18 MOKALS AND MORAL SENTIMENTS. 



his attack against this last. But would it not have been 

 well if he had referred to the &quot; Principles of Psychology,&quot; 

 where this last hypothesis is set forth at length, before 

 criticising it? Would it not have been well to have 

 given an abstract of rny own description of the process, 

 instead of substituting what he supposes my description 

 must be ? Any one who turns to the &quot; Principles of Psy 

 chology &quot; (first edition, pp. 218-245), and reads the two 

 chapters, The Perception of Body as presenting Statical 

 Attributes, and The Perception of Space, will find that 

 Mr. Hutton s account of my view on this matter has 

 given him no notion of the view as it is expressed by me ; 

 and will, perhaps, be less inclined to smile than he was 

 when he read Mr. Hutton s account. I cannot here do 

 more than thus imply the invalidity of such part of Mr. 

 Hutton s argument as proceeds upon this incorrect repre 

 sentation. The pages that would be required for properly 

 explaining the doctrine that space-intuitions result from 

 organized experiences may be better used for explaining 

 this analogous doctrine at present before us. This I will 

 now endeavor to do ; not indirectly by correcting misap 

 prehensions, but directly by an exposition which shall be 

 as brief as the extremely involved nature of the process 

 allows. 



An infant in arms, that is old enough to gaze at 

 objects around with some vague recognition, smiles in 

 response to the laughing face and soft, caressing voice of 

 its mother. Let there come some one who, with an angry 

 face, speaks to it in loud, harsh tones. The smile dis 

 appears, the features contract into an expression of pain, 

 and, beginning to cry, it turns away its head and makes 

 such movements of escape as are possible. What is the 

 meaning of these facts ? Why does not the frown make 

 it smile, and the mother s laugh make it weep ? There 



