26 MORALS AND MORAL SENTIMENTS. 



the idea of reprobation, human and divine, and the sense 

 of satisfaction, partly vague, partly specific, associated 

 with the idea of approbation, human and divine. 



But during the growth of that civilization which has 

 been made possible by these ego-altruistic sentiments, 

 there have been slowly evolving the altruistic sentiments. 

 Development of these has gone on only as fast as society 

 has advanced to a state in which the activities are mainly 

 peaceful. The root of all the altruistic sentiments is 

 sympathy ; and sympathy could become dominant only 

 when the mode of life, instead of being one that habitually 

 inflicted direct pain, .became one which conferred direct 

 and indirect benefits; the pains inflicted being mainly 

 incidental and indirect. Adam Smith made a large step 

 toward this truth when he recognized sympathy as giving 

 rise to these superior controlling emotions. His &quot; Theory 

 of Moral Sentiments,&quot; however, requires to be supple 

 mented in two ways. The natural process by which 

 sympathy becomes developed into a more and more im 

 portant element of human nature, has to be explained ; 

 and there has also to be explained the process by which 

 sympathy produces the highest and most complex of the 

 altruistic sentiments that of justice. Respecting the 

 first process, I can here do no more than say that sym 

 pathy may be proved, both inductively and deductively, 

 to be the concomitant of gregariousness ; the two having 

 all along increased by reciprocal aid. Multiplication has 

 ever tended to force into an association, more or less close, 

 all creatures having kinds of food and supplies of food 

 that permit association ; and established psychological 

 laws warrant the inference that some sympathy will 

 inevitably result from habitual manifestations of feelings 



v O 



in presence of one another, and that the gregariousness 

 being augmented by the increase of sympathy, further 



