THE WORLD GOVERNED BY FEELINGS. 



125 



&quot; Ce n cst pas aux Icc- 

 teurs de cct ouvrage quo je 

 croirai jamais devoir prou- 

 ver que les idees gouverncnt 

 ct bouleversent le monde, 

 ou, en d autres termes, que 

 tout le mecanisme social 

 repose fmalement sur des 

 opinions. Us savent surtout 

 que la grande crise politique 

 ct morale des societes ac- 

 tuelles tient, en derniere 

 analyse, a 1 anarchie intel- 

 lectuelle.&quot; p. 48.* 



Ideas do not govern and overthrow 

 the world : the world is governed or 

 overthrown by feelings, to which 

 ideas serve only as guides. The 

 social mechanism does not rest finally 

 upon opinions; but almost wholly up 

 on character. Not intellectual anar- 

 chy, but moral antagonism, is the 

 cause of political crises. All social 

 phenomena are produced by the to 

 tality of human emotions and beliefs : 

 of which the emotions are mainly 

 pie-determined, while the beliefs are 

 mainly post-determined. Men s de 

 sires are chiefly inherited ; but their 

 beliefs are chiefly acquired, and depend 

 on surrounding conditions ; and the 

 most important surrounding condi 

 tions depend on the social state which 

 the prevalent desires have produced. 

 The social state at any time existing, 

 is the resultant of all the ambitions, 

 self-interests, fears, reverences, in 

 dignations, sympathies, etc., of an 

 cestral citizens and existing citizens. 

 The ideas current in this social state, 

 must, on the average, be congruous 

 with the feelings of citizens ; and 

 therefore, on the average, with the 

 social state these feelings have pro- 

 cases of one general fact not the impossibility of excluding the consciousness of 

 cause. And to the second allegation I reply, that the essential principle of his 

 philosophy, is an avowed ignoring of cause altogether. For if it is not, what be 

 comes of his alleged distinction between the perfection of the positive system and the 

 perfection of the metaphysical system ? And here let me point out that, by affirm 

 ing exactly the opposite to that which M. Comte thus affirms, I am excluded 

 from the positive school. If his own definition of positivism is to be taken, 

 then, as I hold that what he defines as positivism is an absolute impossibility, 

 it is clear that I cannot be what he calls a positivist. 



* A friendly critic alleges that M. Comte is not fairly represented by this 

 quotation, and that he is blamed by his biographer, M. Littre, for his too-great 

 insistence on feeling as a motor of humanity. if in his &quot; Positive Politics,&quot; 

 which I presume is here referred to, M. Comte abandons his original position, so 

 much the better. But I am here dealing with what is known as &quot;the Positive 

 Philosophy;&quot; and that the passage above quoted docs not misrepresent it, is. 

 proved by the fact that this doctrine is re-asserted at the commencement of the 

 Sociologv. 



