SERIAL AKKANGEMENT OF THE SCIENCES. 



127 



&quot;En resultat definitif, la 

 mathematique, 1 astronomie, 

 la physique, la chimie, la 

 physiologic, et la physique 

 sociale ; telle cst la formule 

 enclyopedique qui, parmi le 

 tres-grand nombre de clas 

 sifications que comportcnt 

 les six sciences fondamen- 

 tales, est seule logiquement 

 conforme a la hierarchic 

 naturelle et invariable des 

 phenomenes.&quot; p. 115. 



&quot; On conc,oit, en cffet, que 

 1 etude rationelle do chaque 

 science fondamentale exi- 

 geant la culture prealable 

 de toutes celles qui la pre 

 cedent dans notre hierarchic 

 enclyopedique, n a pu faire 

 de progres re&quot;els et prendre 

 son veritable caractere, qu 

 apres un grand developpe- 

 ment des sciences ante- 

 rieures relatives a des phe 

 nomenes plus generaux, plus 

 abstraits, moins compliques, 

 et independans des autres. 

 C est done dans cet ordre 

 que la progression, quoique 

 simultanee, a du avoir lieu.&quot; 

 p. 100. 



The sciences as arranged in this 

 succession specified by M. Comte, do 

 not logically conform to the natural 

 and invariable hierarchy of pheno 

 mena ; and there is no serial order 

 whatever in which they can be placed, 

 which represents either their logical 

 dependence or the dependence of phe 

 nomena. (See Genesis of Science, 

 and foregoing Essay.) 



The historical development of the 

 sciences lias not taken place in this 

 serial order ; nor in any other serial 

 order. There is no &quot;true filiation 

 of the sciences.&quot; From the begin 

 ning, the abstract sciences, the 

 abstract-concrete sciences, and the 

 concrete sciences, have progressed to 

 gether : the first solving problems 

 which the second and third present 

 ed, and growing only by the solution 

 of the problems ; and the second 

 similarly growing by joining the first 

 in solving the problems of the third. 

 All along there has been a continuous 

 action and reaction between the three 

 great classes of sciences an advance 

 from concrete facts to abstract facts, 

 and then an application of such ab 

 stract facts to the analysis of new 

 orders of concrete facts. (See Genesis 

 of Science.} 



Such then are the organizing principles of M. Comte s 

 philosophy. Leaving out of his &quot;Exposition&quot; those pre- 

 established general doctrines which are the common property 

 of modern thinkers ; these are the general doctrines which 

 remain these are the doctrines which fundamentally dis 

 tinguish his system. From every one of them I dissent. 

 To each proposition I oppose either a widely- different pro- 



