EGYPT. 





Gn. Wolseley's Expedition. The English min- 

 isters in their course toward Gen. Gordon 

 were guided by the political and financial rea- 

 sons that impelled them to force upon the Egyp- 

 tian Government the policy of abandoning the 

 Soudan. They were inclined at first to repudi- 

 ate their envoy, on the ground that, in estab- 

 lishing military rule at Khartoum and under- 

 taking military operations, he had exceeded his 

 instructions, which directed him to use pacific 

 means only. When they first called Gen. Gor- 

 don into consultation he expostulated against 

 the abandonment of Khartoum as injurious to 

 Egypt, to commerce, and to the anti-slavery 

 cause. They assumed that he was now aiming 

 at the restoration of Egyptian authority in the 

 Soudan, or that that would be the result of 

 his successful defense of Khartoum. They 

 would have been glad for him to retreat, but 

 he refused to leave to their fate the 00,000 

 people whom he was sent to rescue. Every 

 one but the Government recognized the neces- 

 sity of Gordon's defensive operations, and the 

 perils of his situation. His defense of Khar- 

 toum, coupled with the belief that he was 

 backed by the military power of England, was 

 of great service in arresting the tide of rebel- 

 lion, which threatened to sweep into Egypt. 

 The Government was nevertheless averse to an 

 expedition for his relief, because if English 

 blood and treasure were spent in the Soudan 

 the policy of abandoning the country might 

 have to be given up, and the English protec- 

 torate in Egypt might be indefinitely prolonged. 

 The apathy shown regarding the fate of Gor- 

 don subjected the Government to telling at- 

 tacks from the Opposition and wide-spread 

 popular displeasure, not confined to the friends 

 of annexation. At length Mr. Gladstone ac- 

 knowledged an obligation to look after the 

 safety of Gen. Gordon, and of those who had 

 incurred greater danger by attaching them- 

 selves to him, while disclaiming any responsi- 

 bility for the other Egyptian posts in the Sou- 

 dan, or any intention to resist the rebellion of 

 the Mahdi, which he described as the move- 

 ment of "a people rightly struggling to be 

 free.' 1 On April 28 a dispatch was forwarded 

 to Gen. Gordon by a variety of channels, in 

 which he was desired to advise as to the time, 

 route, and strength of a relief expedition. Not 

 receiving an answer before the adjournment 

 of Parliament, Mr. Gladstone asked, August 5, 

 for a vote of credit of 300,000 in approval of 

 an expedition in the autumn. A relief expedi- 

 tion was arranged the same month on plans 

 drawn up by Lord Wolseley. Although all au- 

 thorities on Egyptian topography pronounced 

 the Suakin-Berber route the quickest and ea c i- 

 est to Khartoum, the Government would sanc- 

 tion none but the Nile route, as most in har- 

 mony with their purpose to confine their oper- 

 ations to the rescue of Gen. Gordon and those 

 involved with him. Gen. Wolseley suggested 

 small boats for river transport beyond Wady 

 Haifa, such as he had employed in his Red 



river expedition in Canada. As Gen. Ste- 

 phenson, commanding the army of occupation, 

 objected to this scheme, Lord Wolseley was 

 asked to take command of the expedition him- 

 self, and decided on an expeditionary force 

 of 10,000 men as sufficient for his purpose. 

 He arrived in Egypt September 9. The small 

 boats were built in England and Egypt, and a 

 body of 500 Canadian boatmen and 300 Kroo- 

 men from the west coast of Africa engaged. 

 In his letter of instructions, dated October 8, 

 the object of the expedition was stated to be 

 to bring Gen. Gordon and Col. Stewart away 

 from Khartoum. Unless it was necessary for 

 him to penetrate to Khartoum for this purpose, 

 he was not to advance beyond Dongola. That 

 was the sole definite object, though with re- 

 gard to leaving an organized government be- 

 hind, Gen. Wolseley was instructed to enter 

 into treaty with the local chiefs, and.to prom- 

 ise them liberal subsidies from the Egyptian 

 Government if they would engage to preserve 

 order, and keep down the slave-trade between 

 Wady Haifa and Khartoum. He was prohib- 

 ited from advancing beyond Khartoum for any 

 purpose, even for the relief of the garrison at 

 Sennaar, which was within easy access on the 

 Nile. The boats, 800 in number, were light 

 enough to be carried around the rapids, and 

 designed to convey each ten soldiers with food- 

 supplies for 100 days. Stern-paddle steamers, 

 made in sections, were ordered for towage in 

 the clear spaces of the river. Sir Evelyn Wood 

 proceeded to Wady Haifa to superintend the 

 preparations for transport and the collection 

 of stores. It would have been possible at high 

 Nile to draw steamers of not over five feet 

 draught over the cataracts. One steamer, the 

 Nassif-Kheir, was got through with great diffi- 

 culty in the beginning of September. It was 

 high water about the middle of August. Be- 

 fore the transports, commissariat stores, etc., 

 were prepared in Lord Wolseley's thorough 

 manner, the Nile had fallen so that the elabo- 

 rate arrangements for river-transport were al- 

 most useless. The general-in-chief arrived at 

 the second cataract October 5. The passage 

 up the river from Sarras, where the Canadian 

 double-bowed whale-boats were put into the 

 water, and Dongola, was slow and toilsome. 

 Nile nuggars were found as useful at least as 

 the small boats. On the 20th of November, 

 with 16,000 British troops in Egypt, there were 

 only 3,000 south of Wady Haifa, of whom about 

 1,000 had reached Dongola. By December 10 

 there were 10,000 south of Korosko; on the 

 16th Lord Wolseley joined the advance body 

 under Brig.-Gen. Sir Herbert Stewart at Korti. 

 Here Gen. Wolseley decided to abandon the 

 river route and cross the Bahiuda Desert to 

 Shendy, 180 miles. Gen. Stewart started with 

 1,000 men on camels December 30. He occu- 

 pied the wells at Gadkul, 97 miles from Korti, 

 January 3, and, leaving the guards intrenched 

 there, returned for re-enforcements and sup- 

 plies, setting out again on the 8th with a corps 



