262 



CONTEMPT OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY. 



in Congress, as necessary to the exercise of its 

 functions independent of any statute. "The 

 case now before us," the Court proceeded, "is 

 entirely different. It arises under a statute 

 enacted by the Legislature of New York. The 

 inquiry is, not whether the power to enact 

 such a law is to be found in the State Consti- 

 tution, but whether such legislation is prohib- 

 ited or restrained by that instrument, or by the 

 Constitution of the United States. Except as 

 thus limited, the State Legislature possesses 

 the whole legislative power of the State." 

 The main ground on which the statute was as- 

 sailed was that it confers upon each of the two 

 houses a power that is in its nature judicial, 

 to hear, adjudge, and condemn ; that no such 

 power can be conferred upon the Legislature 

 itself, or either branch of it ; that judicial power 

 is vested only in the courts, and can be rightly 

 exercised only by them. To this the Court re- 

 plied that notwithstanding the general division 

 of governmental powers into legislative, execu- 

 tive, and judicial, certain powers in their na- 

 ture judicial are by the express terms of the 

 State Constitution vested in the Legislature. 



The power of impeachment, for example, 

 is vested in the Assembly. Each house is 

 made the judge of the qualifications and elec- 

 tion of its own members ; other instances might 

 be cited. " I think it would be going too far," 

 says Judge Rapallo, who delivered the opinion 

 of the Court of Appeals, "to say that every 

 statute is necessarily void which involves ac- 

 tion on the part of either house partaking in 

 any degree of a judicial character, if not ex- 

 pressly authorized by the Constitution. Where 

 the statute relates to the proceedings of the 

 legislative body itself and is necessary or ap- 

 propriate to enable it to perform its constitu- 

 tional functions, I can not regard it as such an 

 invasion of the province of the judiciary as 

 should bring it within any implied prohibition 

 of the State Constitution. That instrument 

 contains no express provision declaring any of 

 the privileges of the members of either house, 

 except that for any speech or debate in either 

 house the members shall not be questioned in 

 any other place. Even the privilege of exemp- 

 tion from arrest during the sessions is not de- 

 clared. No power to keep order or to punish 

 members or others for disorderly conduct, or 

 to expel a member, is contained in the State 

 Constitution, as it is in the Constitution of the 

 United States. All these matters are in this 

 State left under the regulations of the statutes, 

 and there is not even express authority to en- 

 act such statutes. The necessity of the powers 

 mentioned is apparent and is conceded in all 

 the authorities, and it is equally apparent that 

 statutes upon the subject must authorize some 

 action partaking of a judicial character. If 

 that feature is a fatal objection, it annuls all the 

 statutory provisions in which it appears." The 

 opinion then proceeds as follows . 



The power of obtaining information for the purpose 

 of framing laws to meet supposed or apprehended 



evils is one which has from time immemorial been 

 deemed necessary and has been exercised by legisla- 

 tive bodies. In this State it does not rest upon prece- 

 dent merely, but is expressly conferred by statutes, 

 which proves that every chairman of a committee 

 either of the Senate or the Assembly, or of any joint 

 committee, is authorized to administer oaths to wit- 

 nesses, andj when the committee is by the terms of 

 the resolution appointing it authorized to send for 

 persons and papers, the chairman has the power, 

 under the direction of the committee, to issue compul- 

 sory process for the attendance of any witness within 

 the State whom the committee may wish to examine, 

 and to issue commissions for the examination of wit- 

 nesses out of the State. To subject a witness to pun- 

 ishment as for a contempt, the testimony sought must, 

 as lias already been shown, relate to a legislative pro- 

 ceeding. 



It is difficult to conceive any constitutional objec- 

 tion which can be raised to the provision authorizing 

 legislative committees to take testimony and to sum- 

 mon witnesses. In many cases it may be indispensa- 

 ble to intelligent and effectual legislation to ascertain 

 the facts which are claimed to give rise to the neces- 

 sity for such legislation and the remedy required, 

 and irrespective of the question whether, in the ab- 

 sence of a statute to that effect, either house would 

 have the power to imprison a recusant witness. I 

 can not yield to the claim that a statute authorizing it 

 to enforce its process in that manner is in excess of 

 the legislative power. To await the slow process of 

 indictment and prosecution for a misdemeanor might 

 prove quite ineffectual, and necessary legislation might 

 oe obstructed and perhaps defeated if the legislative 

 body had no other and more summary means of en- 

 forcing its right to obtain the required information. 

 That the power may be abused is no ground for deny- 

 ing its existence. It is a limited power and should be 

 kept within its proper bounds, and when these are 

 exceeded a iurisdictional question is presented which 

 is cognizable in the courts. My conclusion is that 

 subdivision 4 of section 13, 1 Ee vised Statutes, is con- 

 stitutional and valid. 



Throughout this Union the practice of legislative 

 bodies, and in this State the statutes existing at the 

 time the present Constitution was adopted, and whose 

 validity has never before been questioned by our 

 courts, afford strong arguments in favor of the recog- 

 nition of the right of either house to compel the attend- 

 ance of witnesses for legislative purposes, as one 

 which has been generally conceded to be an appropri- 

 ate adjunct to the power of legislation, and one winch, 

 to say the least, the State Legislature has constitu- 

 tional authority to regulate and enforce by statute. 



Having laid down these general principles, 

 the Court went on to consider their applica- 

 tion to the case before it. Two points were 

 presented for consideration: First, whether the 

 investigation was one with legitimate legisla- 

 tive ends in view ; second, whether the specific 

 questions (given above) which the witness re- 

 fused to answer were pertinent and proper. 

 The Court disposed of the second point by 

 saying that "we do not deem it necessary to 

 discuss it, because the contempt charged con- 

 sisted, not merely of the witness's refusal to 

 answer those questions, but of his refusing to 

 be further examined or to remain in attend- 

 ance upon the committee, though informed that 

 his examination was not concluded and warned 

 not to leave, and that if he left he did so at his 

 own peril. His refusal to be further examined 

 Or to remain in attendance was placed upon 

 the ground that the committee refused to rec- 

 ognize his right to be attended by counsel and 



