BRA/IL. 



103 



their resignations ami pnlili>hed their reasons. 

 Tin 1 former accused the Vice-President of em- 

 Iwrkinu in the civil war in H frivolous manner, 

 <<! i lint the operations hud been badly 

 planned and conducted, and that no reasons ex- 

 i-irii fur their continuation, and said that he 

 mwilling to share any longer the responsi- 

 bility for the acts of the Government. The Fi- 

 nance. Minister staled that Vice-President Peixo- 

 to had ignored his warning to use the utmost 

 frugality in expenditures, and had issued a de- 

 o narrowing the functions of the court of 

 aer. milts as to make it worthless as an organ for 

 the control of the financial administration. 

 Itear-Admiral Chaves was induced to take 

 charge of the Ministry of Marine, and Minister 

 1- Ye ire, who had recently entered the Cabinet, 

 took the portfolio of Finance, while continuing 

 to direct the Foreign Office. He was relieved of 

 the duties of the latter post on July 1, when 

 JoSo Pereiro was appointed Minister of Foreign 

 Affairs. 



Revolt of the Navy. Though the rebellion 

 was kept down in Rio Grande do Sul by the 

 military power of the Government, it was not 

 crushed out. In July similar uprisings broke 

 out and gained headway in Entre Rios, Santa 

 Catharina, Corrientes, and other such move- 

 ments were on foot in other States. The ap- 

 proaching presidential election in October set in 

 motion the plots and schemes of ambitious poli- 

 ticians, revived the burning questions of State 

 rights or parliamentarism and the limits of ex- 

 ecutive power, fanned the smoldering jealousy 

 between the army and the navy, inspired ex- 

 travagant rumors of dictatorial purposes and 

 tales of the despotic abuse of his office by the 

 President and of monarchical or separatist de- 

 signs of the Opposition, and generally wrought 

 political passions up to a fever heat. Admiral 

 Mello's dramatic withdrawal from the Cabinet, 

 and the manifesto in which he attacked Peixoto, 

 were ascribed to his ambition to become the 

 next President. The animosity of the navy 

 against Peixoto was intensified by his treatment 

 of Wandenkolk, whom he was determined to 

 have tried by court-martial. The officers of the 

 navy had shown their sympathy with the Fed- 

 erals in the southern province by electing Wan- 

 denkolk, when the object of his mission became 

 known, president of their club. A large section 

 of Historic Republicans, led by Ruy Barbosa, 

 and including other members of the old Pro- 

 visional Government, were strongly opposed to 

 the President's policy of interfering in the in- 

 ternal affairs of the States. When the President 

 and his advisers were on the point of hauling 

 ex- Admiral Wandenkolk before a military tribu- 

 nal, Ruy Barbosa sued for a habeas corpus in 

 his behalf, and in the proceedings the executive 

 officials incensed the navy by treating Wanden- 

 kolk with indignity. The President was charged 

 publicly with having intimidated the Supreme 

 Court and preventing his release on bail. The 

 Senate took action in the matter, and by vote of a 

 small majority decided that Wandenkolk should 

 be tried by the regular courts. In Brazil, as gen- 

 erally in the South American republics, a Presi- 

 dent is not eligible for re-election for the next 

 succeeding term. Peixoto was not an elected 

 President, but as Vice-President succeeded to 



the duties of the office on the resignation of 

 Deodoro da Fonseca, in No\cml>er, 1891. There- 

 fore he did not come under the rule, and he and 

 his friends used the influence and power of the 

 Government to secure his election as regular 

 President. His opponents carried through a bill 

 prohibiting a Vice-President who acts as Presi- 

 dent from being a candidate. This he vetoed. 

 Many of the old Republicans stood on the side of 

 the President, who was also supported by a large 

 part of the former Conservative party, was espe- 

 cially popular in the central and southern States, 

 and had the army and the whole power of the Gov- 

 ernment under his control. Others of the Re- 

 publicans considered that the civil war and dis- 

 order in various States was caused by the un- 

 constitutional policy and revolutionary acts of 

 the Government. The clericals and secret foes 

 of the republic naturally opposed the Govern- 

 ment. As the time of the election approached, 

 hostility to Peixoto and his acts increased, but 

 the dangerous revolutionary spirit that pre- 

 vailed caused a great many who condemned his 

 policy to rally to his support. The naval forces 

 had taken the initiative in the deposition of 

 Fonseca, and the navy was more exasperated 

 against the acting President than it had been 

 against his predecessor. In the Navy Club a 

 number of officers conspired together, laid plans 

 for a stroke of the same character as that by 

 which the Fonseca dictatorship was overthrown, 

 and took into their confidence others of like 

 mind and spirit. 



On the evening of Sept. 5, while the officers of 

 the fleet anchored in the harbor at Rio were at 

 the opera, Admiral Mello, with several of his 

 friends, went on board the " Aquidaban " first, 

 and then to the other war ships, and completed 

 arrangements by which his flag was raised on 

 the " Aquidaban," and every Government vessel 

 in the port was under his orders. The fleet con- 

 sisted of the "Aquidaban," "Republica," "Tra- 

 jano," "Marajo," "Javari," "Orion," "Madeira," 

 " Marcilio Diaz," " Sete de Setembro," " Almi- 

 rante Tamandare," " Amazonas," and 6 torpedo 

 boats, besides towboats, 4 merchant steamers, 

 and several steam launches. In the following 

 morning he sent a message to President Peixoto 

 demanding his resignation and the surrender of 

 the Government offices within six hours. Instead 

 of yielding, as Mello expected, Peixoto defied 

 the naval squadron, and took vigorous measures 

 to frustrate the revolution, for which the Con- 

 gress gave him legal authority and voted sup- 

 plies. The flower of the Brazilian army had 

 been kept in Rio in anticipation of such an 

 emergency. There were about 6,000 troops, 

 which were distributed in the fortifications and 

 strategic points of the bay to prevent a landing. 

 The infantry were armed with Mauser and 

 Mannlicher rifles. A considerable force of in- 

 fantry and artillery was sent by a detour to 

 occupy Nictheroy, or Praia Grande, the capital 

 of the State of Rio Janeiro, on the opposite side 

 of the bay, in order to keep open communica- 

 tions with the fortress of Santa Cruz, which 

 guards the entrance to the harbor. The garri- 

 son of this fort remained stanchly true to the 

 Government, and was prepared to execute its 

 orders to sink any of the ships that came with- 

 in range of the guns. The garrison of Fort 



