410 



GREECE. 



and of the prejudice that would result to the 

 interests of nations from such a war, no naval 

 attack of Greece against the Porte will be per- 

 mitted. British and German ironclads were 

 already on the way to Greek waters. The 

 other powers immediately sent naval squad- 

 rons. They all assembled in Suda Bay, on the 

 coast of Crete, with the object of preventing 

 an attack on that island by the Greek fleet. 

 The Greeks had started an agitation among 

 the Christian population of Crete, and had ob- 

 tained the signatures of a majority, praying for 

 annexation to Greece. Yet the Cretans had 

 not the same crying grievances that formerly 

 drove them to insurrection, and took little in- 

 terest in the movement. On January 31 the 

 second identical note of the powers was pre- 

 sented to the Greek, Servian, and Bulgarian 

 Governments. It declared that the powers 

 would take action against the state that should 

 break the peace, and would allow it to derive 

 no territorial advantage from a war. 



The change of Government in England raised 

 hopes of more sympathetic treatment from Mr. 

 Gladstone and Lord Rosebery ; but those noted 

 Philhellenes made it clear to the Greek minis- 

 ters that they would adhere to the policy of 

 their predecessors. In his reply to the powers, 

 dated February 2, M. Delyannis disclaimed for 

 the Greek Government all responsibility for an 

 eventual conflict, and declared that it would 

 regard any interference with the free disposal 

 of the Greek naval forces as incompatible with 

 the independence of the state. The naval dem- 

 onstration of the powers was regarded by the 

 Greeks as a ~brutum fulmen. Trikoupis, though 

 opposed to a war with Turkey under the exist- 

 ing circumstances, not believing that the na- 

 tional honor required the Hellenes to begin a 

 war that would certainly end disastrously, con- 

 sidered that it would be a dishonorable sacrifice 

 of national independence to pay any attention 

 to the threats of the powers, and that the 

 Greek naval vessels ought to resist if the iron- 

 clads interfered with their movements. 



The Greek Government called two more 

 classes of reserves to arms in the middle of 

 March, raising the effective to the nominal 

 strength of 100,000. The men called out were 

 those aged twenty-eight and twenty-nine years. 

 It was the season when their labor was most 

 needed. The internal situation was already 

 intolerable. Most of the Government officials 

 had been for months without pay, and there 

 was much suffering everywhere. The real in- 

 tention of the order was probably to impel the 

 powers to use coercion and enable the minis- 

 ters to demobilize under the compulsion of 

 force majeure, and thus preserve the national 

 honor and their own reputations. The Turks 

 had an army of 120,000 men echeloned along 

 the frontier, with about an equal force of re- 

 serves and re-enforcements. They had indus- 

 triously constructed earthworks and roads and 

 constantly practiced manoeuvres, while the 

 Greeks had neglected their drill and had no 



fortifications completed. The ministry sum- 

 moned the Assembly in the latter part of March 

 to enable them to call out the classes of re- 

 serves from thirty to thirty-two years of age, 

 and to issue a forced loan of paper money. Jn 

 April the ministry obtained a majority of 42 

 on a vote of confidence. On April 24 the Gov- 

 ernment obtained a loan of 20,000.000 francs, 

 on the concession of certain monopolies. 



The commanders reported that the army was 

 not prepared to fight. Gen. Petmezas esti- 

 mated that 40,000 men, which was about the 

 strength of the army in the field, would be 

 sufficient for a purely defensive campaign, but 

 that 40,000 more would be required for offen- 

 sive operations. The last calls for the reserves 

 had not been willingly responded to, only 9,000 

 out of 19,000 of the class of the age of twenty- 

 nine having presented themselves. Attempts 

 to arrest the recusants were resisted by force 

 by the women of their villages. On April 17 

 the Minister of War, M. Mavromichaelis, who 

 was the chief of the war party, and obnoxious 

 to his colleagues because he was the only one 

 among them earnestly in favor of war, resigned 

 because the bulk of the Ministerial party voted 

 for an amendment to his army bill, giving 

 commissions to non-commissioned officers who 

 had been in the military schools, a proposition 

 which was rejected with the aid of the votes 

 of the Opposition. After passing the army bill, 

 the Chamber closed its session. Delyannis an- 

 nounced in the Chamber that no attack against 

 Turkey that was contrary to the law of nations 

 would be undertaken. In answer to a corn- 

 minatory note of the powers demanding that 

 Greece should observe the wishes of the pow- 

 ers, he declared that Greece had complied with 

 their wish and had in no way broken the peace, 

 but must insist at the least in having the front- 

 ier mentioned in the Berlin Treaty, and would 

 follow the policy previously avowed and soon 

 have an army of 110.000 men under her stand- 

 ards. Delyannis still hoped for diplomatic suc- 

 cess from the want of unanimity among the 

 powers. He had insulted the ministers of 

 Great Britain, Italy, and Germany by causing 

 to be published distorted accounts of confiden- 

 tial interviews. 



The French Government was opposed to the 

 attitude of menace, and joined the other powers 

 in their acts reluctantly. Russia also held aloof 

 until the last moment. M. de Freycinet did 

 not venture to take a stand in favor of the 

 territorial claims of Greece. The French min- 

 ister at Athens, Count de Moiiy, was the only 

 representative of a great power who remained 

 on cordial and confidential terms with the 

 Greek premier. When, after the passage of 

 the army bill, the powers contemplated the 

 employment of the international fleet to com- 

 pel disarmament, which the Porte in another 

 threatening circular urged them to do, the 

 French minister telegraphed instructions to 

 Count de Moiiy to seek to obtain a promise of 

 disarmament from Delyannis, as it would be 



