468 



LAAV, CONSTITUTIONAL. 



nowhere indicated. There is no rate specified, 

 nor any limit set. Nothing whatever is said of 

 the way in which the question of reasonable- 

 ness is to be settled ; all that is left as it was. 

 Consequently, all the power which the State 

 had in the matter before the charter it retained 

 afterward. The power to charge being coup- 

 led with the condition that the charge shall be 

 reasonable, the State is left free to act on the 

 subject of reasonableness within the limits of 

 its general authority as circumstances may re- 

 quire. The right to fix reasonable charges has 

 been granted, but the power of declaring what 

 shall be deemed reasonable has not been sur- 

 rendered. If there had been an intention of 

 surrendering this power, it would have been 

 easy to say so. Not having said so, the con- 

 clusive presumption is, there was no such in- 

 tention. . . . From what has thus been said, 

 it is not to be inferred that this power of lim- 

 itation or regulation is itself without limit. 

 This power to regulate is not a power to de- 

 stroy, and limitation is not the equivalent of 

 confiscation. Under pretense of regulating 

 fares and freights, the State can not require a 

 railroad corporation to carry pesons or prop- 

 erty without reward ; neither can it do that 

 which in Jaw amounts to a taking of private 

 property for public use without just compen- 

 sation, or without due process of law. "What 

 would have this effect we need not now say, 

 because no tariff has yet been fixed by the 

 commission, and the statute of Mississippi ex- 

 pressly provides 'that in ali cases of trials of 

 cases brought for a violation of any tariff of 

 charges, as fixed by' the commission, it may be 

 shown in defense that such tariff so fixed is 

 unjust.' " 



The Court then proceeded to consider the 

 objection that the legislation was an uncon- 

 stitutional interference with interstate traffic. 

 It is true, it said, the Mobile and Ohio Railroad 

 Company extended through several States, and 

 was chartered by each of the States through 

 which it ran. It is also true that Congress 

 aided in the construction of parts of the line. 



But it is none the less true that the corporation cre- 

 ated by each State is, for all the purposes of local gov- 

 ernment, a domestic corporation, and that its railroad 

 within the State is a matter of domestic concern. Every 

 person, every corporation, everything within the terri- 

 torial limits of a State is, while there, subject to the con- 

 stitutional authority of the State government. Clearly 

 under this rule Mississippi may govern this corpora- 

 tion, as it does all domestic corporations, in respect to 

 every act and everything within the State which is 

 the lawful subject of State government. It may, be- 

 yond all question, by the settled rule of decision in 

 this court, regulate freights and fares for business 

 done exclusively within the State, and it would seem 

 to be a matter of domestic concern to prevent the 

 company from discriminating against persons and 

 places in Mississippi. So it may make all needful 

 regulations of a police character for the government 

 of the company while operating its road in that juris- 

 diction. In this way it may certainly require the 

 company to fence so much of its road as lies within 

 the State ; to stop its trains at railroad -crossings ; to 

 slacken speed while running in a crowded thorough- 

 fare ; to post its tariffs and time-tables at proper 



places, and other things of a kindred character affect- 

 ing the comfort, the convenience, or the safety of 

 those who are entitled to look to the State for protec- 

 tion against the wrongful or negligent conduct of 

 others. This company is not relieved entirely from 

 State regulation or State control in Mississippi simply 

 because it has been incorporated by, and is carrying 

 on business in, the other States through which its 

 road runs. While in Mississippi it can be governed 

 by Mississippi in respect to all things which have not 

 been placed by the Constitution of the United States 

 within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress, that is 

 to say, using the language of this Court in Cardwell 

 vs. Bridge Co., 113 United States Keports 210 ^ when 

 the subjects on which it is exerted are national in their 

 character, and admit and require uniformity of regu- 

 lations affecting all States alike." Under this rule 

 nothing can be done by the government of Missis- 

 sippi which will operate as a burden on the inter- 

 state business of the company, or impair the useful- 

 ness of its facilities for interstate traffic. It is not 

 enough to prevent the State from acting that the road 

 in Mississippi is used in aid of interstate commerce. 

 Legislation of this kind to be unconstitutional must 

 be^uch as will necessarily amount to or operate as a 

 regulation or business without the State as well as 

 within. 



The commission is in express terms prohibited by 

 the act of March 15, 1884, from interfering with the 

 charges of the company for the transportation of per- 

 sons or property through Mississippi from one State 

 to another. The statute makes no mention of per- 

 sons or property taken up without the State and de- 

 livered within, nor of such as may be taken up within 

 and carried without. As to this, the only_ limit on the 

 power of the commissioners is the constitutional au- 

 thority of the State over the subject. Precisely all 

 that may be done, or all that may not he done, it is 

 not easy to say in advance. The line between the ex- 

 clusive" power of Congress and the general powers of 

 the State in this particular is not everywhere dis- 

 tinctly marked, and it is always easier to determine 

 when a case arises whether it falls on one side or the 

 other, than to settle in advance the boundary, so that 

 it may be in all respects strictly accurate. As y_et 

 the commissioners have done nothing. There is, 

 certainly, much they may do in regulating charges 

 within the State, which will not be' in conflict with 

 the Constitution of the United States. It is to be pre- 

 sumed they will always act within the limits of then 

 constitutional authority. It will be time enough to 

 consider what may be done to prevent it when they 

 attempt to go beyond. 



The Court further held that general statutes 

 regulating the use of railroads in a State, or 

 fixing maximum rates of charges for transpor- 

 tation, when not forbidden by charter con- 

 tracts, do not necessarily deprive the corpora- 

 tion owning or operating a railroad within the 

 State of its property without due process of 

 law, nor deny the corporation the equal pro- 

 tection of the laws within the meaning of the 

 fourteenth amendment of the Federal Consti- 

 tution. 



On November 23, 1885, the Court rendered 

 a decision that a State legislature has the 

 power to require railroad corporations to 

 fence their tracks, and to subject any company 

 to double damages for injury done to animals 

 through the company's failure to comply with 

 the requirements of the law. The case arose 

 under a statute of Missouri, which requires 

 every railroad corporation in that State to 



erect and maintain lawful fences on the sides of the 

 road where the same passes through, along, or adjoin- 



