104 BIOLOGY AND PHYSICAL SCIENCES 



game world as such, and reacts as in presence 

 of that world, whether it be real or unreal. 



In concluding this lecture let us survey the 

 progress made in our discussion. We have 

 seen that the idea of the physical universe as 

 a world of self-existent matter and energy 

 is only a temporary working hypothesis by 

 means of which we are able to introduce a 

 certain amount of order and coherence into 

 a large part of our experience. The fact that, 

 as shown in the last lecture, this hypothesis 

 breaks down in connection with the pheno 

 mena of life need not, therefore, puzzle us. 

 The phenomena of life involve another and 

 radically different conception of reality, and I 

 have endeavoured to define this conception, 

 and point out that it is actually used as a 

 working hypothesis by biologists, and that by 

 its means we introduce order and intelligibility 

 into biology, whereas there is no such order 

 or intelligibility if the mechanistic theory of 

 life be adopted. The idea of life is nearer to 

 reality than the ideas of matter and energy, 

 and therefore the presupposition of ideal 

 biology is that inorganic can ultimately be 

 resolved into organic phenomena, and that 



