314 



EGYPT. 



had been formerly opposed, should be sent to 

 the Soudan. We knew that Zebehr Pasha was 

 the deadly foe of Gen. Gordon we knew it 

 from his own words but we also knew that 

 the appointment would have constituted a dan- 

 ger to Gen. Gordon of a very urgent character, 

 a menace to Egypt, and a great encouragement 

 to the slave - trade. My lords, we agreed to 

 any other form of assistance which he might 

 prefer, and we placed at his disposal a sum of 

 money which might be required for any pur- 

 pose he deemed necessary. There was an al- 

 ternative suggestion made, namely, to send na- 

 tive soldiers to Wady Halfai, and he also sug- 

 gested the opening of the Berber route by some 

 Indian troops. It was the unanimous opinion 

 of the military authorities, including Sir Eve- 

 lyn Wood and Gen. Stephenson, that, although 

 the expedition to Berber might take place, it 

 was one of great danger on account of the cli- 

 mate, and also one of extraordinary military 

 risk. It would have been quite possible to 

 send out a few hundred men cavalry who 

 might arrive at Berber ; but I venture to ask 

 your lordships what would have been their 

 position if they had arrived ? 



" With regard to Gen. Graham's force, it was 

 impossible at that time to send that force ; when 

 it was finally decided, in August (1884), to send 

 out an expedition for the relief of Gen. Gor- 

 don, the great preponderance of military opin- 

 ion was in favor of that expedition taking the 

 Nile route. This opinion was confirmed by 

 many eminent officers, and by others who were 

 competent to speak on the subject. There 

 were not only military advantages but politi- 

 cal advantages connected with that route. The 

 object of sending the expedition was primarily 

 to rescue Gen. Gordon and those to whom Gen. 

 Gordon considered himself in honor bound, and 

 also the defense against an attack on Egypt. 

 There were other aims, viz., the evacuation of 

 the garrisons, the establishment of some form of 

 orderly government, and the checking the slave- 

 trade. There is hardly any doubt as to the 

 loss of Gen. Gordon, and, supposing that to 

 be true, there were three ways in which we 

 could deal with the matter. In the first place, 

 we could instruct Lord Wolseley to retreat ; in 

 the second, to concentrate his troops ; thirdly, 

 we could give instructions to Lord Wolseley 

 for the purpose of negotiating with the Mahdi. 

 As to the first alternative, it seemed to us that 

 there were overwhelming objections to it, both 

 military and political. It would not only have 

 exposed Egypt, which we are bound in honor 

 to defend, to great danger of invasion, but it 

 would also have exposed us to injury and in- 

 sult, probably, in different parts of the world. 

 We rejected that course. Well, with regard to 

 negotiations, we never shut the door to them, 

 either through Gen. Gordon or Lord Wolseley. 

 But what overtures has the Mahdi ever made 

 toward negotiations ? And even for the pur- 

 pose of negotiation, how could we have taken 

 up a worse position than, notwithstanding our 



military successes, to have shown ourselves in 

 a position of collapse in consequence of one act 

 of treachery far from our troops ? My lords, 

 the decision we came to, after grave consid- 

 eration, was that we were bound to tell Lord 

 Wolseley what our political object was. We 

 told him that it was to check the advance of ; 

 the Mahdi, and for that purpose to destroy his 

 power in Khartoum. We have left entirely to 

 Lord Wolseley the discretion of either attacking 

 Khartoum at once, or at a later period in the 

 autumn of this year. I am not able to tell 

 your lordships what decision Lord Wolseley 

 has come to ; we have given him, at his request, 

 a large force to be sent to Suakin ; and a rail- 

 way is being made from that port to Berber." 



Lord Wolseley s Expedition. The 1st of Janu- 

 ary, 1885, found Gen. Wolseley established at 

 Korti, on the Nile. The Mahdi was reported at 

 Omdurman, closely investing Khartoum. Lord 

 Wolseley thus held one angle of the right-angled 

 triangle movement which had Omdurman or 

 Khartoum as its apex and objective point. The 

 dispatch of the expedition of Sir Herbert Stew- 

 art, on the 8th of January, with a column of 

 1,500 men, across the Bayada Desert to Gakdul 

 and Metemneh, was naturally followed by a 

 movement under Gen. Earle toward Abou Ha- 

 med, to secure his base and protect his commu- 

 nications, which were constantly being threat- 

 ened by the enemy, who held the Korosko 

 Desert route at Abou Hamed. 



On the 17th January Gen. Stewart was at- 

 tacked with desperation by the enemy at Abou- 

 klea wells. The British lost 9 officers killed, 

 including Col. Burnaby, 65 men killed, and 85 

 wounded (12 per cent, of all present killed or 

 placed hors de combat), most of them in a hand- 

 to-hand struggle in the rush made into the 

 square. On the 19th, at sunrise, Gen. Stewart 

 was within five miles of the river, when he was 

 again attacked in force, having barely time to 

 construct a zeriba. Gen. Stewart received a 

 severe wound, from which he died on the 16th 

 of February at Gakdul, and two newspaper cor- 

 respondents, Mr. Cameron, of the "Standard," 

 and Mr. Herbert, of the "Morning Post," were 

 killed. Mr. Burleigh, of the " Daily Telegraph," 

 was wounded. When Gen. Stewart was wound- 

 ed, the command devolved upon Gen. Sir 

 Charles Wilson, as senior officer. The march 

 was resumed toward Metemneh, which was 

 found to be occupied in force. Shendy was 

 then bombarded and a lodgment effected upon 

 the river, where four of Gen. Gordon's steam- 

 ers were in waiting. The commandant landed 

 500 men and five guns as re-enforcements. 

 He had left Khartoum a month before, and 

 reported that at that time Gordon wanted for 

 nothing ; in fact, he was told by the General 

 to ask "why they had come?" On the 24th 

 Sir Charles Wilson left in two steamers, with 

 the Sussex regiment and the black troops, for 

 Khartoum, Col. Boscawen being left hehinc 

 in command of the intrenchments that had 

 been thrown up at Gubat, on the Nile. Capt 



