418 



HANCOCK, WINFIELD SCOTT. 



next day, the first of the battle of the Wilder- 

 ness, Hancock was in command of the left of 

 the Union line, and had charge of his own 

 corps and several divisions from other corps 

 acting in connection with it. The fight began 

 along his front about the middle of the after- 

 noon, and continued until eight o'clock in 

 the evening. The struggle was desperate and 

 bloody, but altogether in Hancock's favor, 

 and Gen. Humphreys, in his history of the 

 campaign, says that, with an hour more of 

 daylight, the shattered and disjointed lines of 

 Gen. Hill, who opposed him, would have been 

 driven from the field. At five o'clock the 

 next morning Hancock renewed the battle, 

 driving Hill's troops back through the forest 

 in disorder after a fierce fight. Longstreet's 

 corps, however, came on the field of battle and 

 checked the advance, and just before seven 

 o'clock Hancock paused to readjust his lines. 

 At about nine he attacked again, but was 

 forced slowly back to the position from which 

 he had moved in the morning. The fighting 

 was furious, and it was carried on with varying 

 fortune, closing with a repulse of the enemy 

 in the evening. Hancock was unable to throw 

 his left into the battle frankly, as he had been 

 warned to look out for Longstreet on that 

 flank, and even after some of that general's 

 command appeared in his front a portion of 

 it was still unaccounted for, and false alarms 

 as to an attack on the left occurred from time 

 to time, and prevented the sweeping advance 

 that might have been made. 



After the movement to Spottsylvania Court 

 House, Hancock crossed the Po on the even- 

 ing of May 9, with part of his force, to turn 

 Lee's left; but he was ordered next day to 

 withdraw and make a direct assault with his 

 own corps and the Fifth. The withdrawal in- 

 volved a severe fight, in which the corps lost 

 its first gun. The woods had taken fire, and 

 the horses attached to this cannon became un- 

 manageable, so that it got caught between 

 two frees and could not be got away. At 

 nightfall Hancock made a direct attack, as 

 Warren had already done in the afternoon, 

 but, like Warren, he failed. After dark, May 

 11, Hancock, under orders, moved three of his 

 divisions over a narrow and difficult road in a 

 heavy rain to a position in the Federal line op- 

 posite a weak salient in the Confederate in- 

 trenchments, since known as "the bloody 

 angle," which had been vainly assaulted by 

 Gen. Wright the day before. Arriving at the 

 designated point half an hour after midnight, 

 he formed, in darkness and storm, for the at- 

 tack, which he was to make at four o'clock in 

 the morning. He delayed the assault until 

 4.85, on account of a heavy fog that pre- 

 vailed, and then threw forward his column. 

 The men wont with a rush, breaking into a 

 ringing cheer as they ran, and, disdaining the 

 sharp fire of musketry that greeted them, car- 

 ried the intrerichment, capturing 4,000 pris- 

 oners, 20 pieces of artillery, and 30 colors. 



The fight to maintain this conquest is consid- 

 ered the most murderous of the whole war. 



In the unsuccessful assaults at Spottsylvania, 

 May 18 and 19, Hancock took part, and, in 

 the manosuvring for position that followed, he 

 was the most important factor. His corps was 

 engaged in the battle of Totopotomoy, May 30, 

 and suffered heavily in the disastrous assault 

 at Cold Harbor, June 3, which, in deference 

 to his adverse opinion, was not renewed. In 

 the movement of the Army of the Potomac 

 from Cold Harbor across the James river to 

 the south of Richmond, by a march of about 

 fifty miles, it was intended to have Hancock 

 reach Petersburg June 15, in time to join Gen. 

 Smith in carrying that place by assault before 

 any part of Lee's army could reach it. He set 

 out June 12, but was delayed on June 15 

 through slowness in furnishing rations, and 

 through errors in the orders as to his line of 

 march, so that he arrived too late for an at- 

 tack with decisive results. He did not know, 

 according to Grant's memoirs, "that he was 

 going to Petersburg, or that anything particu- 

 lar was expected of him " ; and it was after 

 five o'clock in the afternoon when he learned 

 what was at stake, through an order from Gen. 

 Grant and a message from Gen. Smith. He 

 was freely criticised for his delay, felt the criti- 

 cism keenly, and asked for an investigation. 

 Meade, who was himself in ignorance as to 

 the necessity for haste on June 15, forward- 

 ed the application to Gen. Grant with the in- 

 dorsement, u I do not see that any censure can 

 be attached to Gen. Hancock and his corps." 

 And Grant replied that no official censure had 

 ever been passed upon the Second Corps or its 

 commander at his headquarters, adding : u The 

 reputation of the Second Corps and its com- 

 mander is so high with the public and in the 

 army that an investigation could not add to it. 

 It can not be tarnished by newspaper articles 

 or scribblers." In the futile attacks of June 

 16 and 17 Hancock was in command, but dur- 

 ing the failure of the 18th and the misfortune 

 of the 22d he was not on duty, being disable ' 

 through fragments of the bone splintered 

 Gettysburg working to the surface. 



June 27, he took the field again. On 

 morning of July 26 the first movement to 

 Bottom began, in which Hancock, in co-opera- 

 tion with Sheridan's cavalry, crossed to 

 north of the James river with the design of 

 carrying Richmond by a dash, or at least forcing 

 Lee to detach heavily from the army defendin~ 

 Petersburg, and so give an opportunity for 

 successful attack on the Confederate lines thei 

 after the springing of Burnside's mine. The 

 movement was only of use in its secondary 

 purpose, and the Second Corps was rapidly 

 and secretly withdrawn to the south of the 

 James, to support the assault of July 30. Fr 

 July 31 to August 12, Hancock presided ov< 

 the court of inquiry called to investigate 

 causes of the failure of that attack. August 

 12 he was made brigadier-general in the regu- 



