556 



McCLELLAN, GEORGE B. 



tered in the neighborhood of the capital, in 

 positions taken almost at random. The three- 

 months' regiments were being mustered out; 

 old regiments were disheartened by defeat, and 

 new levies were pouring in. McClellan's first 

 task was to render Washington safe, with a 

 small garrison, against any ordinary attack, and 

 this was done by the construction of a series of 

 fortifications ; his second task was the organi- 

 zation of a great army. He did his work well, 

 for unlimited means were put at his disposal, 

 and he enjoyed for a time the confidence of the 

 Administration and the people, and had won 

 the abiding love of the soldiers. He became 

 the national hero, unfortunately for himself, 

 before he had earned the right to be so ; but 

 he made good use of his popularity in spend- 

 ing it upon the foundations of our success. 

 On Aug. 4 he submitted to the President a 

 memorandum on the conduct of the war, in 

 which a general plan of operations was sug- 

 gested. He argued that the main struggle 

 would be in Virginia, but he suggested after 

 West Virginia, Missouri, and Kentucky were 

 secure movements down the Mississippi and 

 into Tennessee. He asked for the main army, 

 to be under his own control, 273,000 men, and 

 said : u I propose, with the force which I have 

 requested, not only to drive the enemy out of 

 Virginia and occupy Richmond, but to occupy 

 Charleston, Savannah, Montgomery, Pensacola, 

 Mobile, and New Orleans ; in other words, to 

 move into the heart of the enemy's country, 

 and crush the rebellion in its very heart." In 

 a letter to the Secretary of War, near the close 

 of October, he urged unity of plan and the con- 

 centration of forces in Virginia. He then re- 

 ported the aggregate strength of the army of 

 the Potomac at 168,318 officers and men, with 

 228 guns ; the force present for duty at 147,- 

 695; the effective force at 134,285; and the 

 number disposable for an advance at 76,285. 

 He estimated the force requisite for an advance 

 at 208,000 men, with 488 guns. 



As early as Oct. 15 the organization of the 

 army had been completed, except the forma- 

 tion of army corps, which was postponed until 

 the opening of the campaign; and this work 

 was so admirably done that no subsequent dis- 

 aster could undo it. Before that time the im- 

 patience of the country for an advance of the 

 main army, which had precipitated the Bull 

 Run campaign, began to make itself felt again ; 

 and the only serious combat that took place 

 along McClellan's lines, the disaster at Ball's 

 Bluff, Oct. 21, seriously affected his popularity, 

 though he was not directly responsible for it. 

 On Nov. 1, 1861, on the retirement of Gen. 

 Scott, he was made General-in-Chief of the 

 Union armies. Besides exercising supervision 

 over the military movements in the West, he 

 arranged the expedition under Burnside for 

 the capture of Roanoke Island and Newbern, 

 and that under Butler for the capture of New 

 Orleans. His letter of instructions to the 

 former, Jan. 7, 1862, indicates Wilmington and 



Raleigh as possible objectives; his letter to 

 the latter, Feb. 23, 1862, indicates the purpose of 

 pushing up the Mississippi to meet the advance 

 of the Northwestern army, and the subsequent 

 reduction of Mobile, Pensacola, and Galveston. 



During the brief period when he was Gener- 

 al-in-Chief, the campaign of Forts Henry and 

 Donelson was carried out, and the campaigns 

 against New Madrid and Corinth begun. But 

 in the mean while the principal Confederate 

 army lay at Manassas, apparently besieging the 

 national capital, and the pressure for a for- 

 ward movement of the Army of the Potomac 

 became too powerful to be resisted with im- 

 punity. McClellan had delayed so long in col- 

 lecting military resources that certain moral 

 forces necessary to success had failed him. 

 The President's faith in him was shaken; pop- 

 ular confidence was impaired ; the active jeal- 

 ousy of many political leaders, displeased with 

 his reticence and suspicious of his opinions, 

 was roused, and he was destined to begin the 

 campaign strong only in the discipline, love, 

 and loyalty of the army he had formed. On 

 Dec. 1, 1861, the President proposed a plan 

 for an advance by which 50,000 men were 

 to menace the Confederate position at Ma- 

 nassas, while 50,000 were to execute a flank 

 movement by Occoquan creek. On Dec. 10 

 McClellan hinted in reply that he had a plan 

 in his mind that would probably prove a sur- 

 prise to friends and foes ; but about the mid- 

 dle of that month he fell sick and was con- 

 fined to his house until the middle of January, 

 1862. During this time the President had 

 called into conference Generals McDowell and 

 Franklin, and declared that " if something was 

 not done soon, the bottom would be out of 

 the whole affair." McClellan, on his recov- 

 ery, "found that excessive anxiety for an im- 

 mediate movement of the Army of the Po- 

 tomac had taken possession of the minds of 

 the Administration," and he submitted to the 

 Secretary of War, and subsequently to the 

 President, his plan for an attack on Richmond 

 by way of the lower Chesapeake, which the 

 latter disapproved. On Jan. 27, 1862, the 

 President issued his first general war order, 

 commanding an advance of all the Union 

 forces Feb. 22 ; and on Jan. 31 he issued his 

 first special war order, commanding the Army 

 of the Potomac to move against the railroad 

 southwest of Manassas on or before Feb. 2 

 McClellan submitted an elaborate argument 

 against this order, Feb. 3. He recalled what 

 he had done in organizing the army and forti- 

 fying the capital, and urged the necessity o 

 a general and harmonious plan of action, 

 set Richmond and Nashville as his immediate 

 objective points, East and West, and descriw 

 his general design as follows : 



After a successful battle our position would be 

 Burnside forming our left ; Norfolk held secur* 

 our center connecting Burnside with Buell, both 03 

 Raleigh and Lvnchburg ; Buell in Eastern Tennessc 

 and northern "Alabama; Halleck at Nashville a 

 Memphis. 



