10 



AFGHANISTAN. 



to the Russian fire, as the day was rainy and 

 their powder wet. The sharp fusillade thinned 

 their ranks rapidly. Two companies were 

 killed to a man. The Russians finally drove 

 them out at the point of the bayonet. After 

 a stubborn tight, the tew Afghan infantry who 

 survived tied over the bridge, leaving three 

 guns behind them. The Russians quickly pur- 

 sued them across the Kushk, and frustrated 

 an attempt to rally the fugitives and make an- 

 utber stand at the fortified camp. The Af- 

 ghan* were thoroughly demoralized. After a 

 brief resistance the entire Afghan army was in 

 full flight, abandoning guns, tents, and baggage. 

 After the engagement the Russians returned 

 to Kizil Tapa. The Afghans retreated to Marn- 

 chak. The Russians reported 1 Turkoman offi- 

 cer killed, 4 officers wounded, and of the rank 

 and Die 10 killed and 29 wounded. 



The action at Pul-i-Khisti, first known in 

 London on the 7th of April, was generally felt 

 in Europe to constitute a casus belli, which the 

 English, in view of their previous declarations 

 and their engagement to the Ameer, would cer- 

 tainly take up. Mr. Gladstone's statement in 

 Parliament that the Russian movement seemed 

 an act of "unprovoked aggression" increased 

 the disquietude. There was almost a panic in 

 London, where consols fell 2 per cent., and the 

 Continent A! bourses were depressed in sympa- 

 thy. 1L, do Giers begged the English Govern- 

 raeot not to allow " this regrettable incident " 

 to ioterfere with the course of negotiations. 

 He published a dispatch from Gen. Komaroff 

 justifying his actions, and explaining that the 

 conflict was brought about by the menacing 

 conduct of the Afghans and was a measure of 

 self-defense. The English ministry deferred 

 pronouncing a definite judgment until the ar- 

 riral of dispatches from Sir Peter Lumsden. 

 The public excitement soon abated. The 

 Ameer, who was at Rawul Pindi when the 

 news of the Penjdeh fight was brought, dis- 

 concerted English diplomacy by declaring that 

 b did not care about the retention of Penjdeh, 

 and would be satisfied with a boundary run- 

 ning through Znlfikar, Akrobat, and Marnchak, 

 which was almost identical with the line for 

 which the Russian Government was contend- 

 He also declared that the advance of an 

 English force through Afghanistan would pro- 

 voke a rising of the clans, and refused to allow 

 an English engineer officer to enter Herat to 

 report upon iu defenses, on the ground that he 

 Id not guarantee his safety. The attitude 

 [tb* Afghans toward their English allies was 

 sHoned to the officers of Sir Peter Lumsden's 

 who were not allowed to approach near 

 ongh to Herat to sketch the fortifications 

 pom the ontside. The abandonment of the 

 >r s claim to Penjdeh left room for a corn- 

 Preliminary arrangements for de- 

 ntation on this basis were discussed. Then 

 came dispatches from Sir Peter Lumsden relat- 

 ing to the Penjdeh affair, which again dashed 

 the expectations of a peaceful termination of 



the difficulty. Capt. Yate's report and Gen. 

 Lumsden's dispatches asserted that the Af- 

 ghans had not advanced; the taking up of 

 defensive positions was being considered in 

 the nature of an advance, while the Russians 

 drew up almost within range of the Afghan 

 guns and endeavored in various ways to pro- 

 voke the Afghans to begin the fight ; that they 

 had no knowledge of the agreement of March 

 17, and refused to give assurances that the 

 Afghans would not be attacked without notice. 

 Circumstances seemed to indicate that the Rus- 

 sian war ministry had willfully kept back the 

 agreement of the 17th, and that the untoward 

 event was the result of a deliberate design of 

 the military authorities and Prince Dondoukoff- 

 Korsakoff, the Governor-General of the Cau- 

 casus. From Russian dispatches it appeared 

 later that the orders transmitted to Gen. 

 Komaroff were "not to encroach upon Penj- 

 deh," and that this had not been commu- 

 nicated to the subordinate officer who treated 

 with Capt. Yate. The military party in Rus- 

 sia and the Muscovite press began to assume 

 a more defiant and bellicose tone. The ac- 

 quisition by England of the coaling-station of 

 Port Hamilton, near Vladivostock, and the 

 durbar at Rawul Pindi, were spoken of in 

 the Russian press as constituting a cause of 

 war. The English Government, which had 

 never relaxed its preparations for war, assumed 

 a peremptory tone again, while the attitude of 

 the Russian Foreign Office suddenly stiffened, 

 and imperious replies were returned to English 

 demands. To the English assertion that Af- 

 ghan outposts existed on the left bank of the 

 Kushk before March 17, M. de Giers replied 

 that the English ambassador assumed the con- 

 trary on the 5th of March ; that such a circum- 

 stance had not been foreseen when the Russian 

 officers were ordered not to advance, and that 

 Gen. Komaroff could not tolerate it, having 

 regard for the safety of his detachment. The 

 same day, April 20, the Russian minister tele- 

 graphed : " We are perfectly aware of the grav- 

 ity of the circumstances, and we share the wish 

 of the English Government to arrive at a friend- 

 ly understanding ; but we could not sacrifice 

 the interests of our dignity for it." The acts 

 of Gen. Komaroff, which the British Govern- 

 ment held to be contrary to the agreement of 

 March 17, were the advance of a large force 

 to Kizil Tapa on the 25th of March, reconnais- 

 sances on both flanks of the Afghan position, 

 and the ultimatum calling upon the Afghans 

 to retire from the left bank of the Kushk, 

 proceedings which justified the Afghans in 

 strengthening their position at Aktapa, and 

 throwing a force across the river where their 

 outposts had been stationed previous to the 

 agreement. 



t In answer to the first demand for explana- 

 tions of the Penjdeh incident, M. de Giers as- 

 cribed the collision to the military aspect of 

 sir Peter Lumsden's Boundary Commission, 

 which encouraged Afghan pretensions. He 



