134 



CHILI. 



order that steps may be taken to amend the Fed- 

 eral law, if the court's construction of the stat- 

 ute is correct, so as to make it conform with in- 

 ternational obligations. 



The New Cruisers. The "Presidente Pin- 

 to" and "Presidente Errazuriz," built for the 

 Chilian Government in France, were completed, 

 and lacked only their guns soon after the hostili- 

 ties begun. The " Arturo Prats " was not ready, 

 but even the two cruisers would be enough to 

 enable the President to cope with the naval 

 forces of Congress. It was therefore a serious 

 disappointment to him when the French Govern- 

 ment, in judicial proceedings taken at the in- 

 stance of the agents of the Junta, placed an 

 embargo on the two ships, in order to determine 

 whether Balmaceda was, in international law, 

 the ruler of Chili. The arguments dragged on 

 till the middle of June, and resulted in the de- 

 cision of the court th it Balmaceda was President 

 de facto until another person should be placed 

 in the seat of power. The Junta met with the 

 same response when it appealed to the Govern- 

 ments of Europe and of the United States and 

 the sister republics in South America, excepting 

 Bolivia. Financiers to whom Balmaceda applied 

 lor aid found his title questionable, and he met 

 with delays in getting guns and in hiring crews 

 and paying the expenses of the cruisers after 

 they were released. The French Government 

 prohibited its citizens from taking service, in ac- 

 cordance with its municipal law of neutrality. 

 Lieut. Armit and another British naval officer 

 accepted Chilian commissions, and enlisted men 

 who shipped on the " Errazuriz," who took her 

 to Lisbon. Chilian officers and marines had 

 gone across the Atlantic to form the military 

 force on the war ships. Men who joined the 

 crew were put ashore or placed in irons when 

 they demanded advanced pay, according to con- 

 tract. Guns, the French contractors being un- 

 able to supply them in time, were obtained from 

 the Armstrong firm. The officers had great dif- 

 ficulty in completing the crew in Lisbon, for the 

 Portuguese Government forbade its subjects to 

 go, took off Frenchmen at the request of the 

 French consul, and required every foreign sea- 

 man who shipped to show a passport properly 

 viseed. The " Presidente Pinto " met with worse 

 mishaps. After leaving the French port, prob- 

 ably through treachery, for the Congressional 

 agents were fertile in resources, she ran aground, 

 and after being got off again and repaired, she 

 was taken to Genoa and then to Kiel, in the vain 

 endeavor to get on board the armament furnished 

 by the Armstrongs, which the neutrality laws 

 would not permit to be transshipped from the 

 steamer that brought the guns from England in 

 any European harbor. The " Errazuriz " was 

 finally able to start for South America with a 

 rough crew of many nationalities. This spurred 

 the revolutionary leaders to extraordinary efforts 

 to bring the conflict to an end before the Presi- 

 dent could make use of the new war ship. 



The Final Campaign. The Congressional 

 army was trained in the German manner of fight- 

 ing by Commandante Korner, who had served 

 under Moltke on the Prussian staff. It was well 

 supplied with modern repeating rifles, not only 

 Winchesters and Remingtons, but Mannlichers, 

 and smokeless powder. The "Maipo" arrived 



at Iquique on June 27, with 8,000 rifles and 

 other war material, and later the " Esmeralda " 

 returned with a larger supply. Balmaceda's offi- 

 cers made ready for a campaign in the Coquimbo 

 Erovince, where the revolutionists landed in the 

 itter part of June and occupied the seaport of 

 Huasco. Balmaceda's forced levies offered no 

 defense, but ran away after the first exchange of 

 shots with the enemy's advanced guard, falling 

 back on Villanar. That town was evacuated 

 also when the Congressional ists appeared, and 

 immediately afterward was retaken by the strong 

 force of presidential troops that was hurried up 

 from Coquimbo. The insurgents were likewise 

 re-enforced by foot and artillery landed from the 

 ships and cavalry advancing from Copiapo, and 

 again drove back the enemy. Troops were sent 

 up to contest the ground, a severe engagement, 

 took place on June 28, and skirmishing was con- 

 tinued for some weeks, the insurgents taking a 

 strong position at Villanar that they could main- 

 tain against a superior force. The Government 

 generals deemed it of importance to regain pos- 

 session of this point, for from the valley it was 

 possible for the rebels to strike Coquimbo in the 

 rear. They had massed their army at three poin ts, 

 holding a force of 6,500 men at Coquimbo and La 

 Serena, where the next struggle was expected to 

 be, and a smaller division at Concepcion. ready 

 for an attack or uprising in the south, besides 

 the main body around Santiago. The rainy sea- 

 son made rapid movements of troops on land im- 

 possible. When the fighting began, Balmaceda 

 sent re-enforcements as fast as he could, and 

 after a while there were from 10,000 to 12,000 of 

 his soldiers in Coquimbo. The operations on this 

 coast were in reality a feint intended to draw 

 away troops from Santiago and Valparaiso. 



Balmaceda and his generals were surprised 

 when a fleet of twenty ships anchored in Quin- 

 teros Bay, north of Valparaiso, on Aug. 20, and 

 could scarcely believe that the rebels intended to 

 fight his army of twice their strength, with other 

 forces within call and the command of all the 

 roads and strategic positions. There was doubt 

 as to what part of the coast they intended to 

 land on. Admiral Brown went down on the 

 "San Francisco" to observe, and from the cir- 

 cumstance that the Government troops moved 

 down to Valparaiso after his return, the Chilians 

 afterward charged that American sailors must 

 have acquainted Balmaceda's friends with the 

 fact of troops debarking at Quinteros, within 

 20 miles of Valparaiso. In twelve hours all their 

 forces were landed, consisting of 8,200 infantry, 

 3 batteries of field artillery and a naval battery, 

 making 800 artillery, and 600 cavalry. The Sec- 

 retary of War, Benados Espinosa, who was chief 

 in command under the direction of Balmaceda, 

 had time to place in the first line of defense, in a 

 strongly intrenched position at Concon, 12 miles 

 south of Quinteros, an army of over 8,000 men. 

 The Government commanders were Gen. Barbosa 

 and Gen. Alzarreca. Contrary to the judgment 

 and instructions of Balmaceda, who intended 

 that his generals should draw the enemy inland, 

 and not engage unless they could oppose a force 

 at least half as great again as the invading army, 

 Barbosa determined to dispute the passage of the 

 Aconcagua river, because beyond was the railroad 

 to Santiago, that the revolutionary forces could 



