272 



COUPON CASES. 



that, being discredited for such uses by the previous 

 refusals of the officers of the State to receive other but 

 similar coupons, the complainant can find no one will- 

 ing to purchase them from him at a reasonable price 

 for such purposes. This damage is not actionable, 

 because it is not a direct and legal consequence of a 

 breach of the contract, and is not distinguishable from 

 the damage any creditor might suffer from the known 

 inability or unwillingness of his debtors to perform 

 their obligations. Such discredit might, and often 

 does, result in the bankruptcy and financial ruin of 

 the creditor, but no action lies to recover damages for 

 the consequential loss, which the law does not connect 

 with the default, as cause and effect. To enable the 

 complainant to avail himself of the benefit of his con- 

 tract with the State, to receive his coupons in pay- 

 ment of taxes, he must first assign them to some one 

 who has taxes to pay, as he has not ; but when he 

 does so, by the assignment, he has lost his interest in 

 the contract and his right to demand its performance, 

 all right to which he has transferred with the coupons. 

 It is only when in the hands of tax-payers or other 

 debtors that the coupons are receivable in payment 

 of taxes and debts due to the State. 



The bill as framed, therefore, calls for a declaration 

 of an abstract character, that the contract set out re- 

 quiring coupons to be received in payment of taxes 

 and debts due to the State is valid ^ that the statutes 

 of the General Assembly of Virginia impairing its 

 obligations are contrary to the Constitution of the 

 United States, and therefore void ; and that it is the 

 legal duty of the collecting officers of the State to re- 

 ceive them when offered in payment of such taxes and 

 debts. 



But no court sits to determine questions of law in 

 tTiesi. There must be a litigation upon actual trans- 

 actions between real parties, growing out of a contro- 

 versy affecting legal or equitable rights as to person 

 or property. All questions of law arising in such 

 cases are judicially determinable. The present is not 

 a case of that description. 



In Moore vs. Greenliow, decided May 4, 1885, 

 the Court, affirming the judgment of the Vir- 

 ginia Supreme Court of Appeals, held that the 

 State officers could not be compelled by man- 

 damus to receive coupons in payment of license- 

 taxes. " This being a case," said Justice Mat- 

 thews, "in which, by mandamus, the plaintiff 

 seeks to compel the officers of the State of Vir- 

 ginia to receive coupons instead of money in 

 payment of license-taxes, it comes within the 

 exact terms of the majority of this Court in 

 Antoni vs. Greenhow ['see Annual Cyclopae- 

 dia' for 1882, page 648], according to- which 

 the plaintiff is remitted to the remedy provided 

 by the act of Jan. 14, 1882." 



Chief - Justice Waite and Justices Miller, 

 Bradley, and Gray dissented from the princi- 

 ples affirmed by the majority of the Court, in 

 the opinion in Poindexter vs. Greenhow. The 

 dissenting opinion was prepared by Justice 

 Bradley. The fundamental ground of dissent 

 was that the proceedings in these coupon cases 

 were virtually suits against Virginia to compel 

 a specific performance by the State of its agree- 

 ment to receive the coupons in payment of all 

 taxes, dues, and demands. Such suits were re- 

 pugnant to the eleventh amendment of the 

 Federal Constitution. To the argument that 

 the laws passed by the State forbidding the 

 receipt of the coupons were in violation of 

 that provision of the Constitution which for- 

 bids a State to impair the obligation of con- 



tracts, Justice Bradley replied : If the con- 

 tract clause and the eleventh amendment came 

 into conflict, the latter has paramount force. 

 It was adopted as an amendment to the Con- 

 stitution, and operates as an amendment of 

 every part of the Constitution to which it is 

 at any time found to be repugnant. Every 

 amendment of a law or constitution revokes, 

 alters, or adds something. It is the latest de- 

 clared will of the law-maker, and has para- 

 mount force and effect. The effect of the 

 amendment is that even if a State should pass 

 a law impairing the validity of its own con- 

 tract, no redress can be had for the enforce- 

 ment thereof against the State in the Federal 

 courts. No State can be coerced into a fulfill- 

 ment of its contracts or other obligations to 

 individuals, by the instrumentality of the Fed- 

 eral judiciary. 



Now, what is the object, Justice Bradley 

 continued, of all this litigation, which fills our 

 courts in reference to the Virginia bonds and 

 coupons, but an attempt, through the medium 

 of the Federal courts, to coerce the State of 

 Virginia into a fulfillment of her contract; 

 to enforce a specific performance of her 

 agreement? It 'is nothing else. Injunctions 

 are sought, mandamuses are sought, damages 

 are sought, for the sole purpose of enforcing 

 a specific performance of the engagement made 

 by the State by the act of 1871. There is no 

 question about the validity of the taxes. They 

 are admittedly due. The officer is entitled to 

 collect them; his authority is undisputed. The 

 coupons are tendered in payment not as 

 money, for they have no quality of money 

 but as a set-off, which, as is insisted, the State 

 has agreed to allow. (The majority of the 

 Court held that the coupons were not set-offs.) 

 The tax-payer stands on this agreement. That 

 is the situation, and that is the whole of it. He 

 stands on the agreement, and seeks to enforce 

 it. All suits undertaken for this end are, in 

 truth and reality, suits against the State to 

 compel a compliance with its agreement. A 

 set-off is nothing but a cross-action, and can 

 no more be enforced against a State without 

 its consent than a direct action can be. It is 

 argued that these coupons are not set-offs. 

 The argument is not sound. 



The coupons, then, are tendered, and the 

 tax-collector declines to receive them. The 

 State does not permit him to receive them. 

 By subsequent legislation it has declared that 

 the taxes must be paid in money, and that the 

 tax-collector must receive nothing else in pay- 

 ment, and that coupons, if offered, must be in- 

 vestigated in a juridical way to ascertain their 

 genuineness before they will be paid, and when 

 so ascertained the provision for paying them 

 is ample. The officers have no power but 

 what the State gives them. They act for and 

 on behalf of the State, and in no other way. 

 To sue them, therefore, because they will not 

 receive the coupons in payment, is virtually to 

 sue the State. The whole object is to coerce 



