240 



CONGRESS. (SUSPENSIONS FROM OFFICE.) 



try, and had control of all papers and records, not by 

 reason of anything expressed in the Articles of Con- 

 federation, but by reason of the intrinsic nature of 

 free government. The jurisdiction of the two Houses 

 of Congress to legislate and the power to advise or 

 withhold advice concerning treaties and appointments 

 necessarily involves the jurisdiction to officially know 

 every step and action of the officers of the law, and all 

 the facts touching their conduct in the possession of 

 any department or even in the possession of the 

 President himself. There was no need to express 

 such a power, for it was necessarily an inherent inci- 

 dent to the exercise of the powers granted. 



It will be observed that in this instance the call for 

 papers covered a period of more than six months, dur- 

 ing which the regular incumbent of the office had 

 been discharging its duties, and also the further pe- 

 riod of more than six months, during which the per- 

 son designated to discharge those duties on suspension 

 of the officer had been acting, and that that person is 

 the one now proposed to be appointed to the place. 



It will also be observed that the President has not 

 undertaken to remove the incumbent of the office, but 

 has only, in expressed and stated pursuance of the 

 statutes on the subject, suspended that officer, and 

 that the same statutes expressly provide that such 

 officer shall not be removed without the advice and 

 consent of the Senate, and that, if that advice and con- 

 sent be not given, the incumbent would (unless his 

 regular term of office should have previously expired) 

 at the close of this session of the Senate be restored to 

 the lawful right to exercise its duties. The Senate, 

 then, by this nomination is asked to advise and con- 

 sent to the removal of the incumbent and to the ap- 

 pointment of the candidate proposed for his place. In 

 exercising its duty in respect of these questions it is 

 plain that the conduct and management of the incum- 

 bent is a matter absolutely essential to be known to 

 the Senate, in order that it may determine whether it 

 can rightly advise his removal or rightly leave him to 

 resume the functions of his office'at the end of its 

 session, as well as whether the candidate proposed 

 has in the exercise of the office under his designation 

 so conducted himself as to show that he is competent 

 and faithful. Indeed, it may be stated with entire 

 accuracy that even in the case of a vacancy in an 

 office and the proposed filling of such vacancy it is 

 important for the Senate to know the previous con- 

 dition and management of the office, the state of its 

 affairs ; whether there have been cases of misconduct 

 or abuse of powers, the embezzlement of money, and 

 indeed all the circumstances bearing upon its a'dmin- 

 istration, in order that it may judge of the suitable- 

 ness of appointing a particular person to take up its 

 duties with reference to the difficulties that may exist 

 in its affairs, the state of the accounts, and everything 

 concerning its administration, so as to measure the 

 fitness and competency of the particular candidate to 

 meet the emergencies of the case. 



It appears from the table herewith submitted that 

 out of about fourteen hundred and eighty-five nomi- 

 nations sent to the Senate during the first thirty days 

 of this session, that is, from the first Monday in De- 

 cember, 1885, to the 5th of January, 1886, six hundred 

 and forty -three were nominations of persons proposed 

 to be appointed in the place of officers suspended and 

 proposed to be removed (and of whom it is known 

 that some are soldiers), and in respect of whom the 

 action of the Senate in advising and consenting to the 

 proposed appointment would effect a rcmovarand in 

 respect of wnom the failure of the Senate to advise 

 and consent to such removals and appointments the 

 effect would be to restore them to the possession of 

 their offices at the end of the session, except in cases 

 in which the terms of some of them should hav< 

 viously expired. 



?e pre- 



Is it not desirable and necessary to the proper per- 

 formance of its duties and in every aspect of the pub- 

 lic interest that the simple facts in regard to what the 

 conduct of these officials as well as in regard to what 



the conduct of the persons designated to perform their 

 duties has been should be made known to the Senate ? 

 Have these suspended officials, or any considerable 

 number of them, been guilty of misconduct in office, 

 or of any personal conduct making them unworthy to 

 be longer trusted with the performance of duties im- 

 posed upon them by law ? If they have, it would 

 seem to be clear that every consideration of public 

 interest and of public duty would require that the 

 facts should be made known, in order that the Senate 

 may understandingly and promptly advise their re- 

 moval, and that the "most careful scrutiny should be 

 had in respect of selecting their successors, as well as 

 in respect of providing better means and safeguards 

 by legislation for administering the laws of the United 

 States. 



Such information, it would seem, the Executive is 

 determined the Senate shall not possess, for the al- 

 leged reason that it might enable the Senate to 

 understand what circumstances connected with the 

 faithful execution of the laws induced the President 

 to exercise the discretion the statute confers upon him 

 to suspend them and ask the Senate to unite with him 

 in their removal from office. A similar result would 

 follow in respect of the knowledge of any and every 

 step in the transactions of the Government ; for in- 

 stance, the President, as Commandcr-in-Chief of the 

 Army, lias as large discretion as he has in the sus- 

 pension of civil officers, but on the theory suggested 

 by the Attorney-General both the President and the 

 Secretary of War would be justified in refusing to 

 either House of Congress copies of papers and docu- 

 ments relating to the administration of the Department 

 of War and the disposition of the troops, etc., for the 

 reason that, the facts being disclosed, the two Houses 

 of Congress might be enabled to comprehend the 

 reasons and motives actuating the Executive in his 

 conduct as Commander-in-Chief. 



Reduced to its simplest form the proposition would 

 be that neither the President nor the head of a de- 

 partment is bound to communicate any official papers 

 to either House of Congress which might draw into 

 question in the minds of its members or of the people 

 the wisdom or fajrness of his acts. .But the commit- 

 tee is of the opinion that in matters of this nature the 

 Senate has little concern with the reasons or motives 

 either of the heads of departments or of the Executive, 

 but it has large concern that its own reasons and 

 grounds of action should rest upon and be drawn 

 from the solid truth. The Senate, if it does its duty 

 and preserves the independence that belongs to it, 

 must act upon its own reasons and judgment and not 

 upon those of the President, however valuable they 

 may be. If the truth regarding the conduct of these 

 officials and designated persons were known, the 

 question for the Senate would be not what were the 

 reasons or motives of the Executive, but whether the 

 facts themselves, as they took place, would furnish it 

 with sufficient reason for giving or withholding its 

 advice and consent to the proposed changes. 



The report then quoted at length the passage 

 in the President's message in regard to civil- 

 service reform, and said that the declarations 

 made therein give special importance to the 

 facts relating to suspensions from office : 



This highly important and valuable official commu- 

 nication in the presence of six hundred and forty- 

 three suspensions from office would seem to lead to 

 the conclusion that this number of the civil officers of 

 the United States selected to be suspended and re- 

 moved had been so derelict in the performance of 

 their functions or guilty of such personal misconduct 

 as to put them in the category of unfaithful public 

 servants deserving dismissal by the President and 

 the Senate and the condemnation of their country- 

 men. In such a state of things we think that the 

 common sense of justice and fair play that is so much 

 prized, as we believe, by the people of the United 



