McCLELLAN, GEORGE B. 



559 



force on the south bank of the Chickahominy, 

 and found the maintenance of the line to White 

 Ilouse difficult and useless. On June 16 Lee 

 wrote to Jackson, "Unless McClellan can be 

 driven out of his intrenchments, he will move 

 by positions, under cover of his heavy guns, 

 within shelling distance of Richmond." Mc- 

 Clellan had set June 26 as the day for an ad- 

 vance ; but on June 25, Jackson, coming from 

 the Valley, began to drive in his pickets, threat- 

 ening his right and rear on the left or north bank 

 of the Chickahominy. The same day the Sec- 

 retary of War telegraphed that neither Banks, 

 Fremont, nor McDowell, knew anything about 

 Jackson's position or purposes, and that pos- 

 sibly his destination might be Richmond. Mc- 

 Clellan sent word to Washington that the crisis 

 which he had anticipated so long and tried so 

 earnestly to prevent had come, and warned the 

 authorities not to be discouraged if his com- 

 munications were cut off. " The case," he said, 

 "is perhaps a difficult one, but I shall resort to 

 desperate measures, and will do my best to 

 out-manoeuvre, out-wit, and out-fight the ene- 

 my." This hinted at the retreat to the James, 

 which was determined upon at the close of the 

 next day. Lee, leaving 25,000 men in front of 

 the main body of the Army of the Potomac be- 

 fore Richmond, threw the mass of his forces, 

 re-enforced by Jackson's army, on the single 

 corps still holding the north bank of the 

 Chickahorainy and the line of communication 

 with White House ; McClellan, abandoning his 

 old base on the Pamunkey, set his vast trains 

 in motion for the new base on the James, and 

 retreated almost directly southward. In this 

 movement occurred what are known as the 

 Seven Days' battles: Mechanicsville or Elli- 

 son's Mills, June 26; Gaines's Mill, June 27; 

 Savage's Station, June 29; Allen's Farm or 

 Peach Orchard, June 29 ; Glendale, or White 

 Oak Swamp, or Frazier's Farm, June 30 ; Mal- 

 vern Hill, July 1. 



Though the moral effect of victory lay with 

 the Confederates, and was emphasized by the 

 subsequent withdrawal of the Army of the 

 Potomac to Washington, they were successful 

 in but one of these battles, Gaines's Mill. 

 After that success, Lee lost a day through his 

 error in supposing that McClellan was retreat- 

 ing northward up the Peninsula, so that to some 

 extent, if not altogether, the latter made good 

 Ins pledge to out-manoeuvre, out-wit, and out- 

 fight the enemy. He has been censured for 

 failing to throw his army, concentrated south 

 of the Chickahominy, upon Richmond, June 

 28, as well as for failing to advance on that 

 city while the battle of Gaines's Mill was in 

 progress on the north bank, June 27. It is 

 known that he entertained such a project, but 

 that none of his corps commanders approved 

 of it. He has also been censured for failure to 

 advance after the battle of Malvern Hill, as 

 well as for failure to advance after the battle 

 of Fair Oaks ; and these criticisms have been 

 strengthened by facts in regard to the condi- 



tion of the Confederates made known since the 

 close of the war. From Savage's Station, June 

 28, McClellan sent to the Secretary of War his 

 passionate protest against what he considered 

 the failure of the Administration to support 

 him properly. " If I save this army now," he 

 said at the close, " I tell you plainly that I owe 

 no thanks to you or to any other persons at 

 Washington. You have done your best to sacri- 

 fice this army." 



On July 3 the Army of the Potomac was in 

 camp at Harrison's Landing, and the campaign 

 was a failure in the eyes of the country. Mc- 

 Clellan, with a smaller force than was subse- 

 quently put at the disposal of some of his suc- 

 cessors, had encountered the most numerous 

 Confederate army that ever took the field, and 

 the greatest Confederate captains of the civil 

 war. He had shown strategical and tactical 

 ability of a high order, and personal qualities 

 that gained and kept the love of his soldiers 

 through every trial. But then, as afterward, 

 he was misled by the secret service into grave 

 errors as to the number of the enemy ; and 

 then, as afterward, he was too anxious to 

 secure, before acting, every condition theo- 

 retically requisite to success, and too ready to 

 assume a perfection of preparation on the part 

 of the Confederate leader that was unattain- 

 able on his own. His fault as a soldier was in 

 expecting things as they ought to be, and not 

 taking them as he found them. Perhaps, too, 

 he was not prodigal enough of human life and 

 suffering for the game of war. 



On July 7 he wrote to the President his well- 

 known letter from Harrison's Landing on the 

 conduct of the war, which was not less politi- 

 cal than military in its scope, and put him dis- 

 tinctly in antagonism to the prevailing senti- 

 ment of the party in power. In this letter he 

 urged the policy of appointing a General-in- 

 Chief; and on July 11 Gen. Halleck was select- 

 ed for that position. In the interim the Presi- 

 dent had visited the army. On June 26 the 

 armies of Banks, Fremont, and McDowell had 

 been consolidated into the Army of Virginia, 

 under command of Gen. Pope. On July 11 

 McClellan sent the President word that he was 

 strong enough for all defensive purposes, and 

 on July 17 he asked for Burnside's troops to 

 enable him to resume the offensive. July 25 

 and 26 Halleck visited the Army of the Poto- 

 mac and conferred with McClellan as to the 

 amount of re-enforcements necessary for an 

 advance, and concluding that sufficient troops 

 were not available, he ordered, Aug. 3, the with- 

 drawal of the Army of the Potomac from its 

 position on James river. Meanwhile McClel- 

 lan, obeying a previous order, had begun a 

 reconnaissance, which, Aug. 5, was pushed 

 beyond Malvern Hill. On Aug. 4 he sent a 

 dispatch, protesting against the withdrawal 

 of his army. Among other things, he said: 

 "All points of secondary importance else- 

 where should be abandoned, and every avail- 

 able man brought here; a decided victory 



