AFGHANISTAN. 



13 



ish artillery with 328 men, 11,016 native in- 

 fantry, 624 native cavalry, and one native bat- 

 tery with 168 men, a total of 15,175 men with 

 22 guns. After the Zhob valley expedition the 

 5,673 men composing it were distributed in the 

 Quetta command and in Sinde. A consider- 

 able portion of this army of more than 20,000 

 troops, with 32 guns, was stationed in the 

 Pishin valley, 30 miles beyond Quetta, while 

 at Quetta there were garrisoned 7,000 men. 

 In Sinde there were 6,138 men and 12 guns. 

 Another enormous garrison was maintained in 

 the Punjaub, principally at Peshawer, near 

 the entrance of the Khyber Pass. 



There were no open and menacing prepara- 

 tions until after the arrival of the British com- 

 missioners on the Afghan frontier, when the 

 Cossacks advanced to Zulfikar and Akrobat, 

 and Gen. Komaroff's detachment threatened 

 Penjdeh, and when the English officers en- 

 couraged the Afghans to advance their out- 

 posts to the same line, and resist every further 

 encroachment, sending home at the same time 

 startling accounts of Russian acts of defiance 

 and aggression. The English demand for with- 

 drawal from the debatable zone had been met 

 by a further advance, and the English minis- 

 ters were in doubt as to whether it was a 

 question of 50 versts of sand and pasture-land, 

 with a few thousand Turkomans, or of the 

 seizure of the " gateway of India." The hot- 

 beaded officers on either side were likely to 

 provoke a collision at any time. A warlike 

 spirit was roused in England and India, and 

 was shared by the military and Anglo-Indian 

 authorities. The sentiments of the Ameer, 

 who was shortly to meet the Viceroy, were 

 not known; and, to preserve his confidence 

 and loyalty, the British Cabinet were ready to 

 go to war. To show the Czar, the Ameer, and 

 the Indian people that they would not shrink 

 from the defense of British interests, they be- 

 gan to mobilize when reports came that Ko- 

 marofF was threatening Penjdeh after the March 

 agreement. Lord Dufferin, when on the way 

 to Rawul Pindi, ordered 50,000 men to take 

 the field under the command of Sir Donald 

 Stewart. The force, composed of the elite of 

 the Anglo-Indian army, was divided into two 

 army corps, commanded respectively by Gen- 

 erals Hardinge and Sir Frederick Roberts. 

 Lord Hartington provided, in the supplement- 

 ary army estimates, for the immediate increase 

 of the English army by 15,000 men, to bring 

 up the regular army, weakened by the Egyp- 

 tian operations, to its normal strength. On 

 the same day, March 26, the British army and 

 militia reserves were called out by royal proc- 

 lamation. There were about 40,000 available 

 men in the regular army reserve, and 30,000 

 in the militia reserve, to enable the places of 

 the two army corps, and a reserve division of 

 10.000 men, also mobilized, to be supplied by 

 fresh English troops. There were already on 

 the Afghan frontier nearly enough men to 

 form the first army corps, the troops in the 



Quetta and Pishin district numbering about 

 20,000, and in Sinde 6,000 more. Arrange- 

 ments were made for sending 15,000 men from 

 England at once to India. The vote of credit 

 for 11,000,000 was asked for a few days be- 

 fore the settlement of the Penjdeh question, 

 on May 4. The Conservatives accused the 

 ministry afterward of threatening war against 

 Russia merely to cover their retreat from the 

 Soodan, and to obtain the money to pay the 

 losses of the Nile expedition by combining 

 the account with a vote fur military prepa- 

 rations. 



The naval authorities had long been busy in 

 the dock-yards preparing for the emergency 

 coaling the reserve fleet, overhauling the tor- 

 pedo-boats, and pushing forward the work of 

 construction and equipment. Orders were now 

 received to prepare for service the ships of 

 the first reserve and ships under construction 

 that could be speedily got ready. The naval 

 and military arsenals, and the private manu- 

 factories of arms and stores, were set in opera- 

 tion to the extent of their productive capacity. 

 The procrastination and delay of the Naval 

 Board with reference to breech-loading guns, 

 and other neglected matters, came to an end. 

 The War Office likewise showed an unwonted 

 and feverish activity. Before the end of March 

 a number of the fastest steamships of the Cu- 

 nard, National, and Guion lines were leased by 

 the Government on contracts running to Sept. 

 1, with the option of purchase. 



The most effective war measure that Eng- 

 land could take in Central Asia was the exten- 

 sion of the strategic railroad. It was expected 

 that it could be completed to Quetta by Sep- 

 tember, 1885, but the natural gradients were 

 found to be too steep between Sir-i-Bolan and 

 Darawaza, so that it could not be completed 

 for two years. A military road had been made 

 through the Bolan Pass before the concentra- 

 tion of troops at Quetta, but, owing to the lack 

 of bridges, a field railroad could not be laid, 

 and mules had to be relied on for transport. 

 Work was begun on a temporary railroad along 

 the bed of the Bolan river, and by the old road 

 to Sir-i-Bolan, and then, beyond the break in 

 the upper pass, from Darawaza to Quetta. 

 This was the route graded under the Conserva- 

 tive Administration. The embankments were 

 now to a great extent washed away. Work 

 was pushed forward also on the Harnai route. 

 Cholera soon broke out in the camps, necessi- 

 tating the cessation of operations on the Har- 

 nai line below the Chappar rift and on the 

 lower sections of the Bolan line, and the re- 

 moval of the men to the mountains until Sep- 

 tember, to work on the summit sections. Be- 

 yond Quetta the road was completed for thirty 

 miles by the end of July. 



During the period of extreme tension in 

 April and May, English cruisers followed Rus- 

 sian men-of-war in all their movements. In 

 American waters the Garnet shadowed closely 

 the Russian Strelok. The Russian admiral 



