

LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL. (CHINESE CITIZENS.) 



427 



It seems to us that the fourteenth amendment, in 

 30 far as it was intended to confer national citizenship 

 upon persons of the Indian race, is robbed of its vital 

 force by a construction which excludes from such citi- 

 zenship Indians who, although born in tribal relations, 

 are within the complete jurisdiction of the United 

 States. There were, in some of our States and Ter- 

 ritories at the time the amendment was submitted by 

 Congress, many Indians who had finally left their 

 tribes and come within the complete jurisdiction of 

 the United States and of the States and Territories in 

 which they resided. They were as fully prepared for 

 citizenship as were or are vast numbers' of the white 

 and colored races in the same localities. Is it con- 

 ceivable that the statesmen who framed, the Congress 

 which submitted, and the people who adopted, that 

 amendment intended to confer citizenship, national 

 and State, upon the entire population in this country 

 of African descent (the larger part of which was short- 

 ly before held in slavery), and, by the same constitu- 

 tional provision, exclude from such citizenship Indi- 

 ans who had never been in slavery, and who, by be- 

 coming bona-fide residents of States and Territories 

 within the complete jurisdiction of the United States, 

 had evinced a purpose to abandon their former mode 

 of life and become a part of the people of the United 

 States ? ^ If this question be answered in the negative, 

 as we think it must be, then we are justified in with- 

 holding our assent to the doctrine which excludes the 

 plaintiff from the body of citizens of the United States 

 upon the ground that his parents were, when he was 

 born, members of an Indian tribe. For, if he can be 

 excluded upon any such ground, it must necessarily 

 follow that the fourteenth amendment did not grant 

 citizenship even to Indians who, although born in 

 tribal relations, were, at its adoption, severed from 

 their tribes, and permanent residents of States and 

 Territories, subject to the complete jurisdiction, as 

 well of the United States as of the State or Territory 

 in which they resided. 



Justice Harlan ends the dissenting opinion 

 with this language: "Born, therefore, in the 

 territory, under the dominion, and within the 

 jurisdictional limits, of the United States, plaint- 

 iff has acquired, as was his undoubted right, a 

 residence in one of the States, with her con- 

 sent, and is subject to taxation and to all other 

 burdens imposed by her upon residents of 

 every race. If he did not acquire national citi- 

 zenship on abandoning his tribe and becoming 

 subject to the complete jurisdiction of the Unit- 

 ed States, then the fourteenth amendment 



ty years prior to this case. The boy went to 

 China in 1879 and returned to California in 

 September, 1884, when the port officers at San 

 Francisco refused to let him land without the 

 certificate required by the Chinese exclusion 

 law. The Circuit Court held that he was a 

 citizen of the United States under, the four- 

 teenth amendment, by reason of his birth in 

 this country, and as a citizen had a right freely 

 to go from and come to the United States. The 

 language of the fourteenth amendment that 

 " all persons born or naturalized in the United 

 States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 

 are citizens of the United States and of the 

 State wherein they reside," was thus inter- 

 preted by Justice Field, of the Supreme Court, 

 whose opinion was concurred in by Circuit 

 Judge Sawyer and District Judges Sabin and 

 Hoffman : 



This language would seem to be sufficiently broad 

 to cover the case of the petitioner. He is a person 

 born in the United States. Any doubt on the sub- 

 ject, if there can be any, must arise out of the words, 

 ''''subject to the jurisdiction thereof." These words 

 were designed to cover the case of children born in 

 the United States of persons engaged in the diplo- 

 matic service of foreign governments, such as minis- 

 ters and embassadors, whose residence, by a fiction of 

 public law, is regarded as a part of their own country. 

 This ex-territoriality of their residence secures to their 

 children born here all the rights and privileges whiclv 

 would inure to them had they been born in the coun- 

 try of their parents. They also cover the case of per- 

 sons born on the public vessels of a foreign country, 

 while within the waters of the United States, and 

 consequently within^ their territorial jurisdiction. 

 Such persons are considered as born in the country to 

 which the public vessel belongs. They are not born, 

 in the sense of public law, within the* jurisdiction of 

 the United States. 



The language used has also a more extended pur- 

 pose. The doctrine recognized in the United States 

 is the right of every one to expatriate himself and 

 choose, if he likes, another country. This right 

 would seem to follow from the greater right recog- 

 nized and proclaimed to the world in the immortal 

 document in which the American colonies declared 

 their independence and separation from the British 



crown, as ^belonging to every human being God- 

 ble the right to pursue one's hap- 



given and inalienabf 



has wholly failed to accomplish, in respect of P iness ' The English doctrine, that allegiance to the 

 *;, -(*'. _, . i_' ._VA ,i government of one's birth is perpetual, attending the 



the Indian race, what, we think, was intended 

 by it; and there is still in this country a de- 

 spised and rejected class of persons, with no 

 nationality whatever ; who, born in our terri- 

 tory, owing no allegiance to any foreign power, 

 and subject, as residents of the States, to all 

 the burdens of government, are yet not mem- 

 bers of any political community nor entitled 



to any of the rights, privileges, or immunities xl - , . ^ 



of citizens of the United fit JL % conse , nt of . hl ? Government. And we adopt as our 



government of one's birth is perpetual, attending the 

 subject wherever he goes, never has taken root in this 

 country, although there are dicta in some judicial de- 

 cisions that a citizen cannot renounce his allegiance to 

 the United States without the permission of the Gov- 

 ernment, under regulations prescribed by law ; and 

 this would seem to have been the opinion of Chancel- 

 lor Kent when he published his commentaries. But 

 a different doctrine prevails now. The naturalization 

 laws have always proceeded upon the theory that 

 any one can change his home and allegiance without 



citizens of the United States. 

 Chinese born in tbe United States held Citizens. 



An important question touching citizenship by 

 birth under the fourteenth amendment came 

 before the United States Circuit Court in Cali- 

 fornia in September. It arose in the case of 

 Look Tin Sing, a Chinese boy born in this 

 country and claiming the right to land as a citi- 

 zen. He was born in 1870 at Mendocino, Cal., 

 where his parents, who were Chinese and sub- 

 jects of the Emperor of China, had lived twen- 



citizens those belonging to our race, who come from 

 other lands and show attachment to our institutions, 

 and desire to be incorporated with us. So profoundly 

 convinced are our people of the right of these dwellers 

 in other countries to change their residence and alle- 

 giance, that when once they are naturalized they are 

 deemed entitled, with the native-born, to all the pro- 

 tection which the strong arm of the national Govern- 

 ment can extend to them, wherever they may be, at 

 home or abroad. And the same right, accorded to 

 the people of other countries to become citizens here, 

 is accorded to them and to the native-born, to change, 

 if they choose, their allegiance from our Government 



