MOLTKK, IIKI.MITII KAIJI. HKIINIIAKI). 



537 



sian propositions When Wilhelm I, who had 

 acini as Kcgcnt since 1867, became King in 

 isill In- determined on such a reorganization ami 

 augmentation of the land forces as would make 



;u a leading military power. With Count 

 lli.-maivk, the head of the Cabinet, and (fen. von 

 I;.M,II. the Secretary nf War. to carry on the 

 liu'lit for the new 'armaments in Parliament, 

 Mi'ltke proceeded with the organization, which 



.impleted in 1803. In 1N<M the war of 

 I'ru.-MH and AuMria against Denmark on account, 

 of the Kiln- duchies gave him his chance to 

 hi< strategical ability by drawing up the 

 plan of operations against ihe army in which he 

 had first learned the soldier's trade. After Field- 

 Marshal von \V runnel had invaded the duchies 

 and taken Diippcl by storm, as ho had planned, 

 Moltke accompanied the King to the seat of war 

 and directed the concluding operations as chief 

 of Ma IT with I'rince Frieuricn Karl as coin- 

 mander-in-chief. When it was discovered that 

 England would not interfere, the German army 

 was allowed to deliver a crushing blow to 

 the Danes, which was easy to do with the 

 needle-gun and breech-loading cannon, and to 

 occupy Jutland and the islands too. if necessary, 

 in order to obtain the desired terms, which were 

 the annexation of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lau- 

 enburg to Germany. The allies quarreled about 

 the possession of the duchies, and in I860 Prus- 

 sia found herself at war with Austria and the 

 majority of the confederated German states. 

 Surrounded by enemies and in danger of having 

 whole sections of the monarchy cut off from the 

 main body, it was necessary for the Prussians to 

 carry the war into the enemy's country. The 

 swift advance of the Prussian army into Bo- 

 hemia in three columns, such a division being 

 rendered safe by the introduction of the field 

 telegraph, and the crushing defeat of Benedek's 

 army, taken on three sides at KOniggratz, proved 

 to the world the strategical genius of Moltke and 

 the superior organization of the Prussian army, 

 for which he and the general staff received the 

 credit. The position of the Austrians was not 

 known until Prince Friedrich Karl, on the after- 

 noon of July 2, 1866, found a large force posted 

 behind the Bistritz. He determined to attack 

 at daybreak, and asked that a part of the second 

 army should hold the Austrians in check near 

 Josephstadt. Moltke, feeling sure that he could 

 bring tip the second army, that of the Crown 

 Prince, although it was wearied out by a week 

 of hard marching and fighting, persuaded the 

 King to countermand the order to rest the ar- 

 mies on the following day, and direct the whole of 

 the second army to attack the enemy on the 

 right flank. When the battle opened eight Aus- 

 trian corps were found in position, but they were 

 rolled up and routed completely when the Crown 

 Prince came up. After the war of 1866 Moltke 

 and his general staff had the great work of ex- 

 tending the Prussian military system to the 

 other North German states and preparing for 

 the war with France. With a dotation of 200,- 

 000 thalers granted by the Landtag, he purchased 

 an estate near Schweidnitz. Silesia, on which to 

 pass his declining years in repose. After his 

 wife's death, in 1868, he withdrew from court fes- 

 tiviiies and social gatherings more than ever. 

 Although affable to all, polished in manners, 



and a man of awthetic and literary taste*, Baron 

 von Moltke was to sparing of words thai he wait 

 spoken of in the army as the man who "kept M- 



lence in veM-n languages." The 1 It-pill 



longer opposed the plans < 'heningthe 



(icrman army which (i-n. von Moltke explained 

 to Parliament, as far as was necessary, in 

 and weighty speeches, as he had been elected 

 Deputy for a di-trict in Kast Prussia. 



When the French war broke nut the prepara- 

 tions had been >o complete. do\Mi to the minut- 

 est details, that a rapid concent rat inn nf the 

 I'ru.-sian troops on the line of the Khine pre- 

 vented the invasion nf (ii-rman territory. A 

 lx)ld advance of the three German armies, at first 

 extended over a line of 150 miles, drawing 

 toget her after the affair at Worth, caused Mac- 

 Mahon to retire, and closed in round Metz, cut- 

 ting Bazaine's line of retreat to Chain is. These 

 movements were executed with sufficient caution 

 to allow the German armies to support one another 

 in case of a French attack, but promptly enough 

 to give the Germans a great advantage from the 

 beginning. The campaign was not planned, for 

 no one could have foreseen the disorganization 

 of the French defense caused by the concur- 

 rent political revolution. The German mobili- 

 zation in July, 1870, when 370,000 men, with 1,- 

 200 guns, in the space of two weeks were massed 

 on the frontier between Coblentz and Germers- 

 heim, was a feat that had never been accomplished 

 before, and was a striking manifestation of 

 Moltlce's genius as a military administrator. 

 Before March 1, 1871, a million German soldiers 

 were united on French territory, while a quarter 

 of a million more were readv to move to the 

 front, and the movement of these masses of 

 troops was directed by Moltke, whose disposi- 

 tions were accepted implicitly by the King. He 

 had no chance during the war to exhibit his 

 strategical insight as brilliantly as at Konig- 

 gra'tz. He cautiously swung the Army of the 

 Meuse round to the northwest when mperor 

 Napoleon and Marshal MacMahon had moved 

 to the north, and in dealing with the various 

 developments that he could not account for 

 on military grounds he was always on guard 

 against, surprises. The great augmentation of the 

 German cavalry since 1866 gave him a great tac- 

 tical ad vantage over the French commanders, for 

 all the German manoeuvres were effectually 

 screened by their cavalry. The efficiency of the 

 military machine perfected by his life's labor was 

 seen in the military results of the war nearly 

 400,000 French soldiers carried as prisoners 

 to Germany. 150,000 men disarmed in Paris. 100,- 

 000 more driven into Switzerland, 22 fortresses 

 captured, and 1,835 field guns, 5,373 fortress 

 guns, and 600,000 rifles taken. He was made a 

 field marshal after the conclusion of the war, 

 n-eeived a dotation from the Parliament, and in 

 1872 was made a life member of the Reichsrath. 

 Residing in the staff palace in Berlin in winter, 

 and on his estate of Rreisau in summer, he con- 

 tinued to preside over the organization of the 

 German army while it was being successively 

 increased, to give instruction to officers of the 

 stair, and to attend Parliament regularly, in 

 which he represented the West Prussian county 

 of Memel-lleydekrug, and occasionally to s|>eak 

 on military subjects. The Emperor presented 



