10 MORALS AND MOEAL SENTIMENTS. 



recent &quot; Genesis of Species,&quot; has been similarly betrayed 

 into misapprehensions. And now Sir Alexander Grant, 

 following the same lead, has conveyed to the readers of 

 the Fortnightly Review another of these conceptions, 

 which is but very partially true. Thus I find myself 

 compelled to say as much as will serve to prevent further 

 spread of the mischief. 



If a general doctrine concerning a highly-involved 

 class of phenomena could be adequately presented in a 

 single paragraph of a letter, the writing of books would 

 be superfluous. In the brief exposition of certain ethical 

 doctrines held by me, which is given in Prof. Bain s 

 &quot; Mental and Moral Science,&quot; it is stated that they are 



&quot;as yet nowhere fully expressed. They form part of the more gen 

 eral doctrine of Evolution which he is engaged in working out ; and 

 they are at present to be gathered only from scattered passages. It 

 is true that, in his first work, Social Statics, he presented w r hat ho 

 then regarded as a tolerably complete view of one division of Morals. 

 But, without abandoning this view, he now regards it as inadequate 

 more especially in respect of its basis.&quot; 



Mr. Button, however, taking the bare enunciation of 

 one part of this basis, deals with it critically ; and, in the 

 absence of any exposition of it by me, sets forth what he 

 supposes to be my grounds for it, and proceeds to show 

 that they are unsatisfactory. 



If, in his anxiety to suppress what he doubtless re 

 gards as a pernicious doctrine, Mr. Hutton could not wait 

 until I had explained myself, it might have been expected 

 that he would use whatever information was to be had 

 for rightly construing it. So far from seeking out such 

 information, however, he has, in a way for which I can 

 not account, ignored the information immediately before 

 him. 



