LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL. 



469 



ing inclosed or cultivated fields or uninclosed lands, 

 with openings and gates therein, to be hung, and 

 have latches or hooks, so that they may be easily 

 opened and shut at all necessary farm-crossings of the 

 road for the use of the proprietors or owners of the 

 lands adjoining such railroad, and also to construct 

 and maintain cattle-guards, where fences are required, 

 sufficient to prevent horses, cattle, mules, and all 

 other animals from getting on the railroad. 



The statute further provides that 

 until fences, openings, gates and fartn-crossHgs and 

 cattle-guards, as aforesaid, shall be made and "main- 

 tained, such corporation shall be liable in double the 

 amount of all damages which shall be done by its 

 agents, engines, or cars to horses, cattle, mules, or 

 other animals on said road, or by reason of any horses, 

 cattle, mules, or other animals escaping from, or com- 

 ing upon, said lauds, fields, or inclosures, occasioned 

 in either case by the failure to construct or maintain 

 such fences or cattle-guards. After such fences, 

 gates, farm-crossings, and cattle-guards shall be duly 

 made and maintained, said corporation shall not be 

 liable for any such damages, unless negligently or 

 willfully done. 



In a suit brought against it, the Missouri 

 Pacific Railway Company claimed that this 

 statute was repugnant to several provisions of 

 the State Constitution, and that it was in vio- 

 lation of the fourteenth amendment to the 

 Federal Constitution, in that it deprived a rail- 

 road corporation of its property, so far as it 

 exceeds the value of the stock killed or injured, 

 without due process of law, and in that it de- 

 nies to such corporation the equal protection 

 of the laws. In an opinion prepared by Justice 

 Field the United States Supreme Court held 

 that the questions arising under the Constitu- 

 tion of Missouri were settled by the decision of 

 the Supreme Court of that State sustaining the 

 legislation, and that only the questions arising 

 under the Federal Constitution were open to re- 

 view by the Federal court. The Court decided 

 that the statute does not deprive a railroad 

 corporation of its property without due pro- 

 cess of law, and does not deny to it the equal 

 protection of the la\vs. " If the laws enacted 

 by a State," says Justice Field, " be within the 

 legitimate sphere of legislative power, and 

 their enforcement be attended with the ob- 

 servance of those general rules which our sys- 

 tem of jurisprudence prescribes for the secu- 

 rity of private rights, the harshness, injustice, 

 and oppressive character of such laws will not 

 invalidate them as affecting life, liberty, or 

 property without due process of law. Within 

 the present century the punishment of death 

 or long imprisonment was inflicted in England 

 for many offenses which are not now visited 

 with any severer penalty than a fine or a short 

 confinement, yet no one has ever pretended 

 that life or liberty was taken thereby without 

 due process of law. And it often happens that 

 heavy and oppressive burdens are imposed by 

 statute upon residents of cities and counties, 

 not merely to meet the necessary expenses of 

 Government, but for buildings or improve- 

 ments of doubtful advantage, which sometimes, 

 as in changing the grade of streets, seriously 

 depreciate the value of property. Yet, if no 



rule of justice is violated in the provisions for 

 the enforcement of such a statute, its opera- 

 tion, in lessening the value of the property af- 

 fected, does not bring it under the objection 

 of depriving a person of property without due 

 process of law. It is hardly necessary to say 

 that the hardship, impolicy, or injustice of 

 State laws is not necessarily an objection to 

 their constitutional validity, and that the rem- 

 edy for evils of that character is to be sought 

 from State legislatures." 



On the point of double damages the Court 

 said: 



It is the duty of every State to provide, in the ad- 

 ministration of justice, for the redress of private 

 wrongs ; yet the damages which should be awarded 

 to the iniured party are not always readily ascertain- 

 able. They are in many cases a matter of conjectural 

 estimate, in relation to which there may be many 

 diiferences of opinion. The general rule undoubtedly 

 is that they should be precisely commensurate with 

 the injury. Yet in England and in this country they 

 have been allowed in excess of compensation, when- 

 ever malice, gross neglect, or oppression has caused 

 or accompanied the commission of the injury com- 

 plained of. " The law," says Sedgwick, in his excel- 

 lent treatise on " Damages," " permits the jury to 

 give what it terms punitory, vindictive, or exemplary 

 damages ; in other words,*blends together the inter- 

 ests of society and of the aggrieved individual, and 

 gives damages, not only to recompense the .sufferer, 

 but to punish the offender." 



For injuries resulting from a neglect of duties, in 

 the discharge of which the public is interested, juries 

 are permitted to assess exemplary .damages. These 

 may perhaps be considered as falling under the head 

 of cases of gross negligence, for any neglect of duties 

 imposed for the protection of life or property is culpa- 

 ble and deserves punishment. The law of Missouri 

 under consideration, imposes a duty in the perform- 

 ance of which the public is largely interested. Au- 

 thority for exacting it is found in the general police 

 power of the State to provide against accidents to life 

 and property in any business or employment, whether 

 under tne charge of private persons or of corporations. 

 In few instances could the power be more wisely or 

 beneficently exercised than in compelling railroad 

 corporations to inclose their roads with fences, having 

 gates at crossings and cattle-guards. The speed and 

 momentum of the locomotive render such protection 

 against accident in thickly settled portions of the 

 country absolutely essential. The omission to erect 

 and maintain such fences and cattle-guards in the 

 face of the law would justly be deemed gross negli- 

 gence ; and if, in such cases, where injuries to prop- 

 erty are committed, something beyond compensatory 

 damages may be awarded to the owner by way of 

 punishment tor the company's negligence, the Legis- 

 lature may fix the amount or prescribe the limit within 

 which the jury may exercise their discretion. 



The additional damages being by way of punish- 

 ment, it is clear that the amount may be thus fixed : 

 and it is not a valid objection thrt the sufferer instead 

 of the State receives them. That is a matter on which 

 the company has nothing to say. And there can be 

 no rational grounds for contending that the statute de- 

 prives it of property without due process of law. The 

 statute only fixes the amount of the penalty in dam- 

 ages proportionate to the injury inflicted. In actions 

 for the injury the company is afforded every facility 

 for presenting its defense. The power of the State to 

 impose fines and penalties for a violation of its statu- 

 tory requirements is coeval with government ; and 

 the mode in which they shall be enforced, whether at 

 the suit of a private party, or at the suit of the public, 

 and what disposition shall be made of the amounts 

 collected, are merely matters of legislative discretion. 



