KAILROAD ACCIDENTS, LAW OF. 



781 



inference that the railroad company was neg- 

 ligent, can not legitimately be made from the 

 evidence. So likewise, even after the question 

 has been submitted to the jury and they have 

 determined upon it, their verdict may be set 

 aside by the court, if in its opinion that ver- 

 dict is contrary to the evidence. In fact, so 

 strong has been the influence that railroad 

 corporations have exerted over the judiciary, 

 that in some States the people have found it 

 necessary to take away from the judiciary (and 

 also from the Legislature) the right to deprive 

 the injured person of the compensation that 

 justly belonged to him. 



The same rule of skill and care applies to a 

 railroad corporation as to an individual ex- 

 cept in the carnage of passengers when the 

 greatest possible care and skill are required. 

 Under the common law, a person injured had 

 the right to recover, from the person inflicting 

 the injury, damages for the injury. But this 

 right was personal to himself, and did not sur- 

 vive him. It died when he died ; and if he 

 began an action during his life, on his death 

 the action abated and could not be revived in 

 the name of his personal representative. In 

 every State, however, it is now provided by 

 statute that the right of action shall survive 

 the death ; that the suit may be begun or pros- 

 ecuted by the personal representative ; and 

 that the amount recovered shall be a part of 

 the dead man's estate. There must, however, 

 be some period of time intervening between 

 the infliction of the injury and the death. If 

 the death followed the wrongful act instantly, 

 there was no period during the lifetime when 

 a cause of action capable of survival accrued. 

 The length of time during which the person 

 lived after the injury is not material. It is 

 sufficient if life continued for any period, how- 

 ever brief, after the receiving of the injury, 

 even without intelligence or consciousness. 

 Such was the law for several years, and the 

 people began to harbor the opinion that rail- 

 road companies found it cheaper to kill people 

 outright than to maim them and let them live; 

 and it was even whispered that certain wrecked 

 trains were purposely set on fire, that the in- 

 jured passengers might not escape to become 

 litigants ! Finally, however, public opinion 

 procured the enactment of laws providing for 

 the recovery of damages in cases where death 

 instantaneously followed the injury. 



Under the common law, the death of a hu- 

 man being could not be complained of, in a 

 civil court, as an injury, no matter whether it 

 resulted from accident or from the careless or 

 felonious assault of the person causing it ; and 

 under the common law no action could be 

 maintained for the loss of the comfort, assist- 

 ance, support, or service of a husband, father, 

 wife, child, or other relative, against the per- 

 son or corporation by whose fault the death 

 was caused. Such was the common law in 

 this country when railroad trains first began 

 to prove death-traps to passengers. To modern 



minds it was barbarous; and public opinion, 

 following the dictates of natural justice, caused 

 it to be modified. Statutes have therefore 

 been enacted in every State in the Union, re- 

 quiring the person or corporation, by whom 

 an injury causing the death of another is will- 

 fully or through negligence inflicted, to com- 

 pensate those who had an immediate pecuniary 

 interest in the life of the deceased person. 

 Such statutes frequently prescribe limits as to 

 the amount of this compensation, above or be- 

 low which damages can not be assessed ; but 

 in many States there is no limit, and the 

 amount is left to the determination of the 

 jury, subject, however, to the interference of 

 the court, or judge, as mentioned above. The 

 remedy in the greater number of the States is 

 by an action for damages, prosecuted by the 

 executor or administrator; and generally the 

 sum awarded does not become such a part of 

 the dead person's estate that it can be claimed 

 by creditors, but is to be distributed among the 

 husband or widow, and next of kin of the 

 decedent. In Maine, New Hampshire, and 

 Massachusetts, however, the remedy is by pros- 

 ecution, on behalf of the State, in form crimi- 

 nal, for the recovery of a fine, to be distributed 

 among the husband, or widow, and next of 

 kin. In Maryland, the proceeding, though on 

 behalf of the State, is in form civil. The stat- 

 utes that provide for a civil remedy, though 

 varying in matters of detail, have all the same 

 general framework, and most of them are sub- 

 jected to amendment. The statute of New 

 York State (passed Dec. 13, 1847, and amended 

 April 7, 1849, and March 16, 1870) may be 

 taken as an example of the laws giving a civil 

 remedy. So likewise the statute of Massa- 

 chusetts (enacted originally March 23, 1840, 

 and then providing only a remedy for the death 

 of a passenger, but amended in 1874 [chapter 

 372, 163J to include, among other provisions, 

 a remedy for the deaths of others than passen- 

 gers) is typical of the statutes providing for a 

 criminal proceeding. These statutes have no 

 effect outside of the States that enacted them, 

 but are limited to injuries inflicted within the 

 State; and they can only be enforced by the 

 courts of the State upon whose statute-book 

 they stand as laws. It has, however, been held 

 that, where the statutes are similar, a recovery 

 can be had for an injury in one State within 

 the jurisdiction of the other. Although the 

 corporation that inflicted the injury was created 

 by the State in which there is a statute of this 

 kind, it is not liable in the courts of that State 

 for an injury committed abroad. Nor does the 

 fact that the injured person died within the 

 jurisdiction of the State bring within the stat- 

 ute injuries inflicted beyond the State. Gen- 

 erally, the statute does not apply to injuries 

 committed on the high-seas; but it has been 

 held to extend to such injuries when com- 

 mitted on waters that, although they were 

 arms of the sea, were within the jurisdiction 

 of the State ; and it has also been extended to 



