214 



CONNECTICUT. 



acts inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed." Thus 

 the law was at the last election that no ballot could be 

 lawfully rejected for being double unless it appeared 

 that the several ballots in the same envelope were for 

 different candidates for the same office. That fact, if 

 it exists, being essential to a legal cause for rejection, 

 must be " stated specifically in the certificate." On 

 the face of the certificates, therefore, these ballots seem 

 to have been illegally rejected. 



Discussing the effect of marks upon the bal- 

 lots, the court said : 



There are two classes of marks : one is where a 

 plausible reason is or may be suggested for their ex- 

 istence consistent with honesty and good faith ; the 

 other, where no such reason can be suggested. The 

 former will rarely be allowed to invalidate a ballot un- 

 less it appears that it was in fact used for corrupt pur- 

 poses : the latter, unexplained, will generally be pre- 

 sumed to be for corrupt purposes. 



The legality of those ballots printed with the word 

 " For " prefixed to the name of the office, in the ab- 

 sence ot any finding that they were so printed for the 

 purpose of identification, etc., has been affirmed by 

 this court. Such of these votes as were counted were 

 properly counted. Those that were rejected should 

 now be counted. 



The folded or creased ballots in the town of East 

 Lyme were each folded precisely alike, and in a strik- 

 ingly unusual manner. It is difficult to imagine any 

 legitimate purpose for which these ballots could have 

 been so folded. They should be rejected. 



In New Haven there were nineteen Republican bal- 

 lots, with each of which were found in the envelope a 

 printed circular from the Republican town committee 

 advising the voter to vote early, and giving the loca- 

 tion of the voting place, etc. There are so many of 

 these votes as to preclude the idea that they were the 

 result of ignorance, accident, or mistake. That leaves 

 the presumption pretty strong that the circulars were 

 there by design. If by design, it is difficult to con- 

 ceive of any nonest motive for it. We think these 

 votes should be rejected. 



Of the 126 ballots rejected in the town of Bridge- 

 port, for the reason that they had thereon marks, 

 which were supposed to have been for the purpose of 

 identifying them, 124 should be counted, as jt now 

 appears that the supposed marks were accidentally 

 caused in printing. 



With these and other instructions of less im- 

 portance set forth at length in the opinion, the 

 case was remanded to the Superior Court. A 

 minority of two judges dissented from so much 

 of the decision as relates to the " so-called " double 

 ballots. Under the majority opinion, the Su- 

 perior Court, in the absence of further evidence, 

 will be compelled to declare that Mr. Phelan had 

 not received a majority of the votes cast, thereby 

 justifying the Republicans of the House in refus- 

 ing to declare his election. The case of Sanger 

 vs. Henry followed the same course as that of Phe- 

 lan vs. Walsh, and the above-quoted opinion in 

 terms covered both cases. 



Decision. Early in the year an action was 

 brought by the State Attorney of Hartford 

 County against Comptroller Staub, to compel 

 the latter to distribute to the several towns the 

 money coming into his hands for school pur- 

 poses. As the General Assembly of 1891 had 

 refused to make a special appropriation author- 

 izing such distribution, the Comptroller was ad- 

 vised that he could not safely draw his warrant 

 for the money ; but the State Supreme Court, 

 late in March, rendered a decision in the above- 

 mentioned case, which in effect legalizes such 

 distribution. The court found that there was a 



direct conflict between section 2,228 of the Gen- 

 eral Statutes, which orders the annual distribu- 

 tion to the towns of the income of the school 

 fund and of $1.50 for each child of school age, 

 and other provisions of law which require the 

 General Assembly to make specific appropria- 

 tions for all purposes authorized by law, and 

 forbid expenditures by any department beyond 

 the limit of such specific appropriations. The 

 court says : 



One law says to the Comptroller: " You shall settle 

 all demands against the State for the expense of car- 

 rying on its government." The other law says: 

 " You shall draw no order upon the Treasury." 

 Obedience to one law involves a violation of the 

 other. Acting is unlawful. Refusing to act is un- 

 lawful. If tins is the real condition, if the conflicting 

 laws can not be reconciled by a reasonable construc- 

 tion, then the paramount law must control. One law 

 can not be said to repeal the other, for both were 

 passed at the same time ; both are contained in the 

 General Statutes, and took eftect at the same moment. 

 The paramount must control. The command to pro- 

 vide for the essential operations of government must 

 prevail against a rule of procedure in applying the 

 funds raised by taxation for the support of the gov- 

 ernment. 



If, notwithstanding what has been so well said, 

 there should be some lingering suspicion that the 

 prohibitory parts of the act under consideration were 

 still in force, there is another view which is wholly 

 conclusive. The omission by the General Assembly 

 to pass any special appropriations has been so long 

 continued that it must be regarded as intentional. 

 The General Assembly is always presumed to know 

 all the existing statutes, and the effect that its action 

 or nonaction will have upon any one of them; and 

 it is always presumed to have intended that effect 

 which its action or nonaction produces. The neglect 

 of the Assembly of 1891 to observe the mandatory 

 provisions of the special appropriation act may be 

 construed in one of two ways. It may be held to be 

 equivalent to an affirmative enactment suspending 

 the prohibitory parts of the act, or it may t>e con- 

 strued as a design by the General Assembly to pre- 

 vent the carrying on of the State government. The 

 latter is something altogether too extravagant to be 

 admitted. We think the former is the proper mean- 

 ing; and that the omission by the General Assembly 

 to pass any appropriation bills, being intentional, 

 operates, and was intended to operate, as a legislative 

 construction that all the prohibitions contained in the 

 act were suspended. 



* We conclude, therefore, that there is nothing in 

 the special appropriation act to prevent the respond- 

 ent from obeying the command of the alternative 

 writ. With the apparent prohibition contained in 

 that act removed, the command in the said section 

 2,228 applies to him in full force. In observing that 

 command the respondent will strictly obey a grant 

 and order of the General Assembly. 



Pursuant to this decision, the Comptroller, in 

 a circular letter of May 17, modified the rule 

 which, under legal advice, he had adopted in 

 July, 1891, and announced his course in drawing 

 future warrants as follows: 



Believing that the opinion of the court was in- 

 tended as advice to now adjust all claims heretofore 

 covered by the usual appropriation acts in the same 

 manner as if the laws establishing a system of special 

 appropriation had been repealed, and that such advice 

 will be held to protect him in now adjusting claims 

 classed in the circular of July 15 as " demands that 

 can not be lawfully adjusted and settled until further 

 action of the Legislature," the Comptroller has de- 

 cided to adjust and settle all such claims. 



