emu. 



11 



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,t by taking the fortified positional VinadclMor 



ith'theaid of their shit is, nrliy turning it ami dc- 

 U one (if tin- bridges i>r the tunnel between 

 ilpue iui'1 Salto. Tlif Congreioii;d army, led 

 I. K>tani>lao del Canto as coinnmnder-in- 

 f tin- land forces, was divided into three 

 which tin- lir>i \\as eoiiununded by 

 .nilwl Frias tin- second by Col. Salvador 

 i, and the third by Col. F.nrique del Canto. 

 icy marched through the night of Aug. 20, and 

 ,.k a portion in the same order in which they 

 arched, with tlie lirst brigade on the right, the 

 ml in the miter, and (lie third on the left, 

 eir front extending for three miles along a 

 .if hills facing the enemy, whose line of 

 intrenehments stretched for four miles along 

 the opposite liank of the Aconcagua. The battle 

 opened by the guns of Col. Canto's battery, 

 d was taken up by the artillery along the 

 hole line. The " Ksineralda" and three smaller 

 Is in Concon Buy, five miles from the ford, 

 ith heavy batteries and machine gun?, kept up 

 well-directed fire on the enemy's position dur- 

 the cannonading, which 'lasted an hour and 

 ilf. A naval battery of 12 Gardner mitrail- 

 <nd a regiment of sharpshooters effectively 

 pported the three brigades from good positions 

 the north bank. At one o'clock the infantry 

 d the swollen river and climbed the hill 

 .der a hot fire, and, after an hour's hard fight- 

 g, the advanced guard of the Government was 

 'veil out, falling back on the strongly in- 

 nched position of the main body on higher 

 und beyond. Supported by the artillery, the 

 siunal infantry assailed them there, and, 

 r two hours more of desperate fighting, the 

 resident's commander drew off what he could 

 ,ve of his army. He began the fight with a 

 rce nearly equal to the enemy, and held a posi- 

 n that would have been impregnable, despite 

 e deadly and distracting bombardment from 

 ;e ships, if all his troops had the heart that a 

 r.ire part of them displayed. Such strenuous 

 d courageous fighting between two tired armies 

 rarely been seen. The commanders knew bet- 

 r than Balmaceda the untrustworthy elements 

 which his army was largely composed and the 

 ngcrous temper of the population, imbittered 

 y his barbarities, which he had crowned the day 

 iore the troops of Congress landed by having 

 ot in relays 60 well-connected youths who had 

 en caught meeting for some political purpose 

 ,t Los Cafios, an estate near Santiago. Railroad 

 mmunication with Santiago was already closed 

 >y friends of the insurgents, who had destroyed 

 he bridges with dynamite. There were enough 

 ps in the field to overwhelm the Congressional 

 my if the President's soldiers would fight. The 

 events of the battle field at the Aconcagua cross- 

 ing showed how necessary it was to strike quickly 

 at Canto's army, and cripple it at whatever sacri- 

 "ce. Although they were crippled, losing 300 

 illed and TOO wounded, their complete victory 

 turned the chances of war in their favor. Their 

 loss was made good by 1,500 men of the oppos- 

 ing army who deserted to them, some of them 

 without breaking their formations. They took 

 18 field pieces and a large train of ammunition. 

 On the Government side two whole regiments 

 were annihilated and the killed exceeded 1,000, 

 the wounded a much greater number. In the 



retreat a part of the forces went off in good or- 

 der, hut a largo part was scattered, and many 

 ran oil into the hills and eagerly threw off their 

 uniforms and put on ordinary clothes that citi- 

 zen > gave them. 



For the second line of defense Balmaceda had 

 Vifia del Mar, where his whole army of 13,000 

 men was intrenched in front of forts that com- 

 manded both the approach by sea and a part of 

 the land approaches. The Junta's army marched 

 down the south bank of the river over 15 miles 

 of broken country, driving back the small de- 

 tachments that had been posted at favorable 

 places to impede its advance. In the evening of 

 Aug. 22 Gen. Canto arrived in front of the main 

 line of defense on the beach. The position was 



Srotected op the north by the estuary of Vifla 

 el Mar, and the intrenchments, on which the 

 soldiers had been busy for two days, were guard- 

 ed by the heavy guns of Fort Callao. 



On the morning of Sunday, Aug. 23, Canto as- 

 sailed this formidable position, and a furious 

 battle raged during the greater part of the day. 

 The Congressionafists dared not expose their 

 ships to the guns of the fort, and therefore the 

 naw could only aid them by an ineffective bom- 

 bardment at long range, except on shore, where 

 all the men that could be spared from the ships 

 joined the land forces and did good service with 

 their machine and quick-firing guns. The losses 

 on both sides were heavy, and the combat was a 

 drawn battle, as Balmaceda, who had come to 

 the front to take command, was able to hold his 

 forces together and defend the narrow line, in 

 front of which there was not room for Canto to 

 deploy his infantry. Finding that he could not 

 force this position and co-operate with the navy 

 in reducing Fort Callao, the northern defense of 

 Valparaiso, Gen. Canto could not continue the 

 campaign without parting from the fleet and run- 

 ning a great risk of having his retreat cut off. 

 On Aug. 24 he drew off his forces-, while the " Es- 

 meralda " and the " Cochrane " kept up a fire on 

 the forts at ViQa del Mar to divert the attention of 

 the Government troops, and pushed inland. Com- 

 pleting the obstruction of the railroad at Salto. 

 they rested for a day at Quilpue, and on the 26th 

 proceeded to march on Valparaiso by way of Los 

 Palmas and Placilla, making a detour around 

 the city in order to attack it from the south side, 

 where there was the least exposure to the guns 

 of the forts. Balmaceda manoeuvred to maintain 

 a defensive position. When the enemy ap- 

 proached Placilla, he took up a strong position 

 on the heights beyond the village, two miles 

 nearer to Valparaiso. Desertions from Balma- 

 ceda's troops swelled the Congressional army to 

 about 12,000 men. 



On the morning of Aug. 28, long before day- 

 lignt, the third and first brigades moved into 

 position on the right and the left of the enemy's 

 position, which extended two miles on the high 

 ground overlooking the Placilla plain. The 

 Government troops had no cavalry scouts out, 

 but held their cavalry in reserve for the end of 

 the battle, which the Balmaeedists felt sure of 

 winning if they were attacked, for their artillery 

 was posted on hills commanding the village and 

 the plain in front and on the right. Under 

 cover of the darkness, the woods, and the undu- 

 lating ground, the first and third brigades of 



