EGYPT. 



313 



said in the House of Commons that " Gen. 

 Gordon went not for the purpose of recon- 

 quering the Soudan, or to persuade the chiefs 

 of the Soudan, the sultans at the head of their 

 troops, to submit themselves to the Egyptian 

 Government. He went for the double purpose 

 of evacuating the country by extricating the 

 Egyptian garrisons, and reconstituting it by 

 giving back to these sultans their ancestral 

 powers, withdrawn or suspended during the 

 period of Egyptian occupation. We are un- 

 willing, I may say we were resolved to do 

 nothing which should interfere with the pacific 

 scheme the only scheme which promised a 

 satisfactory solution of the Soudanese difficulty, 

 by at once extricating the garrison and recon- 

 stituting the country upon its old basis of local 

 privileges." 



Gen. Gordon sent down the Nile, during the 

 six months of leisure that followed his entree 

 into Khartoum, 600 Arab (fellah) soldiers and 

 2,000 civilians, and up to the 14th of Decem- 

 ber, 1884, he could have gone himself or taken 

 the garrison to the succor of those who are re- 

 ported as holding out even now in Sennaar. 

 Until the fall of Berber, there is nothing to 

 prove that he could not have taken away all 

 the garrisons, men, women, and children. In- 

 stead of this, he proclaimed himself Sultan, dis- 

 tributed money to the people, proclaimed the 

 re-establishment of slavery, and proffered the 

 Mahdi the emirate of Kordofan. It leaves the 

 impression that his purpose was to make himself 

 in fact the Sultan of the country, and his proffer 

 to the Mahdi would seem to be a proof of this. 

 The fatal mistake committed by Gordon was 

 that he insisted upon believing the Mahdi to 

 be the chief of a simple revolt against an ac- 

 knowledged oppression. Gordon said: "lam 

 convinced that it is an entire mistake to regard 

 the Mahdi as in any sense a religious leader 

 he personifies popular discontent. All the Sou- 

 danese are political Mahdis, as all Egyptians are 

 political Arabis. The movement is not relig- 

 ious, but an outbreak of despair." 



Circumstances had shown that Mohammed 

 Ahmed was a duly accredited agent of several 

 religious societies. As early as' 1868 he was 

 at Khartoum, and there received religious 

 consecration, and was admitted into the con- 

 friries of Sid-Abd-el-Kader, Sid-el-Djilani, and 

 Sid-es-Senoussi, and in accordance with the 

 formulas of his initiation had sworn to conse- 

 crate his body and soul to the interests of 

 these orders. The prophet's ambition was 

 therefore beyond the price that Gordon offered, 

 which the Mahdi refused with disdain. 



The siege of Khartoum that followed, the 

 investment of the city by the Mahdi, the expe- 

 dition to rescue the rescuer, Stewart's splendid 

 march across the desert, the battles of Abou- 

 klea Wells and Metemneh, and death of the 

 heroic Stewart and his gallant comrades, the 

 repulse of the river-fleet under Wilson and Lord 

 Beresford in sight of the beleagured city, the 

 ( fill of Khartoum, the massacre, and the reported 



death of Gordon, all combine to present a pict- 

 ure of great dramatic interest. But it is in 

 strange contrast to the lone figure who months 

 before had set out across the desert of Koros- 

 ko, ostensibly to rescue, but who, after the sac- 

 rifice of much treasure and many precious lives, 

 has failed to be rescued. 



There has been much bitter recrimination in 

 England as to the responsibility that attaches 

 to Mr. Gladstone for this result. It is difficult 

 to understand in what way the statesman of 

 Midlothian can be responsible. Lord Gran- 

 ville, in the House of Lords, Feb. 19 of this 

 year, said : " Three weeks ago we had cheerful 

 messages from Gen. Gordon, with whom, at 

 least, we had got into somewhat closer com- 

 munication, and our troops were triumphing 

 over many material and military difficulties. It 

 was on the 4th of February, at a moment when 

 we were expecting to hear of the meeting be- 

 tween Sir Charles Wilson and Gen. Gordon, 

 that the dreadful news arrived that that in 

 which military attacks and attempts to starve 

 the garrison had failed, was accomplished by 

 an act of treachery against one of the greatest 

 of our countrymen. This danger had hung 

 over Gen. Gordon's head for weeks and months. 

 It could not be averted by any precipitate ac- 

 tion on our part; indeed, it appears to have 

 been accelerated by the approach of our troops. 

 I have been in the public service for many 

 years, and in my own experience I do not 

 remember such painful circumstances in which 

 a government was called upon to form a very se- 

 rious and grave decision. Before stating that de- 

 cision, perhaps your lordships will allow me very 

 briefly to refer to the character of Gen. Gor- 

 don's mission. When that distinguished man, 

 in a spirit of perfect unselfishness, volunteered 

 to go to Egypt, his instructions were to go 

 to Suakin and report. He was also author- 

 ized to comply with the wishes of the Egyp- 

 tian Government, which might be communi- 

 cated to him by Sir E. Baring. It was left to 

 him to decide whether either he or Col. Stew- 

 art should proceed to Khartoum. On his ar- 

 rival in Egypt, with the full concurrence of Sir 

 E. Baring and the Egyptian Government, and 

 in consequence of his own suggestion, he re- 

 ceived full powers from the Khedive as gov- 

 ernor. It was understood that the operations 

 were to be of a pacific character. The gener- 

 al expressed himself confident that the power 

 of the Mahdi had been exaggerated, and he be- 

 lieved that with time and patience it was pos- 

 sible to evacuate the garrisons and also to es- 

 tablish some form of native government in the 

 Soudan. He telegraphed that he considered 

 there was no danger of the massacre of women 

 and children. He was asked whether the re- 

 port of the sending of an armed force to Sua- 

 kin would be of use. His reply was, that he 

 valued much more the rumor of the force than 

 the force itself. His first proclamation was of 

 a pacific character, but he soon afterward sent 

 us a proposal that Zebehr Pasha, to whom he 



