BULGARIA. 



105 



tional order, and assert the monarchic prin- 

 ciple, and closed by saying that he owed his 

 crown to Russia, and was willing to place it in 

 the hands of Russia's Czar. The Emperor 

 returned a gruff answer, in which he did not 

 even deny that the Russian Government was 

 a party to the revolution, in answer to the 

 prince's expression of confidence that such was 

 not the case, but simply said that he disap- 

 proved of the restoration of Alexander. 



Soon after his arrival in Sofia, Alexander 

 received from the German and Austrian con- 

 suls an identical note, wherein both powers 

 entered a protest in advance against the execu- 

 tion of any of the mutineers and conspirators. 

 He perceived at once that he could not expect 

 from the German powers any moral support in 

 opposition to the will of Russia, and telt that 

 Russian plots would render his stay impossible, 

 and plunge the country into disorder and an- 

 archy unless the laws could be enforced against 

 traitors, and the discipline of the army main- 

 tained. Bribes, threats, and promises could 

 again be employed to effect his removal by a 

 stronger faction than took part in the revolu- 

 tion of Aug. 21, without the need of direct 

 Russian intervention. He therefore decided 

 that the best chance for the maintenance of 

 Bulgarian independence lay in his abdication, 

 and that the immediate resignation of the 

 throne might save the country from strife and 

 confusion that would result in Russian occupa- 

 tion, and himself from a second expulsion. 



After a popular ovation and a review of the 

 troops, on the 3d of September, Alexander ad- 

 dressed the officers and the members of the 

 diplomatic corps in his palace, saying that for 

 seven years he had labored for the independ- 

 ence and the interests of Bulgaria, and that 

 his chief care had been the army and the offi- 

 cers, whom he had regarded as his children. 

 He could now leave Bulgaria without causing 

 disorder, and would always pray for the coun- 

 try ; his heart would be with his officers, and 

 he would be the first who as a volunteer would 

 desire to go into the field with them. He could 

 no longer remain in Bulgaria, because the Czar 

 of Russia would not have it, and because his 

 presence in Bulgaria conflicted with the inter- 

 ests of the country. When Popoif assured 

 him that the army would stand by him, he an- 

 swered that the independence of Bulgaria re- 

 quired that he should leave the country; that 

 if he remained, it would lead to a Russian occu- 

 pation. But before he went, he said, he would 

 consult the higher officers, and appoint a re- 

 gency which would protect the interests of the 

 officers. In any case, he said, he could depend 

 on the army. 



On Sept. V, before his departure, the prince 

 addressed a circular to the diplomatic agents 

 in Sofia, in which he renounced the throne, on 

 the ground that foreign political relations had 

 made the step necessary. In the night follow- 

 ing, his manifesto was affixed in the provincial 

 towns and villages. He nominated as regents 



Karaveloff, Starabuloff, and Mutkuroff, and 

 submitted their names to an assembly of lead- 

 ing civilians and the higher officers. 



The composition of the regency was a sub- 

 ject of contention between the politicians and 

 the military. The officers considered that they 

 should have had at least two representatives, 

 while some of the deputies held that the re- 

 gency as constituted was illegal, because the 

 Constitution prescribed that only such as had 

 filled the posts of ministers or judges of the 

 Supreme Court could be called to the office a 

 condition that was not fulfilled in the case of 

 either Stambuloff or Mutkuroff. The officers 

 objected to Karaveloff, who was suspected of 

 having been concerned in the prince's deposi- 

 tion. At eleven o'clock the notables proceeded 

 to the palace and reported that they were con- 

 vinced of the truth of Karaveloff, and were 

 satisfied with the nominations to the regency. 

 Five minutes later a printed proclamation was 

 circulated announcing the departure of Prince 

 Alexander in the afternoon. 



The soldiers were drawn up in the streets of 

 the city, and the inhabitants of Sofia lined the 

 road for ten miles outside. As the prince's 

 convoy passed along, the army and populace 

 demonstrated their grief in an unmistakable 

 manner. In bidding farewell to the officers 

 who rode in the convoy, neither Alexander nor 

 they could suppress their emotion. At Lorn 

 Palanka, AYiddin, and smaller places, the peo- 

 ple showed by enthusiastic demonstrations 

 their attachment for the hero of Slivnitza. 



Attitude of the Powers. The understanding 

 between Germany and Austria, as appeared 

 from Premier Tisza's answer to the interpella- 

 tions in the Hungarian Parliament, was that 

 Prince Alexander was to be set aside and Rus- 

 sia allowed to regain, as far as fhe could by 

 moral pressure, the influence in Bulgarian af- 

 fairs that she possessed before the estrange- 

 ment of the prince and people by the arrogant 

 interference of the Czar's agents. Alexander 

 was in bad odor on account of his disregard of 

 the Berlin Treaty and of the treaty powers. 



The course of England was resented as an 

 attempt to gain political and commercial pres- 

 tige by intrigues that threatened to plunge 

 Europe in war, without herself incurring risk 

 or responsibility. Alexander had made him- 

 self objectionable to Austria and Germany as 

 well as to Russia, because he had proved ame- 

 nable to such influences. It was only after 

 the Austro-German position had been defined 

 by the Hungarian minister that Lord Randolph 

 Churchill, and afterward Lord Salisbury, inti- 

 mated, in public speeches, that Great Britain 

 would aid in repelling a Russian movement. 



In his avowal that he had received his 

 crown from Russia and his offer to surrender 

 it to the Czar, Alexander showed as little re- 

 spect for the sanction of Europe as in placing 

 himself at the head of the Roumelian revolu- 

 tion. If the Czar had taken him at his word, 

 and sent a commissary to administer the Gov- 



