REASONS FOE DISSENTING FROM COMTE. 



une seulc grande entite ge- 

 nerale, la nature, envisagee 

 comme la source unique de 

 tous les phenomenes. Pa- 

 reillemcnt, la perfection du 

 systemc positif , vers laquclle 

 il tend sans cesse, quoiqu il 

 soit tres-probable qu il ne 

 doive jamais 1 atteindre, 

 serait de pouvoir se repre- 

 senter tous les divers phe&quot;- 

 nomenes obscrvables comme 

 des cas particuliers d un 

 scul fait general, tel quo 

 celui de la gravitation, par 

 cxcmple.&quot; p. 5. 



&quot;...la perfection du sys- 

 feme positif, vers laquelle 

 il tend sans cesse, quoiqu il 

 soit tres-probable qu il ne 

 doive jamais 1 atteindre, 

 serait de pouvoir se repre- 

 senter tous les divers phe 

 nomenes observables comme 

 des cas particuliers d un 

 seul fait general, p. 5 ... 

 . . . considerant comme ab- 

 solument inaccessible, et 

 vide de sens pour nous la 

 recherche de ce qu on. ap- 

 pelle les causes, soit pre 

 mieres, soit finales.&quot; p. 14. 



idea was distinguished. The alleged 

 last term of the metaphysical system 

 the conception of a single great 

 general entity, nature, as the source 

 of all phenomena is a conception 

 identical with the previous one : the 

 consciousness of a single source which, 

 in coming to be regarded as universal, 

 ceases to be regarded as conceivable, 

 differs in nothing but name from the 

 consciousness of one being, mani 

 fested in all phenomena. And simi 

 larly, that which is described as the 

 ideal state of science the power to 

 represent all observable phenomena 

 as particular cases of a single general 

 fact, implies the postulating of some 

 ultimate existence of which this 

 single fact is alleged ; and the postu 

 lating of this ultimate existence, 

 involves a state of consciousness in 

 distinguishable from the other two. 



Though along with the extension 

 of generalizations, and concomitant 

 integration of conceived causal agen 

 cies, the conceptions of causal agencies 

 grow more indefinite ; and though as 

 they gradually coalesce into a uni 

 versal causal agency, they cease to be 

 representable in thought, and arc 

 no longer supposed to be comprehen 

 sible ; yet the consciousness of cause 

 remains as dominant to the last as it 

 was at first; and can never be got 

 rid of. The consciousness of cause 

 can. be abolished only by abolishing 

 consciousness itself.* {First Princi 

 ples, 26.) 



* Possibly it will be said that M. Comte himself admits, that what he calls the 

 perfection of the positive system, will probably never be reached ; and that what 

 lie condemns is the inquiry into the natures of causes and not the general recog 

 nition of cause. To the first of these allegations, I reply tnat, as I understand 

 M. Comte, the obstacle to the perfect realization of the positive philosophy is the 

 impossibility of carrying generalization so far as to reduce all particular facts to 



