McCLELLAN, GEORGE B. 



557 



The next movement would be to connect with Sher- 

 man on the left by reducing Wilmington aud Charles- 

 ton, to advance our center into South Carolina and 

 Georgia ; to push Buell either toward Montgomery or 

 to unite with the main army in Georgia: to throw 

 Halleck southward to meet the naval expedition from 

 New Orleans. 



His plan for the advance against Richmond 

 was to move the army mainly by water to 

 Urbana, on the lower Rappahannock, a point 

 neither occupied nor observed by the enemy ; 

 then to push on to West Point, at the head of 

 York river, only one march distant, thus se- 

 curing a base within two days' march of the 

 Confederate capital. "A rapid movement from 

 Urbana," he said, "would probably cut off 

 Magruder on the Peninsula, and enable us to 

 occupy Richmond before it could be strongly 

 re-enforced. Should we fail in that, we could, 

 with the co-operation of the navy, cross the 

 James and throw ourselves in rear of Rich- 

 mond, thus forcing the enemy to come out and 

 attack us, for his position would be untenable 

 with us on the southern bank of the river." 

 As a less desirable plan, he suggested an ad- 

 vance along the Peninsula, between the James 

 and York rivers, with Fortress Monroe as a 

 base. He sst the force requisite for an advance 

 at from 110,000 to 140,000 men. From the 

 beginning he had no intention of attacking the 

 Confederates in their position at Manassas, and, 

 while the country supposed him afraid to at- 

 tempt to drive them out, he was really anxious 

 that they should stay there. 



The President, though not formally, with- 

 drew his special order for an advance on Ma- 

 nassas, and there were various unsatisfactory 

 conferences over the plan of campaign. Fi- 

 nally, March 8, after a council of generals of 

 division had approved of the Urbana route by 

 a vote of eight to four, the President issued 

 his second ganeral war order, dividing the army 

 into corps and appointing corps commanders, 

 and his third general war order, providing 

 that no change of base should be made by the 

 Army of the Potomac, " without leaving in and 

 about Washington such a force as, in the opin- 

 ion of the General-in-Chief and the command- 

 ers of army corps, shall leave the city entirely 

 secure," and imposing other conditions in re- 

 gard to clearing the lower Potomac of Confed- 

 erate batteries before moving by the lower 

 Chesapeake. The latter order was issued with- 

 out McClellan's knowledge, and put him under 

 the check of the corps commanders, only one 

 of whom had favored the movement by way 

 of Urbana. On March 9 the Confederates 

 evacuated Manassas, having received direct 

 intelligence of McClellan's plans, or having 

 interred their character from the preparations 

 on foot. The army advanced and took posses- 

 sion of the works, and the subsequent cam- 

 paign therefore appeared in the public eyes as 

 the consequence rather than the cause of the 

 Confederate retreat. As the Confederate army 

 took up a position on the south bank of the 

 Rappahannock, the plan for an advance by 



way of Urbana had to be given up, and the 

 movement from Fortress Monroe as a base 

 was determined upon, though the navy, which 

 had merely beaten off the ram Merrimac, March 

 9, could not control the James river at that 

 time. On March 11 the President issued a 

 war order relieving McClellan from general 

 command, but retaining him in command of 

 the Department of the Potomac. On March 13 

 a council of war approved of the plan for the 

 Peninsular campaign unanimously, with certain 

 provisos, the chief of which were the co-opera- 

 tion of the navy in York river, and the cover- 

 ing of Washington with a sufficient force. The 

 same day the President approved of the plan, 

 with the condition that precautions should be 

 taken to prevent the reappearance of the enemy 

 at Manassas, and that Washington should be 

 left perfectly secure. On March 19 McClellan 

 submitted more in detail his plan for an ad- 

 vance, insisting upon the necessity of naval co- 

 operation, especially in the attack on York- 

 town. On March 31 the President, with much 

 reluctance, but yielding to political pressure, 

 transferred Blenker's division of 10,000 men 

 from the Army of the Potomac to the Mountain 

 Department, to give importance to Fremont's 

 command. 



The embarkation of the army began on 

 March 17, and McClellan left Washington April 

 1 and reached Fortress Monroe April 2. On 

 the former day he made a report of the forces 

 left available for the defense of Washington, 

 which he estimated at 73,436 men. This esti- 

 mate included not only the garrison of about 

 20,000 troops in the forts, but all troops sta- 

 tioned or operating within supporting distance 

 of the city. This force was not considered 

 sufficient by the President, and his opinion 

 was sustained by a report from Gen. Hitch- 

 cock and Adjutant-Gen. Thomas, who made 

 a special examination of the subject. Out of 

 this difference of opinion came the chief disas- 

 ters of the campaign, and the historical esti- 

 mate of McClellan will depend greatly on the 

 view taken of it. Before he left the capital, 

 Fortress Monroe was placed under his com- 

 mand. On April 3 he was notified that he 

 was not to command there or to detach troops 

 from that post, so that his base was left out- 

 side of his control. On April 4 his department 

 was narrowed so as to cover only that part of 

 Virginia north of James river and east of the 

 Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, exclu- 

 sive of territory within sixty miles of Fortress 

 Monroe. The same day McDowell's corps, 

 nearly a third of his force, which had not yet 

 joined him, was withdrawn from his army, 

 and that general was ordered to report to the 

 Secretary of War. Of this order McClellan 

 said: "To me the blow was most discourag- 

 ing. It frustrated all my plans for impending 

 operations ; it fell when I was too deeply com- 

 mitted to withdraw; it left me incapable of 

 continuing operations which had begun ; it 

 compelled the adoption of another, a different, 



