COUPON CASES. 



npon, in all courts of justice, as if it were not and 

 never had been. The argument, therefore, which 

 peeks to defeat the present action, for the reason that 

 it is a suit against the State of Virginia, because the 

 nominal defendant is merely its officer and agent, act- 

 ing in its behalf, in its name, and for its interest, and 

 amenable only to it, falls to the ground, because its 

 chief postulate fails. The State of Virginia has done 

 none of these things with which this defense charges 

 her. The defendant in error is not her officer, her 

 agent, or her representative, in the matter complained 

 or, for he has acted not only without her authority, 

 but contrary to her express commands. The plaintiff 

 in error, in fact and in law, is representing her, as he 

 seeks to establish her law, and vindicates her integ- 

 rity as he maintains his own right. 



Tried by every test which has been judicially 

 suggested for the determination of the question, 

 this can not be considered to be a suit against the 

 State. The State is not named as a party in the 

 record ; the action is not directly upon the contract ; 

 it is not for the purpose of controlling the discretion of 

 executive officers, or administering funds actually in 

 the public treasury, as was held to be the case in 

 Louisiana vs. Jumel, 107 United States Keports, 711 ; 

 it is not an attempt to compel officers of the State to 

 do the acts which constitute a performance of its con- 

 tract by the State, as suggested by a minority of the 

 court in Antoni vs. Greenhow, 107 United States Re- 

 ports, 769, 783 ; nor is it a case where the State is a 

 necessary party, that the defendant may be protected 

 from liability to it, after having answered to the pres- 

 ent plaintiff. For, on this supposition, if the account- 

 ing officers of the State government refuse to credit 

 the tax-collector with coupons received by him in pay- 

 ment of taxes, or seek to hold him responsible for a 

 failure to execute the void statute, which required him 

 to refuse coupons in payment of taxes, in any action 

 or prosecution brought against him in the name of the 

 State, the grounds of the judgment rendered in favor 

 of the present plaintiff will constitute his perfect 

 defense. And as that defense, made in any cause, 

 though brought hi a State court, would present a ques- 

 tion arising under the Constitution and laws pt the 

 United States, it would be within the jurisdiction of 

 this Court to give it effect, upon a writ of error, with- 

 out regard to the amount or value in dispute. 



It is still urged upon us, however, in argument, 

 that, notwithstanding all that has been or can oe said, 

 it still remains that the controversy disclosed by the 

 record is between an individual and the State ; that 

 the State alone has any real interest in its determina- 

 tion ; that the practical effect of such determination 

 is to control the action of the State in the regular and 

 orderly administration of its public affairs and that, 

 therefore, the suit is and must be regarded as a suit 

 against the State, within the prohibition of the elev- 

 enth amendment to the Constitution. Omitting for 

 the time being the consideration already enforced, of 

 the fallacy that lies at the bottom of this objection, 

 arising from the distinction to be kept in view between 

 the government of a State and the State itself, the 

 premises which it assumes may all be admitted, but 

 the conclusion would not follow. 



The thing prohibited by the eleventh amendment 

 is the exercise of jurisdiction in a " suit in law or equi- 

 ty commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 

 States by citizens of another State : or by citizens or 

 subjects of any foreign state." Nothing else is touched, 

 and suits between individuals, unless the State is the 

 party in a substantial sense, are left untouched, no 

 matter how much their determination may incident- 

 ally and consequentially affect the interests of a State, 

 or the operations of its government. The fancied in- 

 convenience of an interference with the collection of 

 its taxes by the government of Virginia, by suits 

 against its tax-collectors, vanishes at once upon the 

 suggestion that such interference is not possible, ex- 

 cept when that government seeks to enforce the col- 

 lection of its taxes contrary to the law and contract of 



the State, and in violation of tho Constitution of tho 

 United States. The immunity from suit by the Stato 

 now invoked, vainly, to protect the individual wrong- 

 doers, finds no warrant in the eleventh amendment 

 to the Constitution, and i.s, in fact, a protest against 

 the enforcement of that other provision which forbids 

 any State from passing laws impairing the obligation 

 of contracts. To accomplish that result requires u 

 new amendment, which would not forbid any State 

 from passing laws impairing the obligation of its own 

 contracts. 



The above case, Poindexter vs. Greenhow, 

 was an action in detinue for the recovery of 

 the specific property of the plaintiff seized by 

 the defendant. White vs. Greenhow was an 

 action for damages alleged to have been sus- 

 tained by plaintiff through seizure of his prop- 

 erty by the defendant. The Court held it 

 could be maintained. In Allen vs. The Balti- 

 more and Ohio Railroad Company, the Court 

 held that the State officers might be restrained 

 by injunction from the collection of taxes by 

 distraint upon rolling-stock and other property 

 of railroad corporations after a tender of pay- 

 ment in tax-receivable coupons, on the ground 

 that there is no adequate remedy at law. 



In Marye vs. Parsons the Court held that the 

 contract right of a coupon-holder under the act 

 of 1871 can be exercised only by a tax-payer ; 

 that a coupon-holder who is not a tax-payer is 

 not entitled to an injunction to restrain tax- 

 collectors from refusing to receive his coupons 

 when tendered in payment of taxes. Parsons 

 was a citizen of New York, and filed a bill in 

 equity in the United States Circuit Court in 

 Virginia against Marye, the Auditor, and other 

 officers of the Commonwealth. He alleged that 

 he was the holder of coupons to the amount of 

 $28,000 ; that he had " made arrangements 

 with sundry tax-payers of Virginia to use his 

 coupons in payment of their taxes, by which 

 arrangement, if the said coupons can be used 

 without delay or difficulty, he will receive 

 nearly par therefor, and thus be able to have 

 his coupons collected." He asked that the de- 

 fendants be required to receive his coupons 

 when tendered in payment of taxes by any 

 tax-payer. In delivering the opinion of the 

 Supreme Court on this novel question, Justice 

 Matthews said : 



This bill is without precedent, and should have been 

 dismissed. It is a clear case, as stated, of damnum 

 absgue injuria. So far as the contract with the com- 

 plainant was, that the State should pay to him his cou- 

 pons at maturity, there is, no doubt, a breach ; but he 

 asks no relief as to that, for there is no remedy by suit 

 to compel the State to pay its debts. So far as the 

 contract was to receive the coupons of the complain- 

 ant in payment of taxes and other dues to the State, 

 there is no breach, for he does not allege that any of 

 them have been tendered by any tax-payer or debtor 

 to the State in payment of taxes or other dues ; nor 

 that there has been a refusal on the part of any tax- 

 collector, or other officer of the State charged with the 

 collection and receipt of taxes and dues to the State, 

 to receive them in payment therefor. Personally the 

 complainant has no right to offer them for such pur- 

 pose, for he owes no taxes or other debt to the State. 

 There is nothing shown in the bill by which he is 

 prevented from transferring them to others who would 

 nave the legal right to use them in that way, except 



