OVER-CREDIT BY ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS. 121 



as it was. Though he has asserted new uniformities, I do 

 not think scientific men will admit that he has so demonstrated 

 them, as to make the induction more certain ; nor has he 

 deductively established the doctrine, by showing that uni 

 formity of relation is a necessary corollary from the per 

 sistence of force, as may readily be shown. 



These, then, are the pre-established general truths with 

 which M. Comte sets out truths which cannot be regarded 

 as distinctive of his philosophy. &quot; But why,&quot; it will perhaps 

 be asked, &quot; is it needful to point out this ; seeing that no 

 instructed reader supposes these truths to be peculiar to M. 

 Comte?&quot; I reply that though no disciple of M. Comte 

 would deliberately claim them for him ; and though no 

 theological antagonist at all familiar with science and philo- 

 phy, supposes M. Comte to be the first propounder of them ; 

 yet there is so strong a tendency to associate any doctrines 

 with the name of a conspicuous recent exponent of them, 

 that false impressions are produced, even in spite of better 

 knowledge. Of the need for making this reclamation, 

 definite proof is at hand. In the No. of the Revue des Deux 

 Mondes named at the commencement, may be found, on p. 936, 

 the words &quot; Toute religion, comme toute philosophie, a la 

 prevention de donner une explication de 1 univers. La 

 philosophie qui s appelle positive se distingue de toutes les 

 philosophies et de toutes les religions en ce qu elle a renonce 

 a, cette ambition de 1 esprit humain ;&quot; and the remainder of 

 the paragraph is devoted to explaining the doctrine of the 

 relativity of knowledge. The next paragraph begins 

 &quot; Tout imbu de ces idees, que nous exposons sans les discuter 

 pour le moment, M. Spencer divise, etc.&quot; Now this is one 

 of those collocations of ideas which tends to create, or to 

 strengthen, the erroneous impression I would dissipate. I do 

 not for a moment suppose that M. Laugel intended to say 

 that these ideas which he describes as ideas of the &quot; Positive 

 Philosophy,&quot; are peculiarly the ideas of M. Comte. But 

 6 



