COUPON CASES. 



2G9 



when first enacted, the unchangeable law of 

 Virginia. After a tender of such coupons by 

 a tax-payer in payment of taxes, and a refusal 

 by a tax-collector to receive them, the situation 

 and rights of the tax-payer and coupon-holder 

 were precisely what they would have been if 

 he had made a like tender in gold coin and it 

 had been refused."' 



Mr. Justice Matthews, who wrote the opinion 

 of the Court, then proceeded to draw a distinc- 

 tion between the point raised in this case and 

 that decided by the Court two years before in 

 Antoni vs. Greenhow. The opinion in the lat- 

 ter case is given in the "Annual Cyclopaedia " 

 for 1882, page 648. The question there pre- 

 sented to the Court arose under the act of Jan. 

 14, 1882. That act, after reciting that forged 

 and spurious bonds were in existence, prohib- 

 ited treasurers and collectors from receiving 

 any of the 1871 coupons in payment of taxes 

 until their genuineness should be established by 

 the holder in a court of law. The tax-payer was 

 required to pay his taxes in money which would 

 be refunded to him after he had proved that 

 his coupons were genuine. The act then modi- 

 fied the existing remedy of the holder by pro- 

 viding that whenever any tax -payer should 

 apply to a court for a mandamus to compel a 

 collector to receive the coupons for taxes, it 

 should be the duty of the collector to make 

 return to the mandamus that he was "ready to 

 receive said coupons in payment of such taxes, 

 debts, and demands as soon as they have been 

 legally ascertained to be genuine." The Court 

 held that this act did not destroy the coupon- 

 holder's remedy, but merely changed it ; that 

 it did not impair the obligation of his contract, 

 and therefore was not unconstitutional. In 

 concluding the opinion of the court, Chief-Jus- 

 tice Waite said : "The question presented by 

 this record is not whether the tax-collector is 

 bound in law to receive the coupon, notwith- 

 standing the legislation which on its face pro- 

 hibits him from doing so, nor whether, if he 

 refuses to take the coupon and proceeds with 

 the collection of the tax by force, he can be 

 made personally responsible in damages for 

 what he does, but whether the obligation of 

 the contract has been impaired by the changes 

 which have been made in the remedies for its 

 enforcement in case he refuses to accept the 

 coupons. We decide only the question which 

 is actually before us." Justices Bradley and 

 Gray concurred. Justice Matthews concurred 

 in the judgment, but not in the reasons on which 

 it was based. Justices Field and Harlan dissent- 

 ed, and gave their views in elaborate opinions. 

 The difference between that case and the 

 one now before the court is thus explained by 

 Mr. Justice Matthews : 



That was a case in which it was sought, by manda- 

 mus, specifically to enforce the contract of the State 

 with the coupon-holder, by compelling, by affirmative 

 action and process of law, the collector actually to re- 

 ceive the coupons tendered in satisfaction of taxes. It 

 left unaffected the right of the coupon-holder and 

 i tax-payer, after his tender had been unlawfully re- 



fused, to stand upon his contract and the law, in de- 

 fense of his rights, both of person and property, 

 against all unlawful assaults and seizures. In tfic 

 former ho was an actor, seeking affirmative relief, to 

 compel the specific performance of the contract. In the 

 latter he < is a defendant, passively resting on his rights, 

 and resisting only demands and exactions sought to 

 be enforced against him in denial of them. Ho hat* 

 himself, in all things, performed the contract on hi 

 part, and obeyed the law, and simply insists, that if 

 more is illegally exacted and taken from him, ho shall 

 have the remedy which the law gives to every other 

 citizen, not himself in default, against the wrong-doer, 

 who, under color of law, but without law, disturbs or 

 dispossesses him. As we have seen, the coupon-holder 

 whose tender of genuine coupons in payment of taxes 

 has been refused, stands upon the same footing, in 

 this respect, as though he had tendered gold coin in 

 similar circumstances and with like result. The case 

 of the plaintiif here is reduced to this. He had paid 

 the taxes demanded of him by a lawful tender. The 

 defendant had no authority of law thereafter to attempt 

 to enforce other payment by seizing his property. In 

 doing so, he ceased to be an officer of the law, and be- 

 came a private wrong-doer. It is the simple case in 

 which the defendant, a natural private person, has un- 

 lawfully, with force and arms, seized, taken, and de- 

 tained the personal property of another. That an action 

 of detinue will lie in such a case, accordingto the law of 

 Virginia, has not been questioned. The right of 

 recovery would seem to be complete, unless this 

 case can be met and overthrown on some of the 

 grounds maintained in argument by counsel for the 

 defendant. 



The defense of Virginia was made chiefly on 

 two grounds : First, that the coupons of 1871 

 were bills of credit ; that their issue was in vio- 

 lation of Article I, section 10, of the Federal 

 Constitution, which declares that no State shall 

 " emit bills of credit " ; and hence that the cou- 

 pons were invalid. Second, that the suit of 

 the plaintiff could not be maintained because 

 it was a suit against the State of Virginia, in 

 violation of the eleventh amendment to the Fed- 

 eral Constitution, which declares that " the ju- 

 dicial power of the United States shall not be 

 construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 

 commenced or prosecuted against one of the 

 United States by citizens of another State, or 

 by citizens or subjects of any foreign state." 



The Court decided that the coupons in ques- 

 tion were not bills of credit within the mean- 

 ing of the constitutional prohibition. It then 

 went into an elaborate consideration of the 

 question whether the suit against the tax-col- 

 lector was a suit against the State which could 

 not be maintained. It said that the immunity 

 from suit secured to the States is a part of the 

 Constitution, of equal authority with every 

 other, but no greater, and to be construed and 

 applied in harmony with all the provisions ol 

 that instrument. Such immunity does not ex- 

 empt the State from the constitutional provis- 

 ion that no State shall pass any law impairing 

 the obligation of contracts, for it has long been 

 settled that contracts between a State and an 

 individual are as fully protected by the Consti- 

 tution as contracts between individuals. The 

 question whether a suit is within the prohibi- 

 tion of the eleventh amendment is not always 

 determined by reference to the nominal par- 

 ties on the record. "A defendant sued as a 



