CHINA. 



125 



Shanghai, accompanied by an interpreter of the 

 Chinese legation at Tokio, and having for his 

 traveling companion a Korean noble, who, on 

 Feb. 28, shot Kim dead in their hotel, and the 

 Chinese authorities, instead of arresting the 

 murderer when he avowed that he had com- 

 mitted the murder by order of the King of 

 Korea, gave him passage in a Chinese man-of- 

 war to Seoul with the corpse of his victim, where 

 it was mutilated and exposed to public view. 

 Plots of assassination had several times been 

 concocted against Kim and against other actors 

 in 1he revolutionary attempt of 1884, 3 of whom 

 had fled over sea to California to escape their 

 vengeful countrymen. Kim himself had been 

 kept away on a remote island in the Pacific for 

 years, and soon after his return to Japan was 

 enticed to China by an artful and intricate 

 snare in which high Chinese officials were sus- 

 pected of having a part. His murderer, a rela- 

 tive of one of the Korean ministers who were 

 massacred in 1884, was a man of cosmopolitan 

 finish recently returned from Europe. Another 

 plot was discovered at this time in Tokio which 

 aimed at the life of Boku Eiko, another Korean 

 exile who had been taken under the protection 

 of the Japanese Government; and when the 

 murderers were balked by the Japanese authori- 

 ties they took refuge in the Korean legation, 

 which at first refused to deliver them over to 

 Japanese justice. When the Korean minister 

 did surrender them he took a hasty and secret 

 departure, as if he were an accomplice in the 

 murder of Kim Ok Kiun. 



Both China and Japan had secretly violated 

 the terms of their agreement, and prepared for 

 a contest over Korea and a trial of strength be- 

 tween the young militant power that had for- 

 tified itself with all the resources of the modern 

 art of war and the colossal empire that relied 

 on the spirit of its ancient civilization and the 

 enormous preponderance of its resources in 

 wealth and population. The contest had been 

 foreseen by the statesmen of both countries. 

 Japan had made deliberate preparations, and 

 was able to choose the moment to strike the 

 blow when China was weakened by the divided 

 counsels, intriguing cabals, and disorganization 

 and corrupt maladministration following upon 

 the accession of a new and inexperienced ruler. 

 While Chinese soldiers were settled in Korea in 

 the guise of mechanics and traders, ready to de- 

 fend Chinese interests if the pro-Japanese party 

 attempted a new revolution, the Japanese intel- 

 ligence department had gone to work more 

 sagaciously, studying the topography of Korea 

 so thoroughly that pontoon trains could be con- 

 structed of the exact width of the rivers. Otori, 

 one of the most distinguished of Japanese diplo- 

 matists, was transferred in 1893 from Pekin to 

 Seoul, and there he collected evidence of the 

 grievances of Japanese merchants. Before the 

 rebellion broke out in Chulla persons who took 

 part in the subsequent military operations were 

 in consultation with the Japanese minister and 

 with the authorities at Tokio : and although 

 the popular cry of the revolt was " Eastern civ- 

 ilization," and all foreign influence was decried, 

 and the Japanese were singled out for execra- 

 tion, one of the leaders was a noied Japanese 

 swordsman. 



The Japanese Government gave notice of the 

 sending of troops to Korea on June 3, and within 

 a week a force of 5,000 men, with their arms, 

 stores, and equipment, were landed on the west 

 coast. On the pretext of escorting the Japanese 

 minister on his return to Seoul on June 9, and 

 then of guarding the Japanese legation, and 

 then of releasing the men from their confinement 

 on board ship, the troops were debarked and 

 disposed so as to command the capital and all 

 the roads leading to it, and every military pre- 

 caution was taken, as though they were in the 

 face of an enemy. On June 28 Mr. Otori sent a 

 note to the Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs 

 pointing out that in the treaty of Kanghwa in 

 1876, and in subsequent treaties, the King had 

 represented himself as an independent sovereign, 

 yet in notifying the dispatch of troops to Korea, 

 the Chinese minister in Tokio had declared that 

 it was done in fulfillment of China's obligation 

 to protect her vassal state ; therefore he de- 

 manded to know whether Korea was an inde- 

 pendent state. On June 30 he received the 

 evasive reply that Korea had scrupulously ful- 

 filled her treaty engagements and given Japan 

 no ground of "complaint, and that the Korean 

 Government was not accountable for language 

 held by the Chinese minister at the Mikado's 

 court. On July 3 Mr. Otori presented a note 

 deploring the disorders in a country close to her 

 shores in which Japan felt a deep interest, and 

 submitting a scheme of reform on the details of 

 which he would consult with a commission that 

 the King must appoint forthwith. The scheme 

 was divided into the following general heads : 

 (1) The civil government in the capital and the 

 provinces must be thoroughly reformed and the 

 departments arranged under proper responsible 

 heads. (2) The resources of the country must 

 be developed by opening the mines, construct- 

 ing railroads, etcs " (3) The laws of the country 

 must be radically reformed. (4) The military 

 forces must be reorganized under competent in- 

 structors, so as to render the country secure 

 both from internal disorder and external attack. 

 (5) Education must be thoroughly reformed, and 

 conformed to modern ideas and methods. The 

 King's ministers delayed his answer, and, when 

 importuned by Mr. Otori, appointed three offi- 

 cials with power merely to ascertain his views, 

 and finally, under the spur of an ultimatum, 

 clothed them with authority to decide on a defi- 

 nite programme of reform in consultation with 

 the Japanese minister. When the commission 

 met him, on July 10, he unfolded a plan for the 

 political and social reconstruction of the country 

 on the model of modern Japan : All officials to 

 be appointed for merit and ability, irrespective 

 of birth or rank ; the judiciary and administra- 

 tion to be made distinct and separate branches ; 

 ministers of state to have authority to act on 

 their own responsibility, they consulting the 

 Prime Minister, and he the King, only in matters 

 of high import ; the Foreign Customs Office 

 (conducted under the supervision of the Chinese 

 Imperial Customs, and therefore an evidence of 

 vassalage) to be abolished ; all foreign advisers 

 to be dispensed with ; a system of public educa- 

 tion to be introduced, beginning at the primary 

 school and culminating in the university ; rail- 

 roads and telegraphs to be built and a Govern- 



