428 



LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL. (TAXING IMMIGRANTS.) 



to that of other States. As to the position of the dis- 

 trict attorney, that the restriction act excludes the re- 

 entry of the petitioner into the United States, even if 

 he be a citizen, only a word is necessary. No citizen 

 can be banished from his country except in punish- 

 ment for crime. Banishment for any other cause is 

 unknown to our laws, and beyond the power of Con- 

 gress. The petitioner must be allowed to land, and 

 it is so ordered. 



Power to tax Immigrants. The right of Con- 

 gress to levy a head-tax on immigrants was 

 affirmed by the United States Supreme Court 

 in an opinion handed down December 8. In 

 several previous cases the Court had declared 

 unconstitutional State laws regulating immi- 

 gration and taxing immigrants (see " Annual 

 Cyclopaedia" for 1882, p. 463). The ground 

 of these decisions was that, as the subject per- 

 tains to foreign commerce, it is one on which 

 a State has no right to legislate, for the reason 

 that it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of 

 Congress. These were cases in which the con- 

 stitutionality of State statutes was called in 

 question. The court had not passed directly 

 upon an act of Congress before the suits now 

 under consideration. These were brought 

 against the Collector of the Port of New York 

 by certain steamship companies, which denied 

 the constitutionality of the act passed by Con- 

 gress in 1882, imposing upon the owners of 

 steamers and vessels a tax of fifty cents for 

 every alien brought to this country. The 

 purpose of the tax was the care of immigrants 

 and the protection of the country against the 

 burdens of immigration. The steamship com- 

 panies questioned the constitutionality of the 

 acton these grounds: first, Congress had no 

 power, under the commercial clause of the 

 Constitution, to pass it ; second, assuming that 

 it was an exercise of the taxing power, the 

 tax was not levied to provide for the common 

 defense and general welfare of the United 

 States, nor was it uniform throughout the 

 United States; third, that it violated provis- 

 ions contained in numerous treaties of the 

 United States with friendly nations. 



On the first point the Court, speaking through 

 Justice Miller, said : 



The act of Congress is similar in its essential feat- 

 ures to many statutes enacted by States of the Union 

 for the protection of their own citizens and for the 

 good of the immigrants who land at seaports within 

 their borders. 



^That the purpose of these statutes is humane, is 

 highly beneficial to the poor and helpless immigrant, 

 and is essential to the protection of the people in whose 

 midst they are deposited by the steamships, is beyond 

 dispute. That the power to pass such laws should ex- 

 ist in some legislative body in this country is equally 

 clear. This court has decided distinctly and frequent- 

 ly, and always after a full hearing from able counsel, 

 that it does not belong to the States. That decision 

 did not rest in any case on the ground that the State 

 and its people were not deeply interested in the exist- 

 ence and enforcement of such laws, and were not ca- 

 pable of enforcing them if they had the power to en- 

 act them ; but on the ground that the Constitution, in 

 the division of powers which it declares between the 

 States and the General Government, has conferred this 

 power on the latter to the exclusion of the former. We 

 are now asked to decide that it does not exist in Con- 



gress, which is to hold that it does not exist at all that 

 the framers of the Constitution have so worded that re- 

 markable instrument, that the ships of all nations, in- 

 cluding our own, can, without restraint or regulation, 

 deposit here, if they find it to their interest to do so, 

 the entire European population of criminals, paupers, 

 and diseased persons, without making any provi.M< n 

 to preserve them from starvation and its concomitant 

 sufferings, even for the first few days after they have 

 left the vessel. 



This court is not only asked to decide this, but it is 

 asked to overrule its decision, several times made with 

 unanimity, that the power does reside in Congress, is 

 conferred upon that body by the express language of 

 the Constitution, and the attention of Congress called 

 to the duty which arises from that language to pass 

 the very law which is here in question. 



That these statutes are regulations of commerce 

 of commerce with foreign nations is conceded in the 

 argument in this case ; and that they constitute a regu- 

 lation of that class which belongs exclusively to Con- 

 gress is held in all cases in this court^ It is upon these 

 propositions that the court has decided in all these 

 cases that the State laws are void. 



It can not be said that these cases do not govern the 

 present, though there was not then before us any act 

 of Congress whose validity was in question, for the 

 decisions rest upon the ground that the State statutes 

 were void only because Congress, and not the States, 

 was authorized by the Constitution to pass them, and 

 for the reason that Congress could enact such laws, 

 and for that reason alone, were the acts of the State 

 held void. It was. therefore, of the essence of the 

 decision which held the State statutes invalid, that a 

 similar statute by Congress would be valid. 



To the second objection the Court replied 

 that a tax is uniform within the meaning of the 

 Constitution when it operates with the same 

 force and effect in every place where the sub- 

 ject of it is found. " The tax in this case, which, 

 as far as it can be called a tax, is an excise duty 

 on the business of bringing passengers from 

 foreign countries into this by ocean navigation, 

 is uniform, and operates precisely alike in every 

 port of the United States where such passen- 

 gers can be landed." As to the tax being for 

 the general welfare of the United States, u it 

 would not be difficult to show that it is so, and 

 particularly that it is among the means which 

 Congress may deem necessary and proper for 

 that purpose. But the true answer to all these 

 objections is, that the power exercised in this 

 instance is not the taxing power. The burden 

 imposed on the ship-owner by this statute is 

 the mere incident of the regulation of com- 

 merceof that branch of foreign commerce 

 which is involved in immigration. The title 

 of the act, 'An act to regulate immigration,' 

 is well chosen. It describes, as well as any 

 short sentence can describe it, the real purpose 

 and effect of the statute. Its provisions, from 

 beginning to end, relate to the subject of im- 

 migration, and are aptly designed to mitigate 

 the evils inherent in the business of bringing 

 foreigners to this country, as those evils affect 

 both the immigrant and the people among whom 

 he is brought and left to his own resources. It 

 is true not much is said of protecting the ship- 

 owner. But he is the man who reaps the profit 

 from the transaction, who has the means to 

 protect himself and knows well how to do it, 

 and whose obligations in the premises need 



