60 



BELGIUM. 



yielded reluctantly when he insisted on making 

 that a part of the Government proposals. In 

 Switzerland, where the referendum or popular 

 vote on legislative measures exists, it is invoked 

 only on the demand of a certain number of elect- 

 ors. In the proposed amendment to Article 

 LXVII, the right of calling for a plebiscite is 

 granted to the King alone, who is empowered 

 on his own motion to lay before the people for 

 approval or rejection, by a general vote, any bill 

 that has been passed by Parliament, or any 

 legislative proposal on which Parliament has 

 not yet taken action. The King has under the 

 Constitution the right of naming and dismissing 

 ministers ; of dissolving the Chambers ; and of 

 withholding his signature and refusing to sanc- 

 tion bills that have been passed. Beyond a cer- 

 tain discretion in the selection of the politician 

 whom he thinks able to command a majority in 

 the Chamber in situations when party politics 

 is in a confused state, he has no prerogative. 

 The ministers determine on a dissolution only in 

 case of a parliamentary defeat. The royal veto 

 on legislation is a dead letter. It has never 

 been exercised. The popular veto invited at the 

 discretion of the King, by the advice of his re- 

 sponsible ministers for the counter-signature of 

 the ministers would be necessary to an appeal 

 to the referendum was strongly opposed by 

 Frere-Orban and the rest of the old doctrinaire 

 school, who declared that it would destroy the 

 value and efficiency of a Chamber composed of 

 the selected and trained political guides of the 

 people to have its decisions reversed by the igno- 

 rant masses; and that for the King to descend 

 into the arena of party politics and contend with 

 the parliamentary majority, appealing to the 

 support of a popular majority, would extinguish 

 the principle of the irresponsibility of the sover- 

 eign and lower the dignity and prestige of the 

 throne. M. de Laveleye, on the other hand, 

 defended the referendum in a remarkable series 

 of articles written just before his death. His 

 principal argument in its favor is as follows : 



The referendum is the only means left to the King 

 to exercise his right of veto. Take any treatise upon 

 public legislation. There is not one which fails to 

 recognize that the royal veto is a necessary preroga- 

 tive of the crown in a constitutional Government. 

 But under the present system of parliamentary repre- 

 sentation it is a dead letter ; thus, a principle which 

 science declares indispensable to constitutional royalty 

 has, in point of fact, ceased to exist. 



In England, where we look for our model of a par- 

 liamentary regime, the veto has not been employed 

 since 1707 under Queen Anne. In his well-known 

 work, " The English Constitution," Bagehot says that 

 it is not imagined in England that the Queen could 

 withhold her consent from a law voted by Parliament. 

 And it is the same everywhere. The veto as a weapon 

 is as completely out of date as the silex of prehistoric 

 times. 



Should we desire, however, in accordance with the 

 teaching of science, that the veto should be an effect- 

 ual instrument in the hands of the King, a real power 

 and not the phantom of a right, we must allow him 

 the means, before using it, of consulting the nation. 

 If the result be unfavoi-able to the law, the King may, 

 in all security, withhold his sanction. If, on the con- 

 trary, the people approve, the King can yield to their 

 will clearly expressed. 



The President of the United States may make use 

 of the veto without misgiving, because his office is 

 temporary. For a hereditary monarch the case is 



different. An unpopular veto carried into effect in 

 opposition to the wishes of the majority of the nation 

 may weigh upon an entire reign and even compromise 

 the future of a dynasty. It was the employment of 

 the veto by Louis XVI which gave the first blow to 

 the French monarchy in 1790 before any one, Robes- 

 pierre included, had thought of proclaiming a re- 

 public. 



The King accedes to the throne in virtue of the law 

 of succession. He has no means of bringing himself 

 in touch with his people. If he has recourse to the 

 veto he may appear to be actuated by motives of per 

 sonal or dynastic interests, though he may have noth- 

 ing else in view than the pure advancement of the na- 

 tion. For this reason he abstains from using it. 



While Paul Janson was as earnest an advocate 

 of the referendum as M. Beernaert, the Prime 

 Minister, M. Woeste, leader of the Extreme 

 Right, was as strongly opposed to it as M. Frere- 

 Orban. The friends of the project did not ex- 

 pect that the procedure would be resorted to ex- 

 cept very rarely, but believed that it would prove 

 a safeguard against unpopular measures which 

 have many times been thrust upon the country 

 against its manifest desire. Dissolution of the 

 Chambers is a measure which is not often resort- 

 ed to in Belgium, and when it occurs the legisla- 

 tive question that precipitated it is liable to be 

 swamped by the multifarious interests of party 

 politics. Often the King has been besieged with 

 petitions praying him to veto unpopular meas- 

 ures. With the referendum at his disposal he 

 could lay the question befoi'e the people, who 

 could ratify or reject a particular law, such as 

 the sudden reversal of the Liberal educational 

 policy by the Conservatives when they came into 

 power, without plunging the country into an 

 electoral contest. 



The debate on revision was opened on April 26. 

 The Chamber agreed to submit most of the pro- 

 posed articles to revision. For the revision of 

 Article XLVII, which opens up the question of 

 universal suffrage, the vote was almost unani- 

 mous. As an alternative to an unrestricted fran- 

 chise M. Janson had declared his willingness to 

 accept household suffrage rather than endanger 

 revision. The submission of Article XXVI to 

 amendment that is, the consideration of the ref- 

 erendum was approved by a vote of 78 to 48. 

 The proposals for the proportional representa- 

 tion of minorities and the adjudication of con- 

 tested elections by the courts were, however, de- 

 feated, and M. Beernaert contemplated resigning 

 because a section of the Catholic party had de- 

 serted him. He declared that he and his col- 

 leagues would resign before the elections if the 

 .Right persisted in preventing the question of the 

 referendum from being laid before the electors, 

 and on March 24 the Right signified their sub- 

 mission by passing a vote of confidence. After 

 the decision of the Chambers in favor of revision 

 they were dissolved in accordance with the Con- 

 stitution, and new elections had to be held in 

 time to have the new Parliament meet within 

 forty days after the dissolution. It was the first 

 dissolution in the history of the country that fell 

 at the regular biennial period when half the 

 Chamber had in any case to be renewed. The 

 new Chambers constituted a Constituent Assem- 

 bly in which two thirds of the members were re- 

 quired to be present for the discussion of any 

 amendment to the Constitution, and a two-third 



