. This latest advance of Russia 

 rr.usi-d the British Government to unwonted 

 activity. First, an armed exploring expedition 

 under Col. Stewart was sent into Baluchistan, 

 in order to assert more effectually British au- 

 thority in that country. The administration 

 of the district of Quetta, which formed part of 

 the dominions of the Khan of Kelat, was as- 

 sumed by the Indian Government. It was 

 decided to continue the military railway from 

 Sibi to Quetta. Sir Robert Sandeman was 

 placed in charge of the government, with his 

 residence at Quetta. His administrative dis- 



trict comprises Quetta, Sibi, Pishin, and Thall- 

 Chotiali. 



Anglo-Russian Afghan Frontier Commission. Af- 

 ter the Russian annexation of Merv, the court 

 of St. James entered into correspondence with 

 the St. Petersburg authorities with reference 

 to obtaining a technical understanding of the 

 Afghan boundaries, which were guaranteed by 

 treaty against Russian encroachments. After 

 a protracted discussion the British Government 

 agreed in the summer of 1884 to a basis of de- 

 limitation, which recognized the latest Russian 

 acquisitions, and accepted the proposition of 

 the Russian Government to appoint a mixed 

 commission for the demarkation of the north- 

 ern frontier of Afghanistan. The general terms 

 of the agreement were, that the river Oxus 

 should form the boundary between eastern Af- 

 ghanistan and Bokhara, and that where the 

 line leaves the river at Khoja Saleh it should 

 proceed south and west, taking a circular course 

 along the margin of the desert, and terminat- 

 ing on the Heri Rud river at Phuli Khatum. 



In carrying out this plan, the English were 

 embarrassed by annoying difficulties at the 

 start, owing to their peculiar relations with 

 their subsidized allies. It was found imprac- 

 ticable to convoy their commissioners through 

 Afghanistan with a large British military force, 

 although they expected to meet their colleagues 

 attended by a guard sufficient not only to pre- 

 vent attack, but to inspire the native popula- 

 tion with respect for the military power of 

 England. The Ameer was then asked to provide 

 them with an Afghan guard ; but this he re- 

 fused to do. They next appealed to him to 

 guarantee the safety of the expedition. He 

 represented himself as unable to promise se- 

 curity from the attacks of the Durani Afghans 

 of Zamindawar, if they took the direct Can- 

 dahar-Girishk-Herat route. They were obliged 

 therefore to creep around the edge of Afghan- 

 istan by the circuitous Mushki route through 

 the desert to the Helmund. The Anglo-Indian 

 Commission was not ready to start from Quetta 

 before September. The head of the commis- 

 sion is Sir Peter Lumsden. The Indian con- 

 tingent was attended by a picked guard of 

 native Indian troops, consisting of 200 cavalry 

 and 250 infantry, with armed followers enough 

 to make a total force of 1,200 or 1,300. The 

 party numbered eighteen officers and civilians. 

 The commanding officer was Lieut.-Col. J. 

 West Ridgeway. 



The Quetta Railway. The British Govern- 

 ment, in the spring of 1884, authorized the 

 immediate extension to Quetta of the strate- 

 gic railroad, built during the Afghan war, in 

 the direction of the Bolan Pass, as far as Sibi. 

 It was the intention to carry the road through 

 as soon as it could be built, to Candahar, when, m 

 on the accession of the Liberals, the works* 

 were stopped at Rindli, twenty miles from 

 Sibi. The Harnai Pass was subsequently chosen 

 in preference to the Bolan Pass, as the route 

 of the projected railroad. When the Sibi- 



