CONGRESS. (SUSPENSIONS FROM OFFICE.) 



245 



ing pledged himself not to remove officials except for 

 cause, the fact of their suspension implies such mis- 

 conduct on the part of a suspended official as injures 

 his character and reputation ? and therefore the Senate 

 should review the case for his vindication. 



I have said that certain officials should not, in my 

 opinion, be removed during the continuance of the 

 term for which they were appointed solely for the pur- 

 pose of putting in their place those in political affilia- 

 tion with the appointing power, and this declaration 

 was immediately followed by a description of official 

 partisanship which ought not to entitle those in whom 

 it was exhibited to consideration. It is not apparent 

 how an adherence to the course thus announced car- 

 ries with it the consequences described. If in any 

 degree the suggestion is worthy of consideration, it is 

 to be hoped that there may be a defense against un- 

 just suspension in the justice of the Executive. 



Every pledge which I have made by which I have 

 placed a limitation upon my exercise of executive 

 power has been faithfully redeemed. Of course the 

 pretense is not put forth that no mistakes have been 

 committed ; but not a suspension has been made 

 except it appeared to my satisfaction that the pub- 

 lic welfare would be improved thereby. Many ap- 

 plications for suspension have been denied, and the 

 adherence to the rule laid down to govern my actions 

 as to such suspensions has caused much irritation and 

 impatience on the part of those who have insisted upon 

 more changes in the offices. 



The pledges I have made were made to the people, 

 and to them I am responsible for the manner in which 

 they have been redeemed. I am not responsible to 

 the Senate, and I am unwilling to submit my actions 

 and official conduct to them for i udgment. 



There are no grounds for an allegation that the fear 

 of being found false to my professions influences me 

 ; n declining to submit to the demands of the Senate. 

 I have not constantly refused to suspend officials, and 

 thus incurred the displeasure of political friends, and 

 yet willfully broken faith with the people for the sake 

 of being false to them. 



Neither the discontent of party friends nor the al- 

 lurements constantly offered of confirmations of ap- 

 pointees conditioned upon the avowal that suspen- 

 sions have been made on party grounds alone, nor 

 the threat proposed in the resolutions now before the 

 Senate that no confirmations will be made unless the 

 demands of that body be complied with, are sufficient 

 to discourage or deter me from following hi the way 

 which I am convinced leads to better government for 

 the people. GROVEE CLEVELAND. 



EXECUTIVE MANSION, 



WASHINGTON, D. C., March 1, 1886. 



March 1, the minority of the Committee on 

 the Judiciary, through Mr. Pugh, of Alabama, 

 presented a report, in the course of which it 

 is said : 



The right of the Senate or House to papers and 

 documents in the keeping of the President or the 

 heads of departments must be decided by their con- 

 tents and character and the use that can be made of 

 them in the exercise of any power or jurisdiction in- 

 trusted to either house by the Constitution in execu- 

 tive or legislative session. If the papers and docu- 

 ments can instruct or aid either house in the exercise 

 of legislative or executive powers or privileges in- 

 trusted to them by the Constitution, the right of 

 either house to the possession of such papers or docu- 

 ments or their contents has never been questioned. It 

 is impossible, in the judgment of the minority, for the 

 majority or for the Senate to find the slightest sup- 

 port, excuse, or justification for their claim to the pa- 

 pers and documents relating exclusively to suspen- 

 sions by the President, except on the ground that the 

 Senate has the same power under the Constitution of 

 advising and consenting to suspensions by the Presi- 

 dent that they have to advise and consent to his ap- 

 pointments. 



There is no ingenuity sufficiently skilled in special 

 pleading to separate the two powers of suspension and 

 appointment, and make each absolute and independ- 

 ent of the other, and at the same time claim that the 

 custodian of one power is entitled to all the papers 

 and documents in the sole keeping of the custodian of 

 the other power and relating exclusively to matters 

 within his jurisdiction. 



But it is insisted that the President has no right to 

 know or to inquire what use the Senate intends mak- 

 ing of the papers and documents. Can it be seriously 

 urged that it the papers and documents called for are 

 not public but private, and relate exclusively to the 

 official acts of the President, for which he is under no 

 responsibility to the Senate, that the Senate has any 

 right to their possession 1 Who is to judge whether 

 the papers and documents are public or private the 

 President, who knows their contents and to what they 

 relate, or the Senate, which has no such information 1 

 How is the Senate to pass on the character and con- 

 tents of the papers and documents before seeing them, 

 and how will it be if after inspection of the papers and 

 documents the Senate decides it has no right to their 

 possession? How can the President possibly avoid 

 knowing what us'e the Senate intends making of the 

 papers when they show on their face that they can 

 not be made to relate to anything but suspension? 

 And if it were possible for the President to close his 

 eyes to the contents of the papers and documents and 

 tne use that is to be made of them by the Senate, can 

 the right be denied to those Senators who resist the 

 claim of the Senate to have inspection of papers and 

 documents relating exclusively to suspensions by the 

 President to know what use is intended to be made of 

 the papers and documents by the Senate ? 



The minority claim to know what use is intended 

 to be made by the majority of your committee of the 

 .papers and documents called for and relating exclu- 

 sively to suspensions, and with that knowledge the 

 minority are satisfied that their possession and use by 

 the Senate is unconstitutional and supported by no 

 law, usage, or public policy, and that their transmis- 

 sion to the Senate was rightfully refused by the At- 

 torney-General on the order of the President. 



The debate on the subject was long and ear- 

 nest. Mr. Edmunds, of Vermont, said : " The 

 suspension of an officer is said by the minor- 

 ity of the committee to be an act solely with- 

 in the exclusive discretion of the President of 

 the United States. So say the majority of 

 the committee. But is not the suspension of a 

 public officer an official act? The statute says 

 it is; the President says it is. When under 

 his seal and signature and the certificate of the 

 Secretary of State, the attesting witness of the 

 authenticity of the document, he suspends an 

 officer, he does it officially. Of course he has 

 no right to do it privately. It is the Presi- 

 dent, and not the man, that suspends the offi- 

 cer, and it is therefore an official act. There- 

 fore, every paper which is addressed to the offi- 

 cer exercising that function, in his character as 

 the officer exercising that function and upon 

 that topic, must be an official paper. No mat- 

 ter how vile it may be, no matter how false it 

 may be, no matter how little influence it may 

 produce upon the mind of the officer who has 

 to act upon it, it is not the less an official pa- 

 per. It does not belong to the man, be he 

 President, or Secretary, or Attorney-General, 

 but it belongs to the officer in his character as 

 an officer. I take it there can be no question 

 of that. 



u The Attorney- General, it may be added 



